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by
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A globalizing world is replete with the vulnerable, who are experiencing economic
poverty, medical maltreatment, political persecution, and/or cultural misrecognition. The
vulnerable are under systematic oppression and domination. Although the wealth of humankind
increases continuously, many are excluded from any benefit of this increased wealth. While
human beings have achieved significant progress in medical technology, uncountable numbers of
people are exposed to a shortage of appropriate medical care. Despite continued expansion of
democracy around the globe, the powerless majority and minorities are experiencing ignorance
of their differences, culturally and/or politically.
This dissertation searches for a viable human rights scheme that will effectively address
the systematic oppression and domination of the vulnerable. By addressing oppression and
domination of the vulnerable, I focus on overcoming several dichotomies: a dichotomy between
transcendence and immanence within human beings, a dichotomy between equality and
difference among human beings, and a dichotomy between individual differences and group
differences. Those dichotomies have been detrimental to addressing systematic oppression and
domination of the vulnerable.
With relation to the dichotomy between transcendence and immanence within human
beings, I frame the vulnerable as concrete others who have both transcendental dimensions and
immanent dimensions. In terms of the dichotomy between equality and difference, my proposal
is equality that substantially promotes difference, that is, capability equality and least-gap

equality. With regard to the dichotomy between individual difference and group difference, my
proposal is multiculturalism based on social individuality. These proposals for overcoming
aforementioned dichotomies converge on social multiculturalism. I have argued that equality
between groups and equality within groups can best address oppression and domination of
concrete others. Specifically, reconfigured basic income guarantee, which includes basic income,
public education, public healthcare, and linguistic diversity, is a concrete form of equality within
groups that is conducive to promoting equality between groups. Therefore, I think that social
multiculturalism based on the reconfigured basic income guarantee is a new, viable version of
addressing oppression and domination of the vulnerable.
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Introduction

The preferential option for the poor and the vulnerable is an overriding concern in my
theological journey. Yet, I have witnessed the significant failure of the social gospel movement,
dispiritedness of liberation theology, and increasing indifference of Christian churches to
systematic oppression of the vulnerable on a global level. Indifference of Christian churches to
liberation theology does not suggest that the preferential option for the poor and the vulnerable is
outdated or inadequate. Churches in general have expressed their deep concern for their ongoing
suffering. In spite of churches‘ concern, however, their approaches have failed in addressing the
problem either on a national or worldwide level. This dissertation searches for a viable
alternative to the failed attempts at addressing a problem that should be the concern of all those
who profess to hold religious and ethical values.
A globalizing world is replete with the vulnerable. Vulnerable people in every part of the
world are experiencing economic poverty, medical maltreatment, political persecution, and/or
cultural misrecognition. Despite the continuous increase of the wealth of humankind, many are
excluded from the benefit of the increased wealth. While human beings have achieved significant
progress in the field of medical technology, uncountable numbers of people are exposed to a
shortage of appropriate medical care. Despite the worldwide expansion of democracy, the
powerless majority or minorities are experiencing ignorance of their differences, culturally
and/or politically. As human history continues its sad oppression and domination of the
vulnerable, the existence of the vulnerable seems to be permanently ingrained in human society,
as if it is an irresolvable phenomenon. Perhaps it is brash to attempt to eradicate the oppressive
system that produces the vulnerable. Nonetheless, that is exactly what I propose: a theory of
1

human rights capable of addressing the phenomenon that produces, maintains, and perpetuates
the vulnerable. My proposal endeavors to address systematic oppression and domination of the
vulnerable.
Who are the vulnerable? Are they the poor, the ill, the colonized, the working classes,
multitude, or people? While the vulnerable share the experience of economic inequality, they
also have differences that do not allow them to be lumped together as people, multitude, or the
other. In order to encompass incompatible differences of the vulnerable, I propose an umbrella
term: concrete others. They are not just the other who has a transcendental dimension which
dictates our respect for their dignity. They are also others who have concrete differences,
protection of which is a concrete way of respecting their dignity. The vulnerable are concrete
others, who experience concrete oppression and domination.
My proposal will set forth a comprehensive theory of human rights for the vulnerable that
shall be known herein as the rights of concrete others.

Synopsis of the Argument
The rights of concrete others aims at addressing inequality and disrespect of the
vulnerable by promoting both difference and equality. In promoting difference, economic
equality plays a constitutive role: economic equality substantially promotes and develops
difference. The rights of concrete others espouses equality that substantially promotes
differences of concrete others. Chapter 2 deals with difference that requires equality and Chapter
3 deals with equality that can substantially promote difference.
When it comes to differences of concrete others, not all differences are to be promoted.
For instance, hegemonic differences are excluded from the protection provided by the rights of

2

concrete others, since their protection perpetuates oppression of differences of the vulnerable.
Conversely, discriminated differences are the focal point of protection under the rights of
concrete others, since such protection challenges disrespect of the colonized or the oppressed.
The rights of concrete others protects differences of the vulnerable.
The difference, which is to be protected by the rights of concrete others, has two
dimensions. One is group difference and the other is individual difference. Considering that
identities are constituted by differences, every individual has both group identity and individual
identity. While an individual‘s group identity and individual identity are distinguishable, they are
in a constitutive relationship in shaping each other. In order to address vulnerability of concrete
others, both identities need to be protected. With relation to group identity, every individual has
group identities as she has interaction with her surrounding society, such as family, community,
and culture. Considering the group identity of every individual, the rights of concrete others
endorses multiculturalism, which in turn, recognizes, encourages, and promotes group identities.
There are different ways to promote multiculturalism in human rights tradition: multiculturalism
through individual rights, group rights, and liberal multiculturalism. Both individual rights and
group rights promote multiculturalism, but individual rights focus exclusively on individual
differences while group rights are mainly concerned with group difference. The two human
rights approaches neglect the constitutive relationship between group identity and individual
identity. Unlike the two approaches, liberal multiculturalism acknowledges the constitutive
relationship between those two identities and attempts to promote both.
In promoting both individual difference and group difference, liberal multiculturalism
adopts two principles: equality between groups and freedom within groups. By espousing
equality between groups, liberal multiculturalism provides resources in order to substantially
3

promote group differences. By adopting freedom within groups, on the other hand, it tries to
prevent individual difference from being infringed by group differences. Though liberal
multiculturalism claims to promote both differences, it fails to promote individual difference
since it endeavors to promote freedom within groups without recourse to equality that
substantiates freedom of all. Without that, liberal multiculturalism may promote the difference of
some individuals, specifically the propertied, but its efforts bypass the propertyless. Liberalism
purportedly prioritizes individual freedom. If, however, it prioritizes individual freedom, all
individuals should have equality that substantiates her freedom. However, liberal theories reveal
a tendency of prioritizing private property over individual freedom. As long as private property
is given a higher priority than individual freedom, propertyless individuals are unable to achieve
their freedom that needs to be substantiated by equality. Thus, liberal multiculturalism cannot
promote two kinds of differences of concrete others. In order to achieve individual freedom of all,
individual freedom must have a higher priority than private property.
A view of human beings as social beings, which I call social individuality, provides a
basis for priority of individual freedom over private property. Social individuality means that
human beings are social and individual in a dialectical way. Human beings are shaped by society
and history. A human being becomes a civilized individual through society and history. At the
same time, an individual is not exclusively determined by a society. A society cannot reduce an
individual to being merely its constituent. A society should not override the dignity of an
individual. While social individuality designates individual dignity as an overriding concern, it
indicates private property as social property. In a society, an individual produces, owns, and
disposes of property, as she interacts with other human beings as well as material and immaterial
resources. Property is created through a variety of interactions, such as among capital, labor, and
4

means of production, to name a few. These property producing elements are socially developed,
accumulated, transmitted, and utilized. For instance, capital is the accumulation of social labor;
means of production is the result of collaboration among scientists, technicians, and workers;
individual labor power is shaped through an institutionalized system of education, which is based
on the generational accumulation of human knowledge and techniques.
Property is thus result of social production that limits the extent of individual property
rights. The common good that works toward respecting the individual dignity of all is the
principle that limits the extent of property rights. Put differently, while liberal individualism
prioritizes private property over individual freedom, social individuality prioritizes individual
freedom over individual property rights in order to respect individual the dignity of all. The
priority of individual freedom over property rights justifies equality that substantiates freedom of
all.
Equality that substantiates freedom of all has two dimensions. One dimension is
necessary for developing individual capabilities. The other guarantees the least gap between the
poor and the rich. Between the two, the capability principle is prior to the least-gap principle. By
the priority of capability equality I mean that equality is mainly for developing individual
capabilities. Nonetheless, provision of least-gap equality is essential in completing capability
equality. While without capability equality least-gap equality is pointless, capability equality,
only when coupled with least-gap equality, can substantiate freedom of all.
What is a concrete form of both capability equality and least-gap equality? My proposal
is a reconfigured basic income guarantee (RBIG) supplemented by public education, public
healthcare, and linguistic diversity. Today‘s globalizing world anticipates more automated
production and, as a result, more lay-offs of workers from jobs. There are many people who are
5

unable to find a job that will enable them to earn a decent living. Under my proposal, that pattern
will change: basic income meets basic needs of all individuals without regard to their
employment; public education equips every individual with adequate knowledge for their life
with dignity; public healthcare allows every individual to be free from the vicious cycle of illness
and poverty; and linguistic diversity coupled with cultural diversity promotes group differences
of individuals. The basic income guarantee (BIG) supplemented by public education, public
healthcare, and linguistic diversity provides capability equality. In addition, it ensures least-gap
equality to concrete others, which prevents political manipulation and monopolization of primary
goods by the haves while it promotes more options for freedom.
The basic income guarantee (BIG) supplemented by public education, public healthcare
and linguistic diversity makes possible social multiculturalism, whose principle is equality
between groups and equality within groups, in such a way as to substantially promote group
difference and individual difference. In terms of equality between groups, equality means a
substantial support of internal self-determination (or sometimes external self-determination) of
minority groups. With relation to equality within groups, it is capability equality as well as leastgap equality. Equality within groups supports promotion of individual difference and equality
between groups provide support of group difference. Social multiculturalism, through equality
between groups and equality within groups, enables an individual to promote her group
difference as well as her individual difference.

Outline of Chapters
In chapter 1, I propose an ethics of concrete others. I argue that the concept of concrete
others is better than the concept of the other in protecting the vulnerable. An ethics of concrete
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others promotes both difference and equality, which means not equal balance between the two
but working toward equality that substantially promotes difference.
In chapter 2, I evaluate different types of human rights that protect difference of concrete
others. I discuss strengths and limitations of individual rights, group rights, and liberal
multiculturalism in protecting two dimensions of differences of concrete others, that is, group
differences and individual differences. While individual rights and group rights tends to neglect
the other of the two dimensions of difference, liberal multiculturalism endeavors to protect both
dimensions as it promotes equality between groups and freedom within groups. However, I will
show that liberal multiculturalism can be successful in promoting difference of groups but not
difference within groups. Liberal multiculturalism can promote group difference since it provides
minority groups with equality that substantially supports promotion of their group differences.
However, liberal multiculturalism, with the principle of freedom within groups, can promote
only formal protection of individual difference but not its substantial protection. The reason for
that is liberal multiculturalism‘s indifference to equality within groups.
In chapter 3, I investigate why equality is secondary to freedom in liberalism and liberal
multiculturalism, although protection of freedom without equality can only be a partial
protection. Specifically, through discussion with Isaiah Berlin, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, and
Ronald Dworkin, I demonstrate that liberal theories reveal their reluctance to accept capability
equality and/or least-gap equality, which can ensure freedom of all, and also prove that while
they purportedly prioritize individual freedom over private property, in reality, they endorse
priority of private property over individual freedom. For that reason liberalism in general and
liberal multiculturalism specifically are unable to espouse capability equality, not to mention
least-gap equality.
7

In chapter 4, I propose social individuality, in order to find a basis of the priority of
individual freedom over private property. I show that human beings are social beings
biologically, existentially, in identity formation, and in production. I argue that because of the
depth and breadth of socialness of individuals, human productions are social productions, which
render private property rights as untenable. I conclude that the common good, which works
toward individual dignity, is the principle that restricts private property rights.
In chapter 5, I propose the rights of concrete others as social multiculturalism. Social
multiculturalism espouses equality between groups and equality within groups, in such a way as
to substantiate freedom of all. In proposing a concrete form of equality that substantiates
freedom of all, I reconfigure a basic income scheme by supplementing it with public education,
public health care, and linguistic diversity. Based on the reconfigured basic income scheme, I
conclude that social multiculturalism is a concrete way of substantially promoting both group
difference and individual difference of concrete others and accordingly can address oppression
and domination of concrete others.

8

Chapter 1
An Ethics of Concrete Others in a Globalizing World

A globalizing world is replete with vulnerable people who are experiencing oppression
and domination. Oppression is the situation in which persons are unable to have basic goods
necessary for the development of their human capabilities; while domination is the situation in
which differences of individuals are not recognized as being equal.1 The vulnerable suffer from
economic disadvantages such as shortage of food, jobs, medical services, and/or education; they
also bear the brunt of political and cultural alienation such as tyranny of the majority, oligarchy,
ostracism, or cultural discrimination. Put differently, the vulnerable live through inequality and
misrecognition. How to promote both the equality and difference of the vulnerable is the
question I attempt to answer in this dissertation.
This chapter deals with a concept of the vulnerable in such a way as to be appropriately
sensitive to both their equality and difference and it presents a proper ethics that promotes both
their equality and difference. I propose the concept of concrete others as an appropriate concept
of the vulnerable and an ethics of concrete others that is best for promoting their difference and
equality.
The first part of this chapter deals with the concept of concrete others. Critiquing the
Levinasian idea of the other through the scholarship of Anselm Min, Alain Badiou, and Phillip
Blond, I identify the limitations of his idea of the other: Levinasian the other could be equated
with an angelic being according to Anselm Min; his idea of the other could negate concrete

1

David Ingram, Group Rights: Reconciling Equality and Difference (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of
Kansas, 2000), 36.

9

differences of the other from the perspective of Alain Badiou; and from Phillip Blond‘s
standpoint his idea of the other could justify negative understanding of the immanent dimensions
of the other. Thus, emphasizing the immanent dimension of the vulnerable, consideration of
concrete differences, and positive engagement of the immanent, I find the idea of concrete others
to be better to encompass diverse situations of the vulnerable with relation to a globalizing world.
The second part of this chapter deals with an ethics of concrete others based on a
Levinasian ethics of the other. I agree with the Levinasian emphasis on the transcendental
dimension of the other because it provides a basis for ensuring complete protection to the
vulnerable. However, I am concerned about the limitations in protecting the vulnerable as he puts
exclusive emphasis on the transcendental dimension of the other paired with a reluctance to
recognize the immanent dimensions of the other. Whereas the ethics of the other addresses
vulnerability in light of transcendence, an ethics of concrete others addresses concrete
vulnerabilities of others. In establishing an ethics of concrete others, I discuss the work of
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Jacque Derrida, Walter Mignolo, and Boaventura de Sousa
Santos, showing that vulnerability of concrete others cannot be addressed by either achieving
economic equality or respecting differences. An ethics of concrete others is an attempt to address
their vulnerability by promoting both their equality and difference. Promoting both equality and
difference means not balancing equality against difference, but working toward equality that
substantially promotes differences of concrete others.

1.1 The concept of concrete others
The concept of concrete others is based on the Levinasian concept of the other. The other
has been a critical issue in the tradition of philosophy since Plato. Until Levinas‘s articulation of
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the other that stands beyond and prior to the same, the other has been recognized, represented,
and manipulated by the same. While the Levinasian concept of the other fundamentally
challenges the exploitation of the other by the same, its challenge is severely limited by its
definition of the other. In order to overcome the limitation of the concept of the other, I propose
the concept of concrete others. Let me first delve into the concept of the other.
1.1.1 Levinas’s idea of the Other
Experiencing tragedies of humanity in the twentieth century in which millions of
vulnerable people were killed unreasonably (or more exactly through the logic of the same for
whom it is natural to exclude or eliminate the other who is innately unable to be the same),
Emmanuel Levinas establishes the idea of the other that sets up the fundamental way to afford
complete protection to vulnerable people. He contrasts absolute difference between the other and
the same. The same has a totalitarian tendency. John Wild puts it as follows:
[Totalitarian thinking] aims to gain an all-inclusive, panoramic view of all things,
including the other, in a neutral, impersonal light like the Hegelian Geist (Spirit), or the
Heideggerian Being. It sees the dangers of an uncontrolled, individual freedom, and
puts itself forth as the only rational answer to anarchy. To be free is the same as to be
rational, and to be rational is to give oneself over to the total system that is developing
in world history. Since the essential self is also rational, the development of this system
will coincide with the interests of the self. All otherness will be absorbed in this total
system of harmony and order.2

2

Emmanuel Lévinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press,
1969), 15. Michael Morgan puts ―the same‖ in this way: ―Basically, the same is the self, mind, thought, and reason;
in one sense or another, everything outside the self becomes the same as the self or spirit.‖ See Michael L. Morgan,
Discovering Levinas (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 89. As the source of the concept of the same
and the other, Levinas refers to Plato‘s Sophist, Timaeus, and Theaetetus. See Emmanuel Lévinas, "Philosophy and
the Idea of Infinity," in Collected Philosophical Papers (Hingham, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1987), 48, n
4.
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With the totalitarian tendency, the same gives no room for the existence of the other.
Everything other than the same is grasped and subsumed by the same as instruments. Levinas
rejects such imperialistic understanding of the other by the same. He instead emphasizes the
transcendence of the other, which is inaccessible to the same. Based on the idea of the other who
is infinitely higher than the I and the same, he asserts the priority of ethics over ontology.
The priority allows him to question the oppressive relationship of the same or the I to the
other and reject subsuming the other under the horizon of the same. The infinite asymmetry or
dissymmetry of the other to the same commands the infinite responsibility of the same to the
other. Levinas thus makes it absolutely impossible for the same to override the other. It is his
great achievement to establish the dissymmetry of the other to the same in such a way as to
command the same to be infinitely responsible for the other. In order to figure out how he
establishes the dissymmetry of the other to the same, I will first trace his idea of the other.
The other for Levinas is first of all ―absolutely other.‖3 The Levinasian view of the other
is based on the contention that ―the exteriority of a being is inscribed in its essence.‖4 The
exteriority of a being means ―a surplus always exterior to the totality.‖5 Because of its exteriority,
―beings have an identity ‗before‘ eternity, before the accomplishment of history, before the
fullness of time, while there is still time.‖6 Levinas, thus, further asserts, ―Being is exteriority.‖7
When defining being as exteriority, he emphasizes that it is impossible for a subject to have an
objective form of being because she is unable to epistemologically contain being as exteriority:
―the very exercise of its being consists in exteriority, and no thought could better obey being than

3

Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, 40.
Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, 196.
5
Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, 22.
6
Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, 23.
7
Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, 290.
4
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by allowing itself to be dominated by this exteriority.‖8 A subject needs to give up the possibility
and effort to objectify being in order for being to be being. As a subject is unable to objectify the
other as being, the other is beyond the realm of objectification, that is, the horizon of the same.
The other for Levinas is thus essentially different and separated from the same.9
The other is the absolutely other since she has a different time that the same cannot
subsume. Dwight Furrow explains that in Levinas, the other has her own past, present, and future,
which the same cannot possess or share: ―when we encounter another person, we do not meet as
contemporaries. The time of the other is outside the domain of my temporality.‖10 In terms of the
past, the other has the immemorial, ―the alterity of an unrepresentable past.‖11 The future also
reveals the alterity of the other through eros12 and fecundity.13 Death is another dimension of
time, which points to the alterity of the other.14 Using different dimensions of time, such as the
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Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, 290.
Emmanuel Lévinas, Time and the Other and Additional Essays (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University
Press, 1987), 87-88.: ―the other bears alterity as an essence.‖
10
Dwight Furrow, Against Theory: Continental and Analytic Challenges in Moral Philosophy (New York:
Routledge, 1995), 146.
11
Furrow, Against Theory, 148. Furrow explains the past of the other in this way: ―The Other presents
herself out of a past that is also her own, not mine, and therefore can never be an object of recognition. The past of
the other, as well as the past of the subject, is something that in principle can never be reassembled in memory;
despite our best recollections, the past goes by irrevocably. There is a dimension to the past that is opaque to
consciousness, for although memory involves bringing the past to presence, this activity of ―making present‖ misses
the dimension of time that is irreversible. Despite the fact that we remember episodes from the past, the time that
transpired is not recoverable. This dimension of the past that cannot be recovered by consciousness is referred to as
the immemorial.‖ Furrow, Against Theory, 147-48.
12
Lévinas, Time and the Other and Additional Essays, 88, 90. Eros is the relationship between the lover
and the loved, that is, the I and the other. Eros is different from grasping, knowing, or possessing—these all
presupposes a power relationship that distorts the relationship between the lover and the beloved. In eros the caress
is a mode of contact. The caress is not for knowing the other but ―is anticipation of this pure future‖ ―with
something other, always other, always inaccessible, and always still to come.‖
13
Fecundity is the relationship between the I and the child. The child is the future beyond the being of the I,
because the child makes the I escape her closure. Emmanuel Lévinas and Philippe Nemo, Ethics and Infinity, 1st ed.
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), 70. The child is a possibility of the other and has a future that the I
cannot reach at. In this vein, the child is a stranger to the I. She is beyond the possession of the I. The relationship
with the child is thus not of possession, logic, or power. The child as the other is thus beyond the realm of the same.
―The relation with the child…establishes relationship with the absolute future, or infinite time,‖ since the child is
―infinite being, that is, ever recommencing being.‖ Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, 268.
14
Death signifies ―that the subject is in relationship with what does not come from itself.‖ Levinas
describes the relationship as a ―relationship with mystery.‖ Encountering mystery, a subject experiences pure
9
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past, the future, and death, Levinas shows the absolute alterity of the other. The past of the other
is immemorial past; the future of the other is infinite future; and death denotes pure passivity of
the same to the other. Immemorial past, infinite future, and death as pure passivity indicate the
absolute alterity of the other.
The other, which has such absolute alterity, exposes herself through her face. Different
faces display differences but such differences are not mere differences that can be compared or
paralleled to others. Revealed through time of the other, the other has alterity that is far from
difference in degree, quality, or quantity.15 Without regard to facial difference or exterior
divergence the other has her alterity which secures her transcendence and infinity: ―The Other
remains infinitely transcendent, infinitely foreign‖16 through her epiphany visible in her face.
The Other is infinite because ―infinity overflows the thought that thinks it. Its very infinition is
produced precisely in this overflowing.‖17 Since the other is infinite, the I cannot contain the
other in his thought. The overflowing is apprehended not by pure abstraction, that is, by negation
of experience; rather, it is by very experience of the face of the other: ―The relation with infinity
will have to be stated in terms other than those of objective experience; but if experience

passivity, revealing his loss of mastery. While the I actively constructs and understands objects, ―death announces an
event over which the subject is not master, an event in relation to which the subject is no longer a subject.‖ Death is
―the situation where something absolutely unknowable appears. Absolutely unknowable means foreign to all light,
rendering every assumption of possibility impossible, but where we ourselves are seized.‖ Lévinas, Time and the
Other and Additional Essays, 70, 71. Identifying the other with death, Levinas affirms that the other has alterity that
the I is unable to grasp, possess, or identify.
15
―Alterity is not at all the fact that there is a difference, that facing me there is someone who has a
different nose than mine, different colour eyes, another character. It is not difference, but alterity. It is alterity, the
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precisely means a relation with the absolutely other, that is, with what always overflows thought,
the relation with infinity accomplishes experience in the fullest sense of the word.‖18 Experience
of the face of the other indicates infinity that overflows the thought of a subject without being
fully grasped.19 By overflowing, the other is transcendent and infinite. But overflowing is not the
last word for the transcendence and infinity of the other. The other has a more ultimate
dimension: ―The face of the other human – the stranger, the widow and the orphan – exceeds its
corporeal destitution by ‗referring‘ to the divine Other.‖20 The face of the other indicates infinity
that overflows the thought of a subject not only because of her alterity, but also because of her
divinity. God is accessible through the face of the other.21 In Levinas, the other is enhanced to
the height of the divine Other.22
Enhancing the other to the height of divine Other, Levinas denies an incarnational
understanding of the other. He contends that ―[t]he Other is not the incarnation of God, but
precisely his face, in which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of the height in which God is
revealed.‖23 While the other is recognized by her face of destitution, what is revealed through the
face is God, not an impoverished person. Thus, the other is not the concrete, impoverished
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person, since she ―does not play the role of a mediator.‖24 Her concreteness disappears; but, she
manifests divine heights. When he denies that the other is an incarnation of God and accordingly
her immanent dimension, Levinas implicitly identifies the other with divine Other. However, the
identification of the other and divine Other is evident when Levinas says that the religion is the
bond between the same and the other: ―We propose to call ‗religion‘ the bond that is established
between the same and the other without constituting a totality.‖25 For Levinas, in religion the
same cannot constitute a totality with the divine Other. In the same way, the same has a religious
relationship with the other. In the bond between the same and the other, the other is equated with
divine Other. The other, therefore, by being identified with divine Other, absolutely affirms her
transcendental and infinite alterity.
The Levinasian idea of the other acquires her transcendence and infinity through his view
of being as exteriority, time as immemorable past, infinite future, and pure passive death, and
destitution of face as reference to divine Other. The other who has the height of divine Other thus
establishes an asymmetrical relationship to the same. Based on the asymmetrical relationship
with the same, Levinas opens a way to provide complete protection to the other, who has
transcendental and infinite alterity.
1.1.2 Limitations of Levinas’s idea of the Other
While the idea of the other establishes a fundamental ground for the complete protection
of the other, it has intrinsic limitations in protecting the vulnerable. Though Levinas emphasizes
transcendental and infinite dissymmetry between the other and a subject, the infinity and
transcendence of the other is the very limitation of protecting her concrete vulnerability.

24
25

Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, 78-79.
Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, 40.

16

First of all, the Levinasian idea of the other appears to make the other an angelic being.
The other is a transcendent and infinite being who has absolute alterity. It is unmediated by
totality. Though Levinas specifically refers to the stranger, the widow, and the orphan as
epiphany of the other, they have importance not as historical beings but as infinite and
transcendent beings. Anselm Min says, ―At best, Levinas reduces the stranger, the widow, and
the orphan to abstract symbols of human vulnerability in general, with nothing historically
concrete and specific about them.‖26 As an angelic being, the other loses her concrete
vulnerability. While a stranger, a widow, or an orphan has the concrete political, economic,
medical, or cultural vulnerability, an angelic being does not have such vulnerabilities. That is to
say, an angelic being does not have to worry about her political persecution, economic distress,
medical disadvantages, or cultural ignorance. But, a stranger, a widow, or an orphan is
overwhelmed by worries. She needs her shelter, employment, education, medical treatment,
cultural recognition, and so on. Without addressing those concerns, a stranger, a widow, or an
orphan is unable to overcome her vulnerability. Whereas being transcendentally secured, the
other for Levinas then remains concretely vulnerable.
Such limitation is caused by Levinas‘s rejection of an incarnational understanding of
human beings. ―The Other is not the incarnation of God, but precisely his face, in which he is
disincarnate, is the manifestation of the height in which God is revealed.‖27 Levinas denies the
immanence of human beings in history while accepting their transcendence in history. Levinas‘s
contribution is that he places special emphasis on the transcendental dimension of the other.
However, if the transcendental dimension negates the immanent dimension of the other, the other
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is exposed to the aforementioned concrete vulnerability. While the other without the
transcendental dimension has experienced the imperialism of the same, the other without
immanence will experience indifference and isolation from the same. Diane Perpich puts it in
this way:
―Justice requires representation – and recognition, too, we might add. Levinas may well
have been thinking of representation in this passage only in the sense of the presentation
of an object in consciousness, that is, as the representation of persons in the abstract.
But political representation, as the right and actuality of having an effective voice in the
civil society and government, clearly is equally necessary for justice. The other whose
identity is rendered unintelligible or unrepresentable is thus done an injustice: an ethical
as well as a political injustice‖28
As immanence of the other is ignored, the unintelligible and unrepresentable other is
unrecognizable in civil society and accordingly aggravates her vulnerability.
In order to address the vulnerability of the other, not only her transcendence but also her
immanence should be taken into consideration: ―The ethical dignity of the other may ‗trace‘ its
origin to her transcendent relation to the infinite, but that dignity is effectively destroyed or
honored only in her immanent relations to history and society, and both the transcendent and the
immanent relations are inseparably connected in the unity of the one person.‖29 With clear
separation between transcendence and immanence, however, the other is not able to address the
concrete vulnerability of the other.
In Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, Levinas shows a quite different relationship
between transcendence and immanence of the other when he talks about justice. In justice, the
transcendence no longer means total separation from the immanence. Justice needs to be under
28
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―the control of the responsibility of the one for the other.‖30 That is to say, the transcendence of
the other becomes the criterion in judging immanent matters of the other. Put differently, the
political relationship of the I to the immanent other should be based on the ethical relationship of
the I to the transcendent other. While he seems to bridge the gap between the transcendence and
the immanence of the other, his view of justice still reveals a refusal of representation of the
other, that is, a refusal of the immanent dimension of the other: ―justice remains justice only, in a
society where there is no distinction between those close and those far off.‖31 Levinas puts
forward his hesitation to accept immanent dimensions of the other as she is, because the face is
unable to fully represent the other.32 The immanent dimension of the face cannot fully cover the
transcendental dimension of the other. Every representation of the other is limited in expressing
the other. Nonetheless the immanent dimension of the other is the very place to reveal and
address her vulnerability with which justice should be concerned while we retain the paradox
that we are representing the unrepresentable. Without identifying vulnerability through her
immanent dimension, the paradox might lead to regarding the other as an angelic being. Even
when understanding the paradox as a request for the subject to pay more attention to her
representation of the other, the paradox leads to another question of who the other is.
Encountering the face of the other, we are to decide whether every human being is the
other or only a certain being is the other: that is, whether all human beings are vulnerable or
some of them are vulnerable. Since Levinas contends that the face itself is the revelation of the
30
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vulnerability of the other, all human beings are vulnerable. Though Levinas mentions a stranger,
a widow, and an orphan in referring to the other, considering that the face itself reveals
vulnerability, every human being whether an oppressor or a victim is the other. In principle, I
agree that every human being without her political, economic, and cultural status is the other
who deserves my ultimate responsibility not to kill her. This is because she has the dimension of
transcendence. In this vein, if I only count the transcendent dimension of an oppressor, she
deserves my welcome. But, an oppressor has an immanent dimension as every human being has
both immanent and transcendental dimensions. In light of an immanent dimension, an oppressor
is totally different from the oppressed. It is ambiguous whether Levinas differentiates the
oppressed from oppressors; he is hesitant to judge the other. In dealing with immanent matters,
for instance, Levinas emphasizes inadequacy of objective judgment: ―There exists a tyranny of
the universal and of the impersonal, an order that is inhuman though distinct from the brutish.
Against it man affirms himself as an irreducible singularity, exterior to the totality into which he
enters, and aspiring to the religious order where the recognition of the individual concerns him in
his singularity ... The judgment of history is always pronounced in absentia.‖33 Put differently, to
properly judge an individual as a singularity, Levinas contends that every individual should be
treated as the transcendent and infinite other no matter who she is. If every individual is a
transcendent and infinite other, it is difficult to distinguish between oppressors and the oppressed,
the exploiting and the exploited, ostracizers and the ostracized, to name a few. If the victims are
not differentiated from victimizers, the idea of the other is unable to address the wrongs of the
victimizers and accordingly the vulnerability of the victims remains the same. While Levinas
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protects transcendental vulnerability of the other in her face, he ends up ignoring different
vulnerabilities between a victim and a victimizer.
Levinas‘s rejection of immanent dimension of the other is not without reason. In order to
have ethical primacy of the other over the same, Levinas has to deny immanent dimension of the
other. If considering only immanent dimensions, he is not able to establish dissymmetry of the
other to the same. But, it is not easy to observe transcendental dimension of the other in real life.
Alain Badiou puts it in this way:
The ethical primacy of the Other over the Same requires that the experience of alterity
be ontologically ‗guaranteed‘ as the experience of a distance, or of an essential nonidentity, the traversal of which is the ethical experience itself. But nothing in the simple
phenomenon of the other contains such a guarantee. And this simply because the
finitude of the other‘s appearing certainly can be conceived as resemblance, or as
imitation, and thus lead back to the logic of the Same. The other always resembles me
too much for the hypothesis of an originary exposure to his alterity to be necessarily
true.34
Because of the difficulty to overcome the finite appearance of the other, Levinas exalts the other
to divine Other, which has infinite distance and difference from the same.35 Levinas avoids the
difficulty overcoming resemblance of the other with his view of the other as divine Other.
Levinasian identification of the other with divine Other is helpful to unearth transcendental
dimension of the other and accordingly prevents the other from being subsumed by the same.
However, Levinasian identification of the other with divine Other reveals another
problem: ignorance of concrete differences of the other. Badiou points out that Levinasian ethics
34
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which is a pious discourse identifying the Other with the One, divine Other, is inadequate ―in the
context of a system of thought that is both a-religious and genuinely contemporary with the
truths of our time.‖36 He cannot accept Levinasian ethics of the other as the One, since ―[t]he
only genuine ethics is of truths in the plural – or more precisely, the only ethics is of processes of
truth, of the labour that brings some truths into the world.‖37 Thus, abandoning the Levinasian
transcendental dimension of the other, Badiou emphasizes exclusively the immanent dimension
of the other, which is not one but multiple, because what exists is ―the infinite multiplicity of
differences.‖38 Badiou contends multiple differences of others replacing the other as the One
with the many. While I agree that in the realm of the same there is the infinite multiplicity of
differences, Badiou‘s view exposes two problems. On the one hand, I disagree that ―the infinite
multiplicity of differences‖ can peacefully co-exist with one another without the idea of the other
which has a dissymmetrical relationship with a subject. It is because Badiou‘s view goes back to
the unavoidable subsumption of the other by the same as differences of others are juxtaposed
with one another: denying transcendence of the other makes untenable his view of peaceful
coexistence among the infinitely multiple differences. On the other hand, the infinite multiplicity
of differences can make ambiguous the distinction between oppressors and the oppressed.
Allowing every difference as having a truth, an oppressive difference can have legitimacy as one
truth. While Levinas has this problem as he focuses on the transcendental dimension of the other,
Badiou has it as he focuses on the immanent dimension of the other. Although his way of
recognizing multiple differences reveals impotence in addressing subsumption of the other by the
same and inability to differentiate oppressive differences from oppressed differences, Badiou
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correctly points out the limitation of Levinas‘ identification of the other with divine Other, which
is ignorance of immanent multiple differences of the other.
Phillip Blond discusses the danger of the identification of the other as divine Other.39
Blond criticizes Levinas‘s view of the other focusing on Levinas‘s Manichaean tinge of the
Other as divine Other who negatively engages in the world. That is to say, Blond criticizes the
radical dualism which can be witnessed in gnostic thought. Referring to the unavoidably opposite
relationship between God and phenomenology, Blond says,
For if the deepest of these atheistic and in the end essentially Manichaean prejudices is
that God and phenomena, in order to preserve their true natures, must occur apart from
and in contra-distinction to each other, then Levinas can only be seen as fulfilling to an
extreme degree this deeply ingrained and deeply idolatrous opposition. However, what
is remarkable and what is new in respect of this tradition is that Levinas has taken the
side of God against phenomena rather than the side of phenomena against God, such
that it is the phenomenal world that is erased in the name of God, instead of the more
common erasure of God in the name of phenomena.40
Put differently, while totality infringes on the other as it negates or dominates the other,
according to Blond, Levinas nihilates totality for the other. Though Levinas proposes the idea of
the other to prevent the other from being infringed upon by totality, he ends up allowing
destruction of totality by the other. Blond says that ―this situation is starting to look perilously
like what Levinas has described as ‗the same.‘‖41 In the realm of the same, a subject, by negating
otherness of the other, identifies the other as the same. In the same vein, the other as divine Other,
by nihilating the same, identifies the same as the other. The same has no choice but to nihilate
39
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herself, since negating herself ―is a sacrifice without reserve, without holding back, and in this
non-voluntary – the sacrifice of a hostage designated who has not chosen himself to be hostage,
but possibly elected by the Good, in an involuntary election not assumed by the elected one.‖42
Such total negation of the same is possible because in the Levinasian concept of the other the
same is evil and the other is good. In light of the Manichaean scheme, Blond contends that
Levinasian idea of the other is ―obviously and necessarily violent.‖43
Whereas there is a truth in Blond‘s criticism that the Levinasian idea of the other has a
Manichaean scheme, it needs to be mentioned that the other as divine Other does not have a
compulsory power. Levinas differentiates between authority and force in that regard. The other
as divine Other has authority but it does not have force:
The face is not a force. It is an authority. Authority is often without force. Your
question seems to be based on the idea that God commands and demands. He is
extremely powerful. If you try not doing what he tells you, he will punish you. That is a
very recent notion. On the contrary, the first form, the unforgettable form, in my
opinion, is that, in the last analysis, he cannot do anything at all. He is not a force but an
authority.‖44
Responsibility for the other is far from compulsory or mandatory. Contrary to what Blond
contends, the Levinasian idea of the other is neither violent nor brutal unlike the realm of the
same. Blond went too far in this regard. What is important in Blond‘s points is that like the
Manichaean understanding of the world the realm of the same, the immanent is described
negatively in Levinasian idea of the other. The negative understanding of the immanent can lead
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to indifference to real vulnerability of the other and make impotent the works for addressing real
vulnerability of the other.
1.1.3 From the other to concrete others
The criticism on the Levinasian idea of the other shows the critical limitations in
addressing the vulnerability of a stranger, a widow, or an orphan. To overcome critical
limitations such as the other as an angelic being, the other as one unifying other, and the
Manichaean dualism tendency, I propose an idea of concrete others. The idea of concrete others
emphasizes the immanent dimension of the other while keeping the transcendental dimension of
the other, and the multiplicity of differences in an immanent dimension not in a transcendent
dimension. The idea of concrete others also takes into account a globalizing world that produces
more vulnerable others. I will, by way of an illustration, enlist others who are concretely
vulnerable in a globalizing world.
The idea of concrete others attaches special importance to an immanent dimension of the
vulnerable. While accepting the importance of the transcendental dimension of the vulnerable,
the idea of concrete others is more concerned about the immanent dimension of the vulnerable.
Whereas Levinas refuses an incarnational understanding of human beings, I contend that human
beings should be understood in light of incarnation. That is to say, human beings have both the
transcendental dimension and the immanent dimension without the one negating the other.
Without the transcendence the immanence leads a human being to violence of the same;
conversely, without the immanence the transcendence makes a human being an indifferent
angelic being. Thus, ignoring the immanent dimension of a human being is tantamount to
negating her concrete existence. Without her concrete existence, her transcendental dimension
becomes meaningless. In terms of Manichaean dualism, an incarnational understanding of
25

human beings gives positive meaning to immanence: The world is not a place to avoid but the
very place where a transcendental being exists. In light of the creation story, the world is created
for human beings and human beings are called to enjoy the created world. The created world is
not a place for preparing for the other world; it is the very place where human beings were
created and called to live. Thus the immanent dimension is not a secondary one for a human
being; rather, it is her primary dimension.
The idea of concrete others is better than the idea of the other in encompassing diverse
immanent differences of the vulnerable. In light of the immanent dimension, the idea of other is
incapable of covering the vulnerable, since the idea of the other is impossible to express the
immanent differences of the vulnerable. The vulnerable have finite characteristics. They belong
to a certain family, community, state, ethnicity, economic class, and race, to name a few. Such
finite characteristics have no one common denominator; rather, there can be overlapping
similarities. These finite characteristics, which are multiple identities, are important to them
because their vulnerability is closely connected with their multiple identities. She is vulnerable
because of her race or her family, while he is vulnerable because of his ethnicity or his national
identity. These group identities are inseparable identities, some of which are given by birth.
Group identity is not something that can be easily changed or replaced. For instance, John Rawls
talks about the gravity of leaving one‘s country: ―normally leaving one‘s country is a grave step:
it involves leaving the society and culture in which we have been raised, the society and culture
whose language we use in speech and thought to express and understand ourselves, our aims,
goals, and values; the society and culture whose history, customs, and conventions we depend on
to find our place in the social world.‖45 He also adds that cultural ties ―are normally too strong to
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be given up, and this fact is not to be deplored.‖46 In a similar vein, Daniel Bell says, ―I didn‘t
choose to love my mother and father, to care about the neighbourhood in which I grew up, to
have special feelings for the people of my country, and it is difficult to understand why anyone
would think that I have chosen those attachments, or that I ought to have done so.‖47 An
individual has been given identities beyond her choice. There are other human beings who share
some of her given identities. She is characterized as, for instance, Tutzi in Rwanda, but there are
others who identify themselves as Tutzi. They can be categorized as the other as Tutzi, but they
have other identities such as an economic class or a political affiliation: Some of them are poor
while a few of them are rich; some of them are in a group requesting radical retaliation for
genocide while others prefer peaceful settlements. They have different group identities according
to their political, economic, or cultural differences. Considering that there are many identities
that make people vulnerable, the idea of concrete others seems to be more appropriate than the
idea of the other, in designating diverse groups of the vulnerable. Concrete others are the
vulnerable who have immanent different identities as well as transcendence.
Our globalizing world is another reason why the idea of concrete others rather than the
other is appropriate for representing the vulnerable. A globalizing world has brought about many
changes in this world. While there are various opinions on the changes, Manfred Steger points
out some thematic overlap in diverse scholarly explanations on changes in a globalizing world:
First, globalization involves the creation of new and the multiplication of existing social
networks and activities that increasingly overcome traditional political, economic,
cultural, and geographical boundaries…The second quality of globalization is reflected
in the expansion and the stretching of social relations, activities, and
interdependencies…Third, globalization involves the intensification and acceleration of
46
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social exchanges and activities…Fourth, the creation, expansion, and intensification of
social interconnections and interdependencies do not occur merely on an objective,
material level…[P]eople [become] increasingly conscious of growing manifestations of
social interdependence and the enormous acceleration of social interactions.48
Steger asserts that an overlapping theme of globalization is social relations and activities that are
being created, multiplied, expanded, stretched, intensified, and accelerated. Such lively social
interaction increases and intensifies social interconnections and interdependencies among human
beings. Because of increased interconnections, on the one hand, more differences are exposed
than before as different races and different ethnicities are brought together beyond national and
continental boundaries. Increased interconnections make visible dire situations of the vulnerable.
Intensified interdependencies, on the other hand, may worsen the situation of the vulnerable,
because intensified interdependencies could exacerbate a given unequal relationship between the
powerless and the powerful. Both cases make diverse differences more prominent and emboss
the immanent dimension of the vulnerable. Thus, the idea of the other, transcendence oriented
and unifying concept is inadequate; the idea of concrete others, immanence and difference
oriented concept, is adequate to designate the vulnerable in a globalizing world. A globalizing
world produces the many concrete vulnerable. I broadly categorize them as economic others and
political others, because economic and political dimensions of human life are crucial factors that
make humans vulnerable. In the current global system, in addition, human vulnerability is
evident in medical dimension and cultural dimension. Thus, I deal with economic others, medical
others, cultural others, and political others.
First, there are economic others who are alienated and exploited by a global economy that
is based on neoliberalism which espouses the belief that "human well-being can best be
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advanced" with "strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade."49 Based on this
belief, its basic doctrines are ―deregulation, privatization, economic liberalization, labor
flexibilization and diminished state-supported social provisions.‖50 Deregulation allows foreign
capital to flow without state regulations; economic liberalization with deregulation ―dismantles
restrictions on the flow of goods, services, and foreign investment‖; privatization ―puts public
productive and service enterprises into the private sector, reducing state-subsidized social
services and reducing public sector corporations‖; and labor flexibilization provides ―an
abundant supply of cheap, controllable and disposable labor force.‖51
While neoliberal globalization has exacerbated the situation of the vulnerable, it does not
unilaterally deteriorate the lives of the vulnerable from the beginning. For instance, poor
countries need investment. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is of help to the poor countries, since
with its money FDI creates jobs in those countries. The problem with FDI is that it is concerned
about profits, not about workers. When FDI enters poor countries, wage premiums grow and
working conditions improve; when ―FDI declines, employment shares and wage differentials
fall.‖52 What is worse is that when FDI withdraws from a country, it causes mass layoffs as is
evident in the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Neoliberal globalization has brought some benefit to
poor countries; but it is agreed among scholars that it ―has increased inequality both within and
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between societies.‖53 In South Asia about half-a-billion people have experienced a decrease in
their incomes, whereas only a few educated urbanites have made more money.54 Overseas
migrations as well as regional migrations are increasing in number because of the economic
deprivation caused by globalization.55 For instance, local Mexican farmers abandoned their land
and headed cities and 44% of Mexican migrants to the U.S. are those who live in the
countryside.56 The migrant workers are located ―mostly in the lower rank of the occupational
ladder.‖57 Not only countries of the South (poor countries) but also Northern countries are
experiencing intensified inequalities. The top 5 percent of the U.S. population had more than 55
percent of the total wealth of the U.S. while its bottom 50 percent had 2.8 percent of the wealth.58
For more than 10 years, the number of people in poverty in the United States has increased
continuously: In 2010, the official poverty rate was 15.1 percent and the number of people in
poverty reached 46.2 million.59 Using sub-national studies of five countries, Uganda, Peru,
Kenya, India, and the United States, Anirudh Krishna concludes that ―the risk of impoverishment
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has increased in recent years‖ and ―vulnerability is consistently on the rise.‖60 The poor are
vulnerable in terms of security and the insecurity perpetuates their poverty.61 Insecurity and
poverty create a vicious cycle.
Second, medical others are produced as economic others are unable to pay and follow
medical treatment. The six million deaths of the Holocaust are remembered as a should-not-berepeated tragedy in human history. Still, the public has no interest in the fact that more than
twelve million people die every year because of insufficient medical treatment. Among the
victims are half a million women die in childbirth, almost exclusively poor women.62
An absolute majority of these premature deaths occur in Africa, with the poorer regions
of Asia not far behind. Most of these deaths occur because the world's poorest do not
have access to the fruits of science. They include deaths from vaccine preventable
illness; deaths during childbirth; deaths from infectious diseases that might be cured
with access to antibiotics and other essential medicines; death from malaria that would
have been prevented by bed nets and access to therapy; and deaths from water-borne
illnesses.63
Even though science achieved over 95 percent cure rates of tuberculosis, for instance, millions of
tuberculosis deaths ―occur almost exclusively among the poor.‖64 Paul Farmer finds that
economic factors strongly affect ―initial exposure to infection, reactivation of quiescent
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tuberculosis, transmission to household members, access to diagnosis and therapy, length of
convalescence, development of drug resistance, degree of lung destruction, and most of all,
mortality.‖65 He thus concludes that diseases such as HIV and tuberculosis have displayed a
―preferential option for the poor.‖66
While the poor are the medical others, because of medical expenses people become poor
and impoverished. Based on a 2005 statistic in the United States, ―every thirty seconds, someone
files a bankruptcy in the aftermath of a serious health problem.‖67 One out of five bankrupt
families went without food and a third of them had their utilities shut off.68 In 2005 half of
bankruptcy was caused by medical expenses but it went up to 62.1 percent in 2007.69 In
developing countries, on the other hand, the poor become unhealthier and poorer as they use
drugs without proper prescriptions because they are unable to pay for professional health
services. They use drugs sold by private drug vendors who ―are often unqualified, frequently do
not follow prescribing regulations‖ and thereby ―waste scarce financial resources‖ using drugs
unhealthily and irrationally.70
While the economic others are innately the medical others, neoliberal globalization has
exacerbated their medical vulnerability. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) have pushed poor countries to reduce social expenditures in health in order to induce
foreign capital, believing that more development brings health improvement. Contrary to their
expectation, the poor become more vulnerable as ―health-sector spending in many poor countries
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channeled a majority of resources toward city hospitals that served mostly elites who were able
to pay.‖71 In addition, there are medical ―brain drains‖ in poor countries. In Ghana, for instance,
―72 percent of all clinics and hospitals were unable to provide the full range of expected services
due to lack of sufficient personnel.‖72 What exacerbates the problem is the phenomenon that
―health professionals from poor countries worldwide are increasingly abandoning their homes
and their professions to take menial jobs in wealthy countries.‖73 Because of medical brain drains
coupled with the absence of medicines and tools, health-care workers regard them as ―hospice
and mortuary workers [rather] than healers.‖74 A globalizing world makes medical others more
vulnerable.
Third, cultural others are evident in a globalizing world. A globalizing world is equated
with multiculturalism. The world becomes multicultural ―as a result of the mobility of people or
by growing political recognition of groups hitherto marginalized.‖75 In a multicultural world,
there are two ways that make people cultural others. On the one hand, while cultural others are
recognized and represented by global media and global corporations, they have no substantial
representation or recognition. That is to say, their economic status has not been improved. There
are fewer opportunities for minority groups and community groups.76 In addition, cultural others
who are poor have limited access to information owing to lack of electricity and communication
technologies, and have limited amounts of available information as global media corporations
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gather, select, and distribute information for their benefit, not for the poor.77 In this light, images
of cultural others are accepted but cultural others themselves are ignored. On the other hand,
their very cultural identities are ignored and negated. Their languages, religions, or appearances
are challenged by mainstream cultures. It is said that ―[a]bout 513 million people face
restrictions on religion, language, ceremonies, and appearance.‖78 While there are more than
6000 languages spoken today, 90 percent of them are going to disappear in 100 years: ―in subSaharan Africa, only 13 percent of children in primary school receive instruction in their mother
tongue.‖79 Considering the intimate relationship between languages and cultures, forgotten
languages are tantamount to forgetting cultural differences. In a multicultural world, in addition,
cultural and racial conflicts abound in both rich countries and poor countries. Among rich
countries, England and France, well-established multicultural states, on the one hand, reveal
discrimination against immigrants from different cultures as they are emphasizing either
Britishness or Republicanism, respectively.80 On the other hand, acute racial and cultural
conflicts in poor countries are evident: for instance, out of eighty two armed conflicts seventy
nine conflicts are inter-ethnic and inter-communal conflicts in the world between 1989 through
1992.81
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Fourth, political others are notable with the widening inequality of political power
between poor countries and rich countries, and between the poor and the rich within each country.
Powerful countries such as the United States exert undue influence on global affairs.82 In the
United Nations Security Council, some powerful countries have the right to veto, which the
majority of nation-states in the U.N. do not have. They oligopolize the power to make life-ordeath decisions for the powerless countries. In the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, for example, the
U.S. did not allow military intervention by the U.N. even when the intervention was urgently
needed.83 As another example, the U.S. declared to veto Palestine‘s bid for state, asking for a
peace agreement between Israel and Palestine although knowing that they have never achieved
any agreement.84 The present structure of the Security Council is unable to address political
others, Peter Singer asserts, since ―the institutions of global governance are dominated by the
wealthiest and most powerful states.‖85
In the case of the IMF whose decisions ―affect the lives and livelihoods of billions
throughout the developing world,‖ there is no place for workers in the decision making process:
―The workers who are thrown out of jobs as a result of the IMF programs have no seat at the
table; while the bankers, who insist on getting repaid, are well represented through the finance
ministers and central bank governors. The consequences for policy have been predictable:
bailout packages which pay more attention to getting creditors repaid than to maintaining the
economy at full employment.‖86 Within individual nations, the rich have more political power

82

Held, A Globalizing World?, 153.
Michael N. Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2002), 130-152.
84
Helene Cooper, "Obama Explains Opposition to Palestinian Statehood Bid," New York Times on the Web
(September 21, 2011). http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/22/world/obama-united-nationsspeech.html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=palestine%20statehood&st=cse (accessed September 26, 2011).
85
Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 146.
86
Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents, 225.
83

35

than the poor. In the globalizing world, private interests are inserted in public policymaking in
such a way as to strengthen ―its representation as neutral and technical‖ and ―the market as a
superior ordering from that of governments.‖87 Considering that the domain of the public is ―a
buffer against the vagaries of the market and the inequalities of the class system,‖88 the
superiority of private interests over the governments is tantamount to a political death sentence
for the poor. One example of demonstrating the political power of the rich is the tax reduction for
the wealthy by silently legislating “the massive estate-tax break.‖89 Another example is the
policy ―privileging low inflation over job growth.‖90 With the policy, the wealthy can prevent
their capital from devaluation but unemployment is unavoidable to the poor. Similar to the poor,
immigrants are unauthorized people who are present ―without power and a politics that claims
rights.‖91 Immigrants, specifically, undocumented immigrants, are working under harsh
conditions. But, they do not have political rights to redress their dire situation.
In a nutshell, the vulnerable in a globalizing world exist as economic others, medical
others, cultural others, and political others, to name a few. Concrete others ―do not have a right
to the resources that make life possible; in other words, they do not have the right to exist.‖92 In a
globalizing world, ―the traditional distinctions between the economic, the political, the social,
and the cultural become increasingly blurred.‖93 Basically, concrete others are economic others
who suffer medical, cultural, and political destitution. However, it does not mean that the
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vulnerable are equated exclusively with the economic others. A globalizing world produces
others whose vulnerability is related mainly-but-not-exclusively to economic destitution and
partly-but-still-seriously to cultural and political destitution.

1.2 An ethics of concrete others
In order to address such diverse vulnerabilities of concrete others, I propose an ethics of
concrete others. Though based on Levinasian ethics of the other, an ethics of concrete others is
different in important ways. While Levinasian ethics has trouble in considering concrete
differences of others, an ethics of concrete others takes the concrete differences into
consideration. That is, an ethics of concrete others pays special attention to economic, medical,
cultural, and political vulnerabilities. In developing an ethics of equality that substantially
promotes difference, I will engage in discussion with ethics of the multitude, ethics of différance,
and ethics of equality and difference.
When it comes to concrete others who are economically, medically, culturally, and
politically alienated and exploited, the question is raised whether they are just collective
individuals or undifferentiated unity. This question is important in that how to frame concrete
others determines how to address the vulnerability. Hardt and Negri propose the concept of the
multitude to frame the vulnerable. I call their way an ethics of the multitude. Since their ethics is
closely related to their definition of the multitude, I am going to delve into the concept of the
multitude.
1.2.1 An ethics of multitude
In defining the multitude, Hardt and Negri reject choosing an alternative between unity
and multiplicity. They contend that the multitude is not an undifferentiated unity, comparing it
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with people and the working class. On the one hand, the multitude is different from people.
While being ―composed of numerous different individuals and classes,‖ the people as a group
converts ―social differences into one identity.‖94 The people has unity. Quite contrarily, the
multitude ―is composed of a set of singularities‖ ―whose difference cannot be reduced to
sameness, a difference that remains different.‖95 While the concept of the people denotes the
undifferentiated unity, the multitude signifies the plural singularities. According to Hardt and
Negri, the concept of the multitude refuses undifferentiated sameness among different
individuals and classes. Its basis is not unity or identity but ―what the singularities share in
common.‖96 The multitude is socio-economically ―the common subject of labor, that is, the real
flesh of postmodern production, and at the same time the object from which collective capital
tries to make the body of its global development.‖97 What they have in common is that they are
―all those who work under the rule of capital and potentially as the class of those who refuse the
rule of capital.‖98 On the other hand, the multitude is different from the working class. The
working class ―excludes the various unwaged classes‖ pointing out differences between ―male
industrial labor and female reproductive labor, between industrial labor and peasant labor,
between the employed and the unemployed, between workers and the poor.‖99 Unlike the
concept of the working class which denies the importance of other classes of labor, the multitude
implies that ―all forms of labor are today socially productive, they produce in common.‖100
Compared to the concept of the working class, the multitude is an inclusive and expansive
concept―that includes all who engage in all forms of labor. Thus the multitude is neither an
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undifferentiated unity like the people nor a specific class like the working class. It is a set of
singularities sharing in common.
What is ―the common‖ which the multitude shares? Hardt and Negri contend that what
the multitude produces is the common, since the multitude―whether they are the poor, the
unemployed, the partially employed, or the migrants―participates in social production,
―cooperating in the networks of the multitude, that is, the common.‖101 At a glance, it is difficult
to understand the difference between producing the common and sharing the common. They
explain such a complicated relation of the common to the multitude in this way:
What it produces, in fact, is common, and the common we share serves as the basis for
future production, in a spiral, expansive relationship. This is perhaps most easily
understood in terms of the example of communication as production: we can
communicate only on the basis of languages, symbols, ideas, and relationships we share
in common, and in turn the results of our communication are new common languages,
symbols, ideas, and relationships. Today this dual relationship between production and
the common―the common is produced and it is also productive―is key to
understanding all social and economic activity.102
The common which the multitude produces and shares is the basis of social and economic
activity. The common as social and economic activity is connected to the pragmatic notion of
habit. According to the pragmatic notion of habit, it ―is the common in practice: the common that
we continually produce and the common that serves as the basis for our actions.‖103 In this way,
habits ―are produced and reproduced in interaction and communication with others. Habits are
thus never really individual or personal. Individual habits, conduct, and subjectivity only arise on
the basis of social conduct, communication, acting in common. Habits constitute our social
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nature.‖104 The common shaped by habit is the core factor that shapes the multitude. Based on
the produced and shared common, the multitude is different from a mere gathering of people, a
unified people, or the working class.
Considering the concept of the multitude anchored in the common, however, it is unclear
whether Hardt and Negri contend that the multitude is neither an undifferentiated unity nor plural
collectivities. The common as social nature shaped by habit is the crucial factor that
differentiates race, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality. Put differently, the common as social nature
is the dividing line among race, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality. The common thus separates the
multitude into diverse social groups rather than incorporates diverse groups into the multitude.
This is a challenge to the concept of the multitude since at first Hardt and Negri included in their
concept of the multitude not just economic class but also social classes of race, ethnicity, gender,
and sexuality. If the common cannot be a foundation for the multitude to include different races,
ethnicities, genders, and sexualities, the multitude becomes a mere gathering of people such as
the crowd and the mass. The multitude is then just plural collectivities. On the other hand, they
frame human beings as workers, or at least, producers. All human beings are characterized as
workers whether they are reproductive workers, the unemployed, or the poor. In this case, the
common seems to be the fact that they are all workers. In this sense, the multitude is an extended
and expanded working class. If the multitude is an extended working class, it becomes an
undifferentiated unity. The common thus shows that Hardt and Negri are still leaning toward an
economic dimension of human beings and they pay secondary attention to the political, social
and cultural differences.
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An ethics of the multitude shows that it is based thoroughly on the economic dimension
of vulnerability. But, others are not just poor. While political, social, medical, cultural alienation
can be caused by destitution, it does not mean that poverty is its only cause or its removal is its
unique solution. Alleviating poverty can address much of the existing political, cultural, and
social alienation; but some political, social, and cultural dimensions are beyond economic
destitution: some differences of others such as ethnic or religious identities are more important
than their economic destitution or even their life itself. That is to say, some try to keep their
ethnic or religious identities at the expense of their economic well-being or their very lives. Such
differences are not considered in the ethics of the multitude.
Unlike the ethics of the multitude, another ethics is seriously concerned about differences.
I call it an ethics of différance, which is based on Jacques Derrida‘s view on differences. Derrida
considers seriously the differences of others. When he criticizes Levinas, Derrida points out the
Levinasian ignorance of alter ego as the other. ―The other as alter ego signifies the other as other,
irreducible to my ego, precisely because it is an ego, because it has the form of the ego. The
egoity of the other permits him to say ‗ego‘ as I do; and this is why he is Other, and not a stone,
or a being without speech in my real economy. This is why, if you will, he is face, can speak to
me, understand me, and eventually command me.‖105 Difference of the other as alter ego is the
point of protection for Derrida.
1.2.2 An ethics of différance
Derrida‘s dilemma begins with his exclusive emphasis on the uniqueness of the
immanent alterity of the other. When one respects the immanent alterity of the other, he is faced
with two problems. On the one hand, when he emphasizes exclusively the immanent alterity
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saying that the other is radically foreign thus enhancing the alterity to transcendental one, he
comes to ignore the concrete other as alter ego. On the other hand, at the very moment when the
alterity of the other is identified as a knowledge, the alterity loses its radical foreignness: ―we are
also unable to encounter the other as radically foreign. The other is always to some extent
understood by my horizon of expectation.‖106 Encountering the dilemma, he proposes the
concept of différance, with which he can delay the process of respecting differences of others
while taking differences of others seriously into consideration.107 His concept of undecidability
emerges from différance, oscillation between postponement in identification of alterity and
command of alterity. Undecidability does not mean that one is unable to decide whether to
respect differences of others. It rather shows that respecting the differences of others is
fundamental to him.
While serious is his concern for respecting differences of others, the practicality of
respecting differences is questionable. Especially, when talking about others rather than the other,
his problem is more evident:
There are also others, an infinite number of them, the innumerable generality of others
to whom I should be bound by the same responsibility, a general and universal
responsibility (what Kierkegaard calls the ethical order). I cannot respond to the call,
the request, the obligation, or even the love of another without sacrificing the other
other, the other others. Every other (one) is every (bit) other [tout autre est tout autre],
every one else is completely or wholly other. The simple concepts of alterity and of
singularity constitute the concept of duty as much as that of responsibility. As a result,
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the concepts of responsibility, of decision, or of duty, are condemned a priori to paradox,
scandal, and aporia.108
Paradox, scandal, and aporia are unavoidable in respecting the differences of others. That is why
différance and undecidability are required in respecting differences of others. While admitting
the unavoidable paradox, scandal, and apoira in respecting differences of others, Derridean
discourse such as différance and undecidability stays mainly in the abstract. That is to say,
differences of others are dealt with abstractly rather than concretely. Behind the unavoidable
paradox, scandal, and aporia lies Derridean absolute responsibility to the other: ―I can respond
only to the one (or to the One), that is, to the other, by sacrificing that one to the other.‖109
Theoretically, it is correct that absolute responsibility for one sacrifices my responsibility for the
other. Absolute responsibility, however, is impossible in reality. A living human being cannot be
absolutely responsible for the other: one is unable to cover the other‘s alterity which is infinite.
In this vein, his view of differences is abstract, far from concrete.
Walter Mignolo criticizes Derridean différance in that it is impossible to reveal colonial
differences. Mignolo points out that ―a knowing subject was possible beyond the subject of
knowledge postulated by the very concept of rationality put in place by modern
epistemology.‖110 Differences are at best abstract differences recognized by rational subjects.
This criticism might advocate Derrida‘s position of différance and undecidability as he is very
careful in deciding what difference is. But, when Mignolo identifies modernity with colonialism,
Derrida‘s limitation is visible: he reveals insensitivity to a given colonial difference.111 On the
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one hand, the limitation comes from a dissymmetric relationship between a country of colonizing
history and one of colonized history. For instance, between French and Arabic, there is a risk of
regarding ―translating French into Arabic as importation of knowledge and Arabic into French as
exportation of an ‗Oriental‘ exotic community.‖112 In this case, two different knowledges are
juxtaposed as if there is no dissymmetry since the two different knowledges are translated. In
reality, however, the Arabic knowledge has a dissymmetric relationship with the French
knowledge. Such a dissymmetric relationship can be easily ignored when every difference has
the same importance.
On the other hand, the limitation of Derridean différance arises from Derrida‘s view that
―[a]ll culture is originally colonial‖113 or that ―I resist this movement that tends towards a
narcissism of minorities that is developing everywhere.‖114 Based on this view, Derridean
difference is not concrete enough in that he does not differentiate the culture of colonies from
European culture and the survival of minorities from their narcissism. Derrida is correct in
saying that every culture has coloniality but he fails to notice the coloniality of the
modern/colonial world system, the history of colonialism. Every culture is prone to be colonial,
but it neither justifies nor hides the history of Western colonialism which has silenced or
trivialized the differences of the colonized. In the same vein, every minority is apt to express
narcissistic or egoistic tendencies, but it neither nihilates nor negates the history of
discrimination and ostracism of minorities. Derrida is successful in accentuating irreducible
differences, but in so doing he is unable to accept colonial differences that have been ignored,
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neglected, or negated. Without acknowledging, respecting, and promoting colonial differences,
others are not able to be themselves where they are present. Only when acknowledging colonial
differences and discriminated differences is one ―always able to be where one belongs.‖115
While an ethics of différance tries to respect and protect differences of others, it has
limitations in that it deals with differences abstractly and accordingly it shows hesitation in
acknowledging and promoting concrete differences such as colonial differences.
1.2.3 An ethics of equality and difference
To overcome limitations of the ethics of différance; that is, in order for one to be able to
be where one belongs, colonial differences should have priority over hegemonic differences.
However, the priority of colonial differences over hegemonic differences has a problem. Since
every culture is originally colonial, the priority of colonial differences over hegemonic
differences will end up replacing old colonial structures: it is just the reverse of the oppressive
structure of the other and the same. This dilemma requests a criterion which prevents the endless
violent cycle between the same and the other. Mignolo introduces a double critique to prevent
such an endless violent cycle: the double critique is ―(1) a decolonizing deconstruction…of
Western logo- and ethnocentrism that has been exported all over the planet, and that will
complement a postmodern deconstruction a la Derrida or in the form of Foucault‘s archaeology
or Nietzsche‘s genealogy; and (2) a criticism…of the knowledges and discourses produced by
the different societies of the [Third] world.‖116 That is, the double critique criticizes both
hegemonic and colonial differences. Using the double critique one can deconstruct hegemonic
differences and also prevent colonial differences from becoming hegemonic. The priority of
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colonial over hegemonic differences based on the double critique is an ethics of equality and
differences.
In the ethics of equality and differences, there is a question of the criterion with which
one distinguishes colonial from hegemonic differences. At what point does a colonial difference
become hegemonic? To what extent is a colonial difference protected and promoted? Mignolo‘s
criterion is that ―people and communities have the right to be different precisely because we are
all equals.‖117 Because all human beings are equal, everyone has the right to be different; that is,
the right to be herself where she is. Considering his view that the colonized were not able to be
themselves where they were, his dictum criticizes both the inequality and ignorance of
differences. Differences were not recognized because they were thought to be unequal. For one
to be able to be oneself where one is, thus, both difference and equality need to be considered
together. A more concrete form of a criterion, presented by Boaventura de Sousa Santos, is the
equal priority between ―the principle of equality and the principle of respect for difference.‖118 In
the equal priority, the principle of respect for difference should not override the principle of
equality; the principle of equality should not overrule the principle of respect for difference. It
means that ―people have the right to be equal whenever difference makes them inferior, but they
also have the right to be different whenever equality jeopardizes their identity.‖119 The equal
priority of two principles means that one principle must ―open space for the other principle‖120
rather than both principles being strictly observed equally.
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1.2.4 An ethics of equality substantially promoting difference
While an ethics of equality and difference provides a boundary within which we can
promote both equality and difference of concrete others, it provides only an adumbrative
criterion. It is correct that an ethics of equality and difference excludes two cases of interaction
between difference and equality: One is the case in which promoting difference leads to
inequality; the other is the case in which promoting equality results in negating difference.
Within the adumbrative boundary of promoting equality and difference, I propose an ethics of
equality substantially promoting difference. It rejects both maximization of difference that leads
to inequality and maximization of equality that causes negating difference. Instead, it attempts to
find ways in which equality can substantially promote difference of concrete others.
An ethics of equality substantially promoting difference emphasizes the importance of
equality in promoting difference. Though acknowledging that there are cases in which promoting
equality is detrimental to protecting difference, I contend that equality is essential in promoting
difference, specifically, difference of concrete others. For instance, major impediments to the
promotion of individual difference are economic destitution, deprivation of equal educational
opportunity, and/or a shortage of appropriate medical service. Those who are suffering from
economic destitution have no time to spend developing their differences. Those who are without
educational opportunity have difficulties in recognizing and developing their differences. Those
who are ill tend to squander their fortune on recovering their health to the extent that even their
family members sink into desperate poverty, which makes promoting difference impossible. For
concrete others, equality is essential for promoting difference.
An ethics of equality substantially promoting difference needs further clarification. What
kind of equality is appropriate in substantially promoting difference? What kind of difference is
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to be promoted by equality? Equality that substantially promotes difference has two principles:
one is the capability principle and the other is the least-gap principle. I will delve into the two
principles of equality that substantiates difference in Chapter 3. In terms of difference, there are
two kinds of difference: one is group difference and the other is individual difference. I will
focus on the two kinds of difference that need to be substantially promoted by equality in the
next chapter.

1.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have developed the concept of concrete others and an ethics of concrete
others with relation to globalization. The concept of concrete others is based on the Levinasian
concept of the other in that it accepts the transcendental dimension of others; however, the
concept of concrete others is different from the concept of the other because it emphasizes
immanent dimensions of human beings and their multiple differences. Because of such emphasis
on immanent dimensions of human beings and a globalizing world which makes different
vulnerabilities more visible, I contend that the vulnerable need to be framed as concrete others
rather than the other. There are different ethics which try to address vulnerabilities of concrete
others. An ethics of the multitude betrays its exclusive concern for the economic dimension of
the vulnerable while it shows little attention to cultural and political vulnerabilities of others. An
ethics of différance, although its emphasis is on concrete difference, reveals its limitation in
respecting differences of concrete others as it hesitates to acknowledge colonial differences. It
also betrays limitations in recognizing and addressing inequality behind diverse differences of
the vulnerable. Both ethical approaches can address vulnerabilities of concrete others partially.
An ethics of equality and difference, equal priority of equality and difference, can address the
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limitations of an ethics of the multitude and an ethics of différance. An ethics of equality and
difference, attempts to address the vulnerabilities of others by promoting their differences and
equality together. I slightly revise it and propose an ethics of equality substantially promoting
difference. I emphasize the importance of equality in promoting difference of concrete others.
An ethics of concrete others, which emphasizes both transcendental dimension and immanent
dimension of concrete others, promotes both difference and equality of concrete others through
equality that is substantially conducive to protection and promotion of difference. In the next
chapter, I focus on what differences of concrete others are to be protected and how to promote
the differences.
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Chapter 2
Difference of Concrete others and Human rights

An ethics of concrete others is an ethics of equality substantially promoting difference.
Of the two factors of quality and difference, this chapter deals mainly with difference of concrete
others. And the chapter will explore whether liberal multiculturalism is the best way to protect
those differences. What differences do concrete others have? There are actually two tiers of
differences: one tier involves individual differences; the second involves group differences. The
two differences that constitute individual identity are distinguishable but interconnected and
interdependent. An ethics of concrete others endeavors to protect and promote both individual
difference and group difference through equality by substantially promoting them.
Concrete others are not just individuals. The concept of concrete others does not endorse
the view that group identity is easily separable and alienable from an individual. Rather, the
concept of concrete others advocates the view that group identity plays a constitutive role in
forming individual identity. Individuals cannot have unencumbered identities separated from
their groups, since they exist ―as members of this family or community or nation or people, as
bearers of this history, as sons or daughters of that revolution, as citizens of this republic.‖1 If
individuals can voluntarily choose their social attachments, group identity means a secondary
identity to individuals, but ―social attachments [] more often than not are involuntarily picked up
during the course of our upbringing, rational choice having played no role whatsoever.‖2 In this
vein, some of group identities are a primary identity to individuals. Nonetheless, it does not mean
1
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that every social attachment is ascribed to individuals uncritically. Rather it means that some
social attachments are ―so fundamental to our identity that they cannot be set aside, and that an
attempt to do so will result in serious and perhaps irreparable psychological damage.‖3 Thus,
group identities are inseparable from individual identities. Protecting concrete others means
protecting both their group identity and individual identity.
What kind of human rights can best protect both differences? Individual human rights
seem to be sufficient because individual human rights gives the impression that differences can
be protected by its civil and political rights and by social, economic, and cultural rights. Group
rights, in this sense, appear to be redundant and unnecessary. However, it will become clear that,
while individual human rights can protect differences of individuals, they cannot protect group
differences of individuals. More exactly, individual human rights protect individual differences
through ignoring group differences. Unlike individual rights, group rights endeavors to protect
group difference of individuals. However, even while offering protection, the group rights rubric
creates a problem of internal minorities, which is the result of promoting group differences by
ignoring individual differences among group members. Acknowledging the limitation of group
rights, liberal multiculturalism attempts to protect both group difference and individual
difference by promoting both equality between groups and freedom within groups. Equality
between groups means providing resources in order to promote group differences. Freedom
within groups indicates protecting individual difference that can be infringed as group
differences are promoted. I will argue that liberal multiculturalism fails to protect individual
differences and group differences since it is indifferent to equality within groups; that is, equality
substantially promoting individual differences.
3
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2.1 Group difference of concrete others
Concrete others have group differences. Every concrete others belongs to a certain family,
community, and a nation. Their belonging to these groups gives them an established group
identity. A group existing within the territorial boundary of a larger group is called a minority.
There are religious minorities, cultural minorities, and ethnic minorities, to name a few.
Generally speaking, minorities have experienced domination and oppression by the majority
which has disadvantaged those minorities culturally, politically and economically. Minority
problems refer to the domination and oppression of minority groups. Minority problems exist
owing to group difference of a minority.
There are two types of group difference. One is a dissimilation group difference and the
other is an assimilation group difference. A dissimilation group difference occurs in minorities
by their own will; that is, by those who ―want to preserve their distinctiveness as unique ethnic,
cultural, religious, or linguistic communities within the territory of the state but are instead
subject to majority campaigns of assimilation.‖4 An assimilation group difference occurs by
force, imposed on those who ―want to be incorporated within the majority but are separated from
it against their will.‖5 In such instances, the minority by force has experienced separation and
discrimination from the majority. The majority in this case emphasizes different characteristics
of the minorities such as race, ethnicity, language, religion or culture in order to perpetuate the
separation. In this case, the minority group identity does not assign important meaning to the
imposed difference since it is imposed by the majority. In the case of a minority by will, on the
other hand, the minority emphasizes its dissimilation group difference, in order not to be
4
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assimilated into the majority. By rejecting assimilation into the majority, the dissimilation
minority experiences misrecognition, oppression, or ostracism. Although there are two different
kinds of group differences, both minorities―by will and by force―experience similar
domination and oppression. Nonetheless, the two minorities need different approaches to address
minority problems.6 Between the two kinds of group differences, I am concerned about
dissimilation. One determining factor of the dissimilation group difference is the ―will‖ of a
minority group.
The other factor of determining the dissimilation group difference is individual choice. A
group difference of minorities by will whose identity is not dependent upon individual choice is
a dissimilation group difference. The dissimilation group difference is shaped by group goods
and identities that could be beyond an individual choice. A salient example of a dissimilation
group difference is that of indigenous people. For instance, Kieran Cronin enlists several group
goods and identities that form a dissimilation group difference of indigenous peoples: the land
for indigenous peoples, education in social and cultural perspective, religious identity, and a
language as ―an intergenerational reality.‖7 In terms of the land, it ―is more than a piece of
property that can be easily alienated.‖8 In the same vein, Darlene M. Johnston says that ―[Native
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Americans] and land and culture are indissolubly linked,‖9 referring to the testimony of a Fort
McPherson Indian:
It is very clear to me that it is an important and special thing to be an Indian. Being an
Indian means being able to understand and live with this world in a very special way. It
means living with the land, with the animals, with the birds and fish, as though they
were your sisters and brothers. It means saying the land is an old friend and an old
friend that your father knew, your grandfather knew, indeed your people always have
known…we see our land as much, much more than the white man sees it. To the Indian
people our land is really our life. Without our land we cannot – we could no longer exist
as people. If our land is destroyed, we too are destroyed. If your people ever take our
land, you will be taking our life.10
The land is inseparable from the native people. The land means more than benefits and personal
interests to the individual members of the Native American tribes. It is equated with their life and
their very existence. Put differently, the land is inseparably ingrained in members of the tribes.
Considering the inseparable relationship between the land and the native people, education is not
just for individuals but for the entire tribe who will work toward using and preserving the land in
their unique ways. The inseparable relationship among the land, the native people, and their
education shapes the dissimilation group difference of the native people.
Religious identity is quite different from voluntary affiliation with a political party or a
charity group. Religion has an ―architectonic significance‖ to its believers, ―as it co-ordinates
and permeates each aspect of culture.‖11 Architectonic means that ―it rules or has authority over
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other concerns‖ in such a way as to make certain concerns the master concerns.12 For some a
religious conversion is a matter of individual choice, for others, whose religious identity has the
architectonic significance, it ―amounts to…the betrayal of [their] identity.‖13 Even when some
people convert to another religion, their new religious identities give them architectonic
significance, so that another conversion is equated with the betrayal of their identities. For many
religious people, religion is not a matter of choice but is instead just such an architectonic choice.
Specifically, religious identity is crucial for ethnic or national minorities when religious identity
is intertwined with their ethnic or national identity.
Language also plays a constitutive role in shaping the dissimilation group difference.
With regard to language, as is evident in the case of Native Americans who express their special
relationship with land, ancestor, and nature, ―each language contains its own unique set of clues
to some of the mysteries of human existence.‖14 Richard Blot says, ―Language is inescapably a
badge of identity.‖15 He contends that ―without any connection with language in use‖ the abstract
identity concepts such as ethnicity, gender, class, nation and nationality lose ―an extremely
important means‖ by which people shape their identities.16 While a language is an important sign
of a collective identity, a lively discussion continues on the relationship between language and
culture. In a world where bilingualism is well established, one language and one culture seems to
be inadequate. Languages are innately connected to their cultures: ―Specific languages are
related to specific cultures and to their attendant cultural identities at the level of doing, at the
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level of knowing and at the level of being.‖17 The United Nations Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) emphasizes the importance of saving indigenous languages:
Protecting indigenous languages ―is a matter of great urgency and is crucial to ensuring the
protection of the cultural identity and dignity of indigenous peoples and safeguarding their
traditional heritage.‖18 According to the UNPFII, more specific reasons to protect indigenous
languages are these:
As a result of linguistic erosion, much of the encyclopedia of traditional indigenous
knowledge that is usually passed down orally from generation to generation is in danger
of being lost forever. This loss is irreplaceable and irreparable.
Customary laws of indigenous communities are often set out in their languages, and if
the language is lost the community may not fully understand its laws and system of
governance that foster its future survival.
The loss of indigenous languages signifies not only the loss of traditional knowledge
but also the loss of cultural diversity, undermining the identity and spirituality of the
community and the individual.
Biological, linguistic and cultural diversity are inseparable and mutually reinforcing, so
when an indigenous language is lost, so too is traditional knowledge on how to maintain
the world‘s biological diversity and address climate change and other environmental
challenges.19

This demonstrates the constitutive role languages play in shaping customary laws and cultures of
indigenous people. For indigenous peoples, then, their language and culture are so closely
connected that their group identity cannot be reduced to a matter of individual choice.
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As with indigenous peoples, those who are minorities by will such as national minorities,
some immigrant groups, refugees, or guest workers have the dissimilation group difference. The
dissimilation group difference should be protected as long as the group members endeavor to
preserve it. Even when minorities by force want to become assimilated into their majority culture,
if their culture and language are endangered, the culture and language should be protected for
linguistic and cultural diversity. Identifying the endangered group difference as an exceptional
case, however, I will focus on how to protect the dissimilation group difference.

2.2 Group rights and individual rights for group difference
There are two ways in dealing with the dissimilation group difference of minorities. One
is the assimilation solution through universal human rights and the other is the dissimilation
solution through special group rights. The dissimilation solution has been proposed by the
League of Nations, though it failed to implement minority rights and powerful states persisted in
abusing minority rights. The League of Nations actually instituted ―minority rights law on the
international level.‖20 It stipulated provisions such as the free exercise of religion, the free use of
language, equal treatment and security of minorities, and education through one‘s own
language.21 Although stipulating the guarantee of minority rights, the League of Nations was
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unable to protect them. On the one hand, it sided with state authorities rather than minority
groups.22 On the other hand, when minorities wanted to protect their group rights through the
League of Nations, individual states ―did not necessarily recognize the existence of their
minorities.‖23 Though there was the stipulated minority rights law, the League of Nations was
unable to challenge state sovereignty that either denied rights of minority groups or ignored the
existence of its minority groups.24 While some failed cases of respecting minority rights occurred,
there were more dangerous cases of asserting minority rights by some sovereign states. For
instance, minority rights allowed Hitler ―to exploit the perception that all foreign German
nationals should be treated with equal respect,‖ which resulted in his annexing neighboring
states.25 The special group rights gave justification for him to occupy adjacent states. For another
instance of abuse, Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 ―on the grounds that the Japanese foreign

own language; it being understood that the teaching of the official language [may be] made obligatory in
the said schools.
Minorities will be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of public funds for
educational, religious or charitable purposes.
The stipulations affecting persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities are declared to
constitute obligations of international concern and are placed under the guaranty of the League.
22
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nationals possessed the right to be free from oppression in a foreign land.‖26 The idea of special
group rights was thus thought to be destabilizing international stability. From the perspective of
the invaded states that contained minority groups, the claim of special group rights was a threat
to their state security.
Because of the difficulty and the danger in promoting special group rights, universal
individual human rights became the norm of the international system as the United Nations
accepted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Since special group rights had the
effect of destabilizing states within and without, the states that created the United Nations, were
―deeply suspicious of would-be rival claimants to their authority, territory, or population.‖27
Through the postwar movement that promoted universal individual human rights rather
than special group rights, assimilation is the only way for individuals in minority groups to
protect themselves, though they may lose their collective identities. With the replacement of the
idea of universal individual human rights, ethnic minorities lose their support for cultural and
political protection. In the same vein, Kymlicka contends that individual human rights are not
just ―an alternative means of protecting minority‖ but are also a reflection of ―a desire to control
and disempower minority‖ since ―it protected the members of minority groups as individuals, but
did not protect their institutions, and so disempowered them as collective actors.‖28 With
universal individual human rights replacing minority rights, Kymlicka says, states were able ―to
centralize all political and legal power in forums dominated by the majority group‖ by
eliminating the pre-existing local autonomy of minority groups, ―to privilege that group‘s
language and culture in all public institutions, which are then diffused throughout the territory of
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the state[,] and to make minority language and culture invisible in public space.‖29 In the name of
universal individual human rights, states began to neglect the language and culture of their
minority groups.30 In the process of assimilation, minority members have been involuntarily
assimilated in the majority culture and language.31 The majority rule deprives minority
individuals of their group identities. He thus concludes that assimilation based on universal
individual human rights ―has been the creation of multiple and deeply rooted forms of exclusion
and subordination for minorities, often combining political marginalization, economic
disadvantage, and cultural domination.‖32 The universal individual human rights ―had
successfully contested formal state discrimination but were unable to effectively remedy the
lingering social, economic, political and cultural effects of historic hierarchies.‖33 Because of
assimilation, individuals of minorities under universal individual human rights still have been
experiencing infringement of their dissimilation difference.
Quite differently from Kymlicka, Jack Donnelly contends that if individual human rights
are implemented well, the idea of special group rights is redundant and unnecessary. Donnelly
first of all denies the existence of the special group rights. He refers to the Article 27 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR): ―In those States in which ethnic,
religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied
the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to
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profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.‖34 Donnelly points out that
in Article 27 individual members of minorities, not minorities as a group, have these rights. In
his view, the rights stipulated in the Article 27 belong only to individuals. Kymlicka
acknowledges that the Article 27 ―can be seen as essentially an anti-discrimination provision‖ in
such a way to ―prohibit discrimination in civil liberties on the basis of race or ethnicity.‖35
Donnelly thus contends that ―a liberal individual rights‖ approach can address ―the sufferings of
members of despised, oppressed, or disadvantaged groups.‖36 He further asserts that individual
human rights can replace group rights with the principle of nondiscrimination, freedom of
association, and guaranteed participation.
Donnelly contends that the principle of nondiscrimination ensures members of the
minority groups equal rights enjoyed by members of the majority group. Nondiscrimination
stipulates that ―[e]ach individual, irrespective of race, gender, religion, or any other group
affiliation, should be treated equally.‖37 According to the principle of nondiscrimination,
individuals have the same rights without regard to their different identities and classes: Whether
an individual is a person of the North or the South, a male or female, a religious fundamentalist
or a religious reformist, a poor or a rich person, or a liberalist or a socialist, everyone has the
same rights without discrimination. He enlists three requirements of nondiscrimination:
toleration, equal protection, and multiculturalism. Toleration means not ―impos[ing] special
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burdens on (members of) despised groups‖ by either disapproving a group related behavior or
disqualifying individuals based on their group membership.38 Toleration breaks down the
barriers between individuals of the majority group and individuals of minority groups.
However, toleration has a shortcoming. When individuals of despised groups are
tolerated, it does not mean that they are accepted. That is to say, the minority can coexist with
individuals of the majority, but they are not yet allowed to enjoy the same goods or services
provided to the majority. Toleration thus needs equal protection. Equal protection ensures
members of the minority enjoying the rights that they formerly held and the rights that members
of the majority take for granted: ―At minimum…members of disadvantaged or despised
groups… are not excluded from goods, services, and opportunities that would be available to
them were they not members of despised or disadvantaged groups….In its stronger forms –
affirmative action and even certain kinds of reverse discrimination – equal protection seeks to
assure that members of targeted groups achieve full legal and political incorporation into
society.‖39 With equal protection, members of the minority are able to enjoy the equal rights that
had been given only to members of the majority. But equal protection has a limitation. While it
provides equal protection to members of the minority, it opens a way for members of the
majority to regard members of the minority as the underdeveloped or the backward, instead of
acknowledging and encouraging their uniqueness or differences. Equal protection thus needs to
be supplemented by multiculturalism, which ―positively values diversity, implying policies that
recognize, celebrate, preserve, or foster group differences.‖40 In his view, the individual human
rights through the principle of nondiscrimination stipulated as toleration, equal protection, and
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multiculturalism thus guarantees that members of the minority groups have equal rights without
recourse to group rights.
Donnelly, however, points out that the nondiscrimination principle cannot fully address
systematic discrimination. He thus adds freedom of association and guaranteed participation to
complement what the principle of nondiscrimination cannot provide to the members of the
minority group. Whereas the principle of nondiscrimination provides equal rights to members of
the minority group, it does not support collective action for challenging systematic
discrimination. He thinks that freedom of association and guaranteed participation enable the
minorities to challenge the systematic inequality as they ensure the minorities‘ collective action.
In collective action, freedom of association and guaranteed participation do not force individuals
to participate. Rather, they respect autonomy of individuals. It is an individual‘s autonomous
decision whether or not to participate in the collective action. Emphasizing autonomy of
individuals, however, he regards individual group identities as a matter of individual choice.
Donnelly also acknowledges the limitation in freedom of association: ignorance of group identity
imposed on individuals. He thus admits that there exist externally imposed group identities; but
he still emphasizes the importance of freedom of association. In his thinking, individual
autonomy can overcome such an imposed group identity since group identities are social
constructs. In addition, freedom of association helps members of despised minorities ―act
collectively to realize their interests or protect their rights‖ as it encourages other people to join
the struggle.41 For Donnelly, the idea of universal individual human rights, with freedom of
association, guaranteed participation, and the principle of nondiscrimination, suffices for
protecting rights of minority members.
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While I accept that universal individual human rights through freedom of association and
nondiscrimination can address many problems of minority group members, insoluble problems
of minorities still remain. Those problems are more easily seen when we consider minority
groups that want to preserve their own identities. Specifically, Donnelly‘s individual human
rights solution is insufficient for minorities who claim their external or internal selfdetermination. Put differently, individual human rights are a workable solution to minorities by
force but are inefficacious to minorities by will. The problem of minorities by will only reveals
that universal individual human rights is a ―difference-blind human rights,‖ devoid of ―minorityspecific provisions.‖42

2.3 Liberal multiculturalism: equality between groups and freedom within groups
Considering limitations of special group rights and universal individual human rights in
promoting both individual differences and group differences, Kymlicka proposes liberal
multiculturalism as offering a liberal understanding of group rights. I will first identify what
liberal multiculturalism is and then engage in a discussion with it. As I have shown, individual
rights cannot promote the dissimilation group difference, but at the same time group rights could
be detrimental to individual difference. Liberal multiculturalism endeavors to address the
problem of internal minorities as well as the problem of inequality between groups, through
incorporating both individual rights and group rights in a balanced way:
Liberal multiculturalism is the view that states should not only uphold the familiar set of
common civil, political, and social rights of citizenship that are protected in all
constitutional liberal democracies, but also adopt various group-specific rights or
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policies that are intended to recognize and accommodate the distinctive identities and
aspirations of ethnocultural groups.43
Like universal individual human rights, liberal multiculturalism is concerned about the rights of
individual members in a group. Unlike universal individual human rights, liberal
multiculturalism addresses ―highly group-differentiated‖ and ―highly targeted‖ group rights: it
―guarantees certain generic minority rights to all ethnocultural groups, but it also elaborates a
number of targeted categories of minority rights.‖44 Because it addresses highly targeted group
rights, it does not say that ―‗all minorities have a right to X‘ or ‗all persons belonging to
minorities have a right to X‘‖; instead, different minorities have different types of minority
rights.45 Kymlicka categorizes minority rights into three types: indigenous people, national
minorities, and immigrant groups. He assigns these three groups different group rights. For
instance, national minorities are assigned at least generic rights whereas indigenous people have
particular rights, which include ―the promise of rights to land, control over natural resources,
political self-government, language rights, and legal pluralism.‖46 Thus, liberal multiculturalism
not only promotes ―symbolic recognition or identity politics‖ of minorities but ―also addresses
issues of power and resources‖ in such a way that national minorities and indigenous peoples
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have their self-government.47 It shows that liberal multiculturalism is concerned about the
equality between groups.
Liberal multiculturalism is also concerned about the internal minority problem. In that
matter, liberal multiculturalism requires liberal constitutionalism. That is to say, minorities can
―challenge their historic exclusion and subordination,‖ but they should respect common
standards of civil, political, and social rights of citizens, which on the one hand do not allow
them ―to contest their subordinate status vis-à-vis the dominant group while still hoping to
maintain their own dominance over women, religious minorities, migrants, lower caste groups,
and so on‖ and which on the other hand assure the dominant group ―that they won‘t be stripped
of their citizenship, or subject to ethnic cleansing, or jailed without a fair trial, or denied their
rights to free speech, association, and worship.‖48 Liberal multiculturalism thus ―legitimizes the
claims of historically disadvantaged minorities, yet reassures members of the dominant group
that no matter how debates over minority rights are resolved, basic rights will be protected.‖49
Kymlicka emphasizes two important principles of liberal multiculturalism: they are ―the
twin ideas of ‗equality between groups‘ and ‗freedom within groups.‘‖50 Kymlicka explains the
double protection using the terms, inter-group equality and individual freedom.51 In his book,
Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka identifies inter-group equality with external protections, and
individual freedom with the removal of internal restrictions. Internal restrictions happen when a
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minority group ―may seek the use of state power to restrict the liberty of its own members in the
name of group solidarity.‖52 External Protections denote that a minority group ―may seek to
protect its distinct existence and identity by limiting the impact of the decisions of the larger
society.‖53 Through endorsing external protections, liberal multiculturalism tries to ―promote
fairness between groups.‖ 54 In rejecting internal restrictions, on the other hand, it tries to ―revise
traditional authorities and practices.‖55 While emphasizing that liberal multiculturalism supports
external protections but disallows internal restrictions, Kymlicka admits that it is not easy to
draw a fine line between external protections and internal restrictions. Put differently, supporting
external protection can lead to internal restrictions. While admitting cases such as ―group-libel
laws‖ and ―indigenous land rights‖ in which external protections justify internal restrictions,
Kymlicka does not endorse external protections that justify internal restrictions.56 In his thinking,
external protections should be given with the proviso that internal restrictions are minimized.
Kymlicka further contends that ―the very reasons we have to support external protections are also
reasons to oppose internal restrictions.‖57 In other words, ―minority rights are not only consistent
with individual freedom, but can actually promote it.‖58 To prove his argument, he has recourse
to his understanding of culture.
When it comes to culture, instead of the traditionalist understanding of culture, Kymlicka
adopts a transformational understanding of culture. Kymlicka regards cultural hybridity as ―the
normal state of human affairs,‖ acknowledges plurality of cultures within a given group, accepts
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coexistence between ―support for a right to cultural preservation [and] support for universal
human rights,‖ and renders cultural identity claims as negotiable.59 That is to say, his view of
culture rejects the essentialization of culture, includes many subcultures, is compatible with
universal individual human rights, and does not impose fixed identity on its individual members.
This transformational understanding of culture enables liberal multiculturalism to promote both
equality between groups and freedom within groups. For him, culture is societal,
that is, a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the
full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and
economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be
territorially concentrated, and based on a shared language.60
According to Kymlicka, societal culture assures the fundamental freedom of its members. The
societal culture ―grants people a very wide freedom of choice in terms of how they lead their
lives. It allows people to choose a conception of the good life, and then allows them to
reconsider that decision, and adopt a new and hopefully better plan of life.‖61 The societal culture
provides its individual members freedom of choice among various options for a good life. 62 Thus,
culture is valuable not because of itself, but because of its provision of a range of meaningful
options to individual members.63 This is why group differentiated rights are necessary: ―For
meaningful individual choice to be possible, individuals need not only access to information, the
capacity to reflectively evaluate it, and freedom of expression and association. They also need
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access to a societal culture.‖64 Individuals have the ability to make a choice but what provides a
context of choice is a culture.
While culture provides a context of choice, it also changes, since cultural hybridity is ―the
normal state of human affairs.‖65 If a culture changes and at the same time provides a context of
choice, two questions arise. With relation to group rights, why should culture be protected? If it
is in the nature of culture to change, there seems to be no need to protect it. The second question
is about the relationship between a culture and its individual members. Is a changing culture able
to provide group identity to its individual members? Put differently, is the relationship between a
changing culture and individual members thick enough to justify group rights? Kymlicka notices
these possible questions. He tries to address them by distinguishing between the existence of
culture and the character of culture. ―The character of a culture can change dramatically,‖ but the
existence of a culture does not change easily.66 Considering cultural hybridity, the existence of a
culture needs more explanation. Kymlicka admits that a culture is influenced by a variety of
disparate cultural sources. But such influences do not negate the existence of a culture:
It is often possible to trace the path by which our culture incorporates the cultural
materials of other nations. The work of other cultures may become available to us
through translation, or through the influx of immigrants who bring certain cultural
narratives with them as they integrate. That we learn in this way from other cultures, or
that we borrow words from other languages, does not mean that we do not still belong
to separate societal cultures, or speak different languages.67
While a culture continuously interacts with other cultures, it has its own existence, even when it
is in the process of its shaping. Such understanding of the existence of culture has been criticized
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by many theorists. First of all, Benhabib challenges Kymlicka‘s view of culture, denying a single
culture:
Any complex human society, at any point in time, is composed of multiple material and
symbolic practices with a history. This history is the sedimented repository of struggles
for power, symbolization, and signification – in short, for cultural and political
hegemony carried out among groups, classes, and genders. There is never a single
culture, one coherent system of beliefs, significations, symbolizations, and practices,
that would extend ―across the full range of human activities.‖ I am arguing that there
cannot be such a single principle of societal culture, and also that at any point in time
there are competing collective narratives and significations that range across institutions
and form the dialogue of cultures.68
For Benhabib, no human society has a single culture but instead has many cultures existing
through conflicts and dialogues. She thus accuses Kymlicka‘s view of culture as culturalist
essentialism.
However, I do not think that Kymlicka essentializes culture. His view that a society has
its representative culture is, in my opinion, far from essentializing culture. While Benhabib
denies the existence of a single culture, her view of an individual identity opens a way to the
possibility for a society to have a representative culture. When it comes to the identity of
individuals, Benhabib contends that although human beings are thrown into ―the macronarratives
of collective identity,‖ we have ―our capacity to weave out of those narratives our individual life
stories, which make sense for us as unique selves.‖69 For Benhabib, individuality, as the dialogic
and narrative constitution of self, is ―the unique and fragile achievement of selves in weaving
together conflicting narratives and allegiances into a unique life history.‖70 Benhabib accepts that
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an individual has a self although he is in the process of constituting himself in a dialogical way.
Put differently, an individual like a human society is exposed to many conflicting cultures with
which one can have a dialogical relationship for constituting one‘s own self. Sometimes, an
individual has difficulty in identifying herself since she contains conflicting cultural claims
within herself. But, it does not mean that she does not exist or that she does not have her own
identity. In the same way, the existence of many conflicting cultures in a society does not deny
the existence of a representative culture for the society. As an individual has her identity in the
midst of her identity making, a society can have a representative culture in its endless process of
interaction with other cultures. A represented culture is a snapshot of a culture interacting with
other cultures within and without. If Kymlicka says that the snapshot of a changing culture is the
culture of a society, it is an essentialization of a culture. However, Kymlicka did not adopt a
view of culture that is unchanging, essential, or singular.
The existence of a culture, in a different vein, can also be justified by Benhabib‘s claim
of the possibility of shared plausible and comprehensible evaluation beyond culture. While
criticizing cultural relativism, Benhabib contends that beyond the dichotomy of ―us and them‖
there are those who can share ―plausible and comprehensible‖ evaluations.71 This view allows a
commonality that people can share beyond their culture-based particular understanding of
evaluations. If she asserts that there can be common threads beyond cultures, there can be
common threads among many cultures within a given society. Put differently, within a society
people can share ―plausible and comprehensible‖ evaluations. In reality, without the possibility
of shared plausible and comprehensible evaluations within a culture, there will be no shared
plausible and comprehensible evaluation beyond a culture. If we can admit the possibility of the

71

Benhabib, The Claims of Culture, 42.

71

common or shared evaluations within a society, there can be the existence of a representative
culture in a society.
Patchen Markell criticizes the existence of a culture, pointing out the danger of separating
the existence of a culture from its character. Markell says, ―the ‗character‘ of the culture, where
people live and act, can be represented as a site of freewheeling autonomy, while all the work of
differentiation and identification can be magically performed by some mysteriously separate
property called the ‗existence‘ of the culture, which, just by virtue of its separateness from the
culture‘s character, would seem to pose no threat to the autonomy of the culture‘s members.‖72
That is to say, Kymlicka neatly separates culture into an identity provider and an autonomy
provider. According to Markell, however, ―culture somehow exists in and through its character‖
and thereby without the character, ―the ‗existence‘ of distinct cultures loses its connection to
human agency.‖73 In his view, the separation between the existence and character of culture is
denial of culture itself: Kymlicka‘s culture based on the separation of the inseparable is
unsustainable. What is problematic in the separation, Markell points out, is Kymlicka‘s
regression to the thick, ethnographic sense of culture.74 The thick, ethnographic sense of culture
means a culture in which people share ―specific folk-customs, habits, and rituals‖ while the thin
sense of culture ―focuses on a common language and societal institutions.‖75 As Kymlicka
emphasizes the existence of a culture, in Markell‘s view, the thin sense of culture comes to be
replaced by the thick, ethnographic sense of culture. Kymlicka‘s view then ―locate[s] politics of
culture outside of culture.‖76 In other words, injustice within a culture finds problems in ill-
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recognition or non-recognition of the culture. Such understanding of culture is ―framing issues of
justice and injustice in culture in terms of multicultural recognition.‖77 Framing justice in terms
of culture ―risk[s] overlooking…some of the deeper relations of power and forms of
subordination that underlie the very injustices they are meant to combat.‖78 What Markell points
out is injustice imposed upon individuals. He gives an example of the French headscarves affair.
He points out ―the relative absence of the voices of the girls‖ while it raised ―power, racial,
patriarchal, colonial, and religious‖ issues, which ―do not determine the lives of North African
immigrant women in France.‖79 For Markell, cultural issues hide individual injustice. Put
differently, the separation of the existence and the character in a culture conceals individual
injustice in the group.
Markell indicates that Kymlicka‘s liberal multiculturalism is effective in promoting
equality between groups but is detrimental to freedom within groups. For Markell, furthermore,
culture is the source of injustice. As he admits, however, injustices are imbricated in the case. In
the case of the French headscarves affair, the injustice issues cannot be separated from the
cultural identities of the girls. They belong to North African immigrants, patriarchal society,
colonial situation, and the religious community. Seeing injustice in the culture itself, however,
Markell emphasizes the separation between culture and individual, while pointing out that it is
wrong for Kymlicka to separate existence of culture from its character. But Markell‘s separation
is not persuasive. Surely, the girls were discriminated against not by their individual existence
but by their cultural practices. Without cultural differences there would not have been such
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injustice. It does not mean, however, that throwing off their cultural identity is the only option
for the girls to have justice.
I think he is confusing different kinds of injustice: injustice from outside and injustice
from inside. His view can address injustice from inside but not the injustice from outside. In
addition, according to Kymlicka, without addressing the injustice from outside injustice from
inside is meaningless. The culture that Kymlicka espouses is not a thick culture but a thin one.
With a thin culture that ―does not preclude differences in religion, personal values, family
relationship, or lifestyle choices‖ the injustice from outside can be addressed.80 In addition, since
the culture is shaped by people who ―decide what is best from within their own culture, and []
integrate into their culture whatever they find admirable in other cultures‖ individual members
are able to have their culture that provides a context of choice.81
Sarah Song also criticizes Kymlicka‘s separation between the existence of culture and its
character, contending that the separation makes unnecessary his liberal multiculturalism. For
Kymlicka, culture ―provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of
human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life.‖82 In
providing meaningful ways of life, Song indicates, culture cannot exist without its character such
as cultural norms and practices. She contends that group rights then have ―the danger of freezing
cultures in time and space.‖83 As soon as a culture is frozen in time and space, the separation
between the existence of culture and its characters is nullified. What is worse, when culture is
frozen, it excludes those who subscribe to subcultures other than the frozen one; that is, the
internal minority problem. She thinks that one way to avoid this dilemma is to identify culture
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with its community. Separating existence of culture from its character opens a way for the
identification between a culture and its community. As a context of choice without specific
characters, culture becomes ―whatever we already do or believe at any given time.‖84 Since
culture is a context of choice, protecting culture means protecting those who have the culture that
provides a context of choice. It leads to the identification of the existence of culture with the
existence of the cultural community. Such identification of culture and community leads to the
following simple conclusion:
If a cultural structure is nothing more than the existence of a cultural community, then it
seems that threats to its survival would be threats to the survival of persons who are
members of the cultural community, and this threat could be addressed by liberalism‘s
commitment to protecting the basic rights and liberties of individual persons without
any reference to the value of cultures.85
For her, a practice-free culture as a context of choice is fully compatible with individual human
rights. As long as a culture is identified with its members, there is no need of group rights. But,
for Kymlicka, culture is more than a context of choice without contents. Culture provides its
individual members with a valuable identity: ―most people, most of the time, have a deep bond to
their own culture.‖86 For Kymlicka, cultural identity is crucial for individual‘s self-identity. He
compares identity of belonging and identity of accomplishment. While Song seems to regard a
culture as a context of achievement, Kymlicka regards it as a ground of belonging: ―Although
accomplishments play their role in people‘s sense of their own identity, it would seem that at the
most fundamental level our sense of our own identity depends on criteria of belonging rather
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than on those of accomplishment.‖87 The existence of a culture provides individuals with not
only a context of choice but also a sense of identity and belonging.
Kymlicka‘s emphasis on the existence of culture as an identity provider reveals his
sensitivity to colonialism. While accepting that people have bonds to groups, Song questions
why among many groups it is the cultural group that has priority: ―[P]eople have bonds to
smaller, larger, and cross-cutting communities, and it‘s not clear why any one particular
community should take priority above the others.‖88 She mentions that people in general have
multiple identities rather than having ―strong attachments to cultural identity.‖ 89 For instance,
she indicates that many ethnic white Americans show ―middle-class American values, such as
valuing family, education, and patriotism.‖ 90 Thus, Song refuses the view ―that posits a single
value to cultural membership as a matter of general theory.‖91 She goes on to say: ―Today, due in
part to interactions through the global economy, transnational communications networks, and the
increasing migrations of peoples across borders, people in many parts of the world live in
multicultural contexts and possess multiple identities.‖92 Because people have multiple identities
with different intensities, she says that the priority of cultural group is not granted. I will agree
with her that people have multiple identities and there are many group identities to which
different people attach different values. But, I will argue that her example is too selective. For
instance, her ground is based on the study of ethnic white Americans. They are hardly
representatives of diverse ethnic minorities. In addition, in a globalizing world, those who have
multiple identities are usually those who have the relative luxury of global communications and
87

Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 89. Reciting Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, "National SelfDetermination," Journal of Philosophy 87, no. 9 (1990): 447.
88
Song, Justice, Gender, and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 27.
89
Song, Justice, Gender, and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 28.
90
Song, Justice, Gender, and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 28.
91
Song, Justice, Gender, and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 28.
92
Song, Justice, Gender, and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 33.

76

mobility. Those who have limited ability in regard to global communications and mobility, to my
mind, are far from having such multiple identities. Her examples are thus parochial and partial.
Her examples at best represent minorities by force but not minorities by will. I maintain therefore
that people with multiple identities cannot represent minorities in general.
Song also contends that group rights which try to protect a culture are untenable since
there are not many cases of cultural extinction. As she makes her argument, she reveals her
indifference to colonialism. For instance, she mentions many Pueblo children ―spoke only
English and understood Indian languages only a little or not at all‖ under Anglo-American rule.
What she asserts is that through colonial conquest and coercion, the Pueblo nation experienced
―cultural change without wholesale cultural extinction.‖93 In terms of Native Americans who
experienced assimilation either voluntarily or involuntarily, she correctly claims that
―multicultural experience has led to the adaptation of old cultural forms into new cultural forms,
but the generation of new cultural forms does not necessarily mean that Native American
identities have been lost.‖94 But the fact that a culture has adapted to different cultures does not
justify colonialism. Even African Americans have survived despite their servile lives and their
cultural identities probably have adapted to hostile cultures. However, it does not justify their
slavery imposed by Westerners. Sara Song‘s criticisms on Kymlicka‘s group rights have some
validity, but her criticism misses the crucial point of his group rights. As she contends, culture
can be changed by its members, and, accordingly, cultural identity changes. But, changes can be
achieved through different reasons. What Kymlicka warns is the change of culture that is ―a
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result of decisions made by people outside the culture.‖95 Kymlicka tries to provide ways in
which a group keeps its autonomy while not infringing the rights of its individual members.
Through his understanding of culture and his distinction between the existence of a
culture and its character, Kymlicka endeavors to show that culture is not detrimental to rights of
its individual members. In addition, his emphasis on equality between groups and group identity
reveals his sensitivity to colonialism. Cultural changes should be brought forth from within but
not forced from outside. This frame of voluntary changes is applied to addressing the problem of
internal minorities, i.e., increasing freedom within groups.
Kymlicka emphasizes that group rights should provide freedom to its individual members.
But a simple solution is nonexistent. When a minority group does not accept the civil rights of its
members, what can its liberal society do to the illiberal minority group? The universal individual
human rights tradition can justify the imposition of liberal principles. However, Kymlicka
eschews imposing liberal principles on the minority group. To explain his reasoning, he
juxtaposes minorities with the sovereign state.
For Kymlicka, minority groups have the same rights as the sovereign state. It is difficult
and dangerous to impose liberal principles onto sovereign states such as Saudi Arabia in which
women or non-Muslims have no political rights or onto Germany wherein political rights are
denied to guest-worker children who were born in Germany.96 In his thinking, it is inconsistent
for liberals to be willing to impose liberalism on minorities but to be reluctant to impose it on
foreign countries. Kymlicka thus concludes that ―liberal institutions can only really work if
liberal beliefs have been internalized by the members of the self-governing society, be it an
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independent country or a national minority.‖97 Some might ask whether such internalization is
possible. It is possible because a given culture has its many subcultures, which can ask
legitimacy of certain cultural practices.
Michael Perry‘s concept of an internal critique is helpful to gain an understanding of such
internalization.98 An internal critique is a critique based on subcultures of a given culture. Perry
points out that cultures are morally pluralistic, which opens a way of dealing with moral issues
intraculturally rather than interculturally. An internal critique is possible because there are
different moral traditions in a given culture. An internal critique is better than an intercultural
critique since the intercultural critique will be regarded as ―a morally imperialist attempt by
outsiders to impose their values on the insiders, to make the insiders more like the outsiders.‖99
For instance, in terms of female circumcision, the Association of African Women for Research
and Development stated that ―[f]eminists from developed countries…must accept that [female
genital mutilation] is a problem for African women, and that no change is possible without the
conscious participation of African women.‖100 It means that critiquing and addressing problems
of African women needs to be based on their shared understanding and participation. Female
circumcision needs to be addressed through African women who can understand and participate
in cultural changes. In this case, allowing the autonomy of African women seems to justify
illiberal cultural practices, and thus may be criticized as restricting freedom within groups.
It is easy to blame the illiberal acts of minority groups. But criticizing illiberal minority
groups does not prove that the majority embodies liberal principles. Sarah Song points out the
97
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danger, for example, when a group of liberal multiculturalists criticizes illiberal minorities, it
does not recognize its own illiberal characteristics such as gender inequality. In the case of
immigrants, what she calls congruent effect, ―patriarchal practices in minority cultures may find
support from mainstream norms such that the process of assimilation involves an affirmation of
patriarchal traditions within minority cultures.‖101 On the other hand, there is the diversionary
effect. While the majority condemns illiberal practices of minority groups, it hides its own
illiberal practices: ―by focusing on the patriarchal practices of minority cultures, the majority can
divert attention from its own gender hierarchies….It also help[s] deflect criticism away from
gender inequality in Western societies by emphasizing gender oppression in non-Western
societies.‖102 In many cases it is hypocrisy for a majority to impose liberal values onto an
illiberal minority.103 What she proposes to both the majority and the minority is to work together
in addressing oppression and unjust hierarchies. In the same vein, Kymlicka also contends that
protecting individual freedom needs collaboration between the liberal majority and the illiberal
minority:
Liberals have a right, and a responsibility, to speak out against such injustice. Hence
liberal reformers inside the culture should seek to promote their liberal principles,
through reason or example, and liberals outside should lend their support to any efforts
the group makes to liberalize their culture. Since the most enduring forms of
liberalization are those that result from internal reform, the primary focus for liberals
outside the group should be to provide this sort of support.104
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Effective liberal solutions to internal minority injustice would undergird voluntary internal
liberalization without external intervention. Although he justifies external intervention in the
cases of ―slavery or genocide or mass torture and expulsions,‖ the underlying principle is to
respect the autonomy of minority groups with minimum intervention.105 In terms of protecting
differences, while it may take more time, this way of respecting the autonomy of minorities
seems to promote freedom within groups as well as equality between groups.

2.4 Limitations of liberal multiculturalism
Liberal multiculturalism endeavors to promote both group difference and individual
difference through equality between groups and freedom within groups. I agree that equality
between groups can promote group difference. I also agree that group difference provides
context of individual freedom, which is a crucial basis of individual difference within the group.
In addition, I maintain that freedom within groups can address the internal minority problem.
However, I argue that equality between group and freedom within groups can only partially
protect and promote group difference and individual difference. Group difference that is
substantiated by equality between groups is prone to be group difference by elites. If group
difference is determined by elites, ordinary members of the group are excluded from the group
difference determining process. The group difference is then a partial group difference. In terms
of individual difference, the principle of freedom within groups reveals inconsistency of
Kymlicka‘s view of difference and equality. Kymlicka acknowledges the importance of equality
between groups in promoting group difference. In the same way, equality between individuals is
essential in promoting individual difference. Nonetheless, his principle of freedom within
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groups is silent on the relationship between equality and individual difference. In this sense,
individual difference guaranteed by freedom within groups is also a partial individual difference.
Group difference and individual difference should be promoted substantially by equality within
groups.
Group difference that is promoted by equality between groups is partial and insufficient.
It needs to be supplemented by equality within groups. Otto Bauer contends that promoting
multiculturalism is inseparable from achieving economic equality. Multiculturalism in this case
is not multiculturalism within a nation but every nation with its own culture.
Among three types of nations he mentions, it is the third type that is my concern, the one
that can work toward respecting cultural differences and addressing economic inequality―the
socialist society――the community of education, of labor, of cultural enjoyment,‖ which ensures
―participation in public life and social labor.‖106 Through participation in public life and social
labor, the entire people, not only the educated few, decide the destiny of its nation. Bauer
emphasizes that in the socialist society, the culture is shaped not only by the elites but by the
entire people. Nations will have their own cultural community only as socialist societies, because
through economic equality the entire people of a nation participate in the decision-making
process. He contends that this participation is possible through ―the transfer of the means of
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production from private ownership to ownership by the society‖ and ―the establishment of a
national education system.‖107 In terms of the transfer of the means of production, while his
proposal is designed to address economic inequality, his solution that the working class can
address economic inequality is questionable in a highly developed capitalistic world. However,
his proposal at least reminds us of the importance of the economic dimension in addressing
minority autonomy and the intrinsic connection between autonomy and economic equality. To
prevent minority autonomy from being monopolized by dominant classes, the economic
inequality of the poor class should be addressed in such a way that all classes including the poor
can participate in public life. Equality within groups is necessary for promoting group difference.
The question then is whether liberal multiculturalism can promote equality within groups.
Liberal multiculturalism seems to be unable to provide it. Walter Benn Michaels points out that
multiculturalism ―obscur[es] obscuring class difference.‖108 According to him, multiculturalism
makes poor people ―[regard] their problems as effects of discrimination and intolerance.‖ 109
Poor people gather the false impression that they can solve their economic problems by
addressing discrimination and intolerance. Michaels thus contends, ―The dream of a world free
of prejudice…is completely compatible with (is, actually, essential to) the dream of a truly free
and efficient market. Here‘s where the concept of neoliberalism – the idea of the free market as
the essential mechanism of social justice – is genuinely clarifying.‖ 110 How can it be so? It is
because the corollary of the exclusive focus on identity, a society without racism and sexism,
makes people believe that inequality is fixed and thus hides economic inequality. Kymlicka
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acknowledges such a danger of liberal multiculturalism. He admits that liberal multiculturalism
is used ―to repackage cultural differences as an economic asset in a global economy and/or as a
commodity or life style good that can be marketed and consumed.‖111 He mentions several
examples of commodified cultural diversity such as ―‗corporate multiculturalism,‘ ‗consumerist
multiculturalism‘, ‗boutique multiculturalism‘, ‗neo-liberal multiculturalism,‘ or ‗Benetton
multiculturalism.‘‖112 What he accentuates is that corporate elites are not supporters of
multiculturalism; rather, they can easily reject it depending on the market situations. According
to him, ―Corporate elites have typically been latecomers to the multicultural bandwagon, and the
first to jump off the wagon in periods of backlash and retreat against multiculturalism.‖113 While
Kymlicka is successful in pointing out the disconnection between multiculturalism and a neoliberal economy, he does not and is unable to refute Michaels‘ argument that multiculturalism
cannot address economic inequality.
It does not mean that Kymlicka completely ignores the importance of the economic
dimension of minority rights. The targeted indigenous rights track, his preference between
generic rights for national minorities and targeted rights for indigenous people, shows the
importance of the economic dimension. Specifically, indigenous rights guarantee ―rights to land,
control over natural resources, political self-government, language rights, and legal pluralism.‖114
With such a guaranteed set of rights, a minority group can have their full autonomy. This shows
the close connection between group economic rights and autonomy of minority groups. However,
Kymlicka does not apply the close connection between economic equality and autonomy to
individuals within groups. While he allows groups to have economic equality that guarantees
111
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group autonomy, he is silent on individual economic equality that ensures individual autonomy.
Kymlicka reveals his inconsistence in applying his principle of the close connection between
economic equality and autonomy. His principle of freedom within groups is hardly workable
since the individual‘s autonomy is not substantiated by economic equality.
The issue of neglecting economic equality is also evident in Kymlicka‘s principle of
equality between groups. In protecting differences of internal minorities, Kymlicka asks to
respect autonomy of internal minorities without providing economic equality. In protecting
equality of the minority, he also asks respect for the autonomy of a state or the majority. In both
cases, what Kymlicka asks is to wait. But there is a difference between the two cases. In the case
of protecting differences of the internal minority, respecting autonomy of internal minorities is
not without challenges from outside. Liberals can challenge illiberal practices imposed on
internal minorities although done without coercion. In the case of protecting equality of the
minority, however, liberals give permission to postpone providing the targeted rights to the
minority. Challenges can arise from the minority groups but they can be easily ignored by the
permission of liberal multiculturalism, revealing a unidirectional tendency of liberal
multiculturalism in addressing minority issues. Liberal multiculturalism engages aggressively in
addressing neglected differences of minorities; it engages passively in addressing economic
inequality of minorities. While liberal multiculturalism declares that it promotes both difference
and equality of minority groups, it shows its inclination to difference. Liberal multiculturalism‘s
silence of equality within groups uncovers its thoroughness of claiming freedom and its halfheartedness of claiming equality. Freedom is its central concern while equality remains
peripheral.
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One of the reasons for the priority of difference to equality in liberal multiculturalism, I
think, is its liberal understanding of an individual human being as the foundation of human rights.
A liberal understanding of human beings is the reason why even liberal multiculturalism, a
liberal understanding of group rights, prioritizes difference over equality. I will discuss the
connection between liberal understanding of human beings and its negligence of equality in
regard to human rights in the next chapter. In addition, I will show that without equality
individual difference cannot be properly protected.

2.5 Conclusion
An ethics of concrete others promotes differences of concrete others through equality.
There are two differences of concrete others: group difference and individual difference. The two
differences are separable but interconnected and interdependent. Ignoring either one of them is
detrimental to the other. Universal human rights and special group rights have endeavored to
promote both differences. However, universal human rights could promote individual difference
at the cost of group difference, while special group rights could promote group difference at the
expense of individual difference. In order to promote both differences, liberal multiculturalism
proposes equality between groups and freedom within groups. Although liberal multiculturalism
endeavors to promote group difference through equality between groups and individual
difference through freedom within groups, I have shown that it is partially successful in
promoting individual difference and group difference. It is because liberal multiculturalism
neglects equality for individuals. While liberal multiculturalism emphasizes individual difference
and group difference of concrete others, it fails to substantially promote such differences. In the
next chapter, I will contend that liberalism and liberal multiculturalism fail to substantially
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promote individual difference because in promoting individual freedom they deny a constitutive
role of economic equality, specifically capability equality and least-gap equality.
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Chapter 3
Liberal Individualism and Its Priority of Property over Freedom

I have shown in the previous chapter that liberal multiculturalism is unable to fully
protect individual difference with its principle of freedom within groups. The reason for the
failure is that the principle neglects equality within groups that is necessary for substantially
promoting individual difference. This chapter delves into why liberal multiculturalism prioritizes
individual freedom over equality. Specifically, I focus on liberalism because liberal
multiculturalism is in alignment with liberalism in that both neglect equality for prioritizing
individual freedom. I work with liberal theories that justify equality as secondary or irrelevant to
individual freedom. In evaluating liberal theories, my view of equality consists of two kinds:
capability equality and least-gap equality. Both are essential for promoting individual freedom of
all: capability equality provides basic needs for individuals and least-gap equality reduces the
economic gap between the poor and the rich. I will argue that the justifications of the priority of
freedom over equality are not persuasive as they are put forth by the liberal theorists such as
Isaiah Berlin, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, and Ronald Dworkin and that they are unsuccessful in
promoting the freedom of all by neglecting equality.
Arguing that it is inconsistent for the supporters of liberalism to justify the priority of
freedom over equality, I will show that liberalism‘s priority of freedom is based on its
prioritization of private property over individual freedom. The discrepancy between the
purported priority and the real priority of liberalism is the corollary of the liberal understanding
of human beings, that is, liberal individualism: individuals as asocial, self-interested beings.
Theoretically, while the twin pillars of liberal individualism, which consist of individual freedom
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and private property, have equal values, private property has more prominence, as a protector of
individual freedom. As private property is prioritized, however, it protects the freedom of some
individuals, i.e., the propertied, but not all individuals. Liberal individualism, therefore, is unable
to protect the freedom of all and, thus, proves itself unable to be a foundation for the rights of all
human beings.

3.1 Priority of Individual Freedom over Equality
Individual freedom is the core value of liberalism. Liberal political morality is
―fundamentally connected to a view of individual liberty.‖1 According to Anthony Arblaster,
―Liberalism distinguishes itself from other political doctrines by the supreme importance it
attaches to freedom, or liberty.‖2 There is no doubt that individual freedom is a basic value of
liberalism. However, different types of liberalism reveal different understandings of the
relationship between individual freedom and equality. Broadly speaking, there are two liberal
views of relationships between individual freedom and equality: 1) the view that individual
freedom is unrelated or opposed to equality and 2) that equality is necessary and conducive to
individual freedom. The former view is expressed by the traditional liberalist, Isaiah Berlin, and
by the extreme libertarian, Robert Nozick, while the latter view is contended by the liberal
egalitarians, John Rawls and Richard Dworkin. Though they reveal differing views on the
relationship between individual freedom and equality, I will demonstrate that both traditional
liberalism and liberal egalitarianism prioritize individual freedom over equality and that neither
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form of liberal political theory provides persuasive reasons for justifying the priority of
individual freedom over equality.
In evaluating the liberal theories, I use as criteria capability equality and least-gap
equality. They are two dimensions of equality that substantiate individual freedom of all.
Capability equality is based on ―Capabilities Approach‖ proposed by Martha Nussbaum.3 The
Capabilities Approach ―takes each person as an end, asking not just about the total or average
well-being but about the opportunities available to each person. It is focused on choice or
freedom, holding that the crucial good societies should be promoting for their people is a set of
opportunities, or substantial freedoms, which people then may or may not exercise in action: the
choice is theirs.‖4 Nussbaum emphasizes substantial freedom of individuals. For instance, one
can skip a meal as a result of either famine or fasting. The Capabilities Approach allows a fast
but not famine. It emphasizes individual choice but on the presumption that individuals have
material resources for their choices. Nussbaum enlists ten central capabilities.5 These capabilities
may require adequate food, shelter, healthcare, education, protection of individual freedom, and
the like. According to Nussbaum, these capabilities are far from solving social injustice but show
―a rather ample social minimum.‖6 Though I agree that an ample social minimum is a necessary
condition for substantial freedom, it is not a broad enough condition for substantial freedom.
Substantial freedom requires least-gap equality, which is the other dimension of equality with
which I evaluate liberal theories. Least-gap equality means that the economic gap between the
rich and the poor should be as narrow as possible in a given political community. Without least3
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gap equality, the worse-off are unable to have substantial freedom, as they can have fewer
primary goods than the better-off, which I will discuss in the section on John Rawls. In terms of
capability equality, it is different from the Capabilities Approach. While the Capabilities
Approach requires ample social minimum without designating strict economic equality,
capability equality requires more than ample social minimum, such as basic income, public
education, and public health care.7 When I use the term economic equality, the definition will
necessarily include both dimensions: capability equality and least-gap equality.
3.1.1 Individual Freedom unrelated or opposed to equality
3.1.1.1 Isaiah Berlin
Isaiah Berlin places great emphasis on individual freedom, specifically, negative freedom.
In asserting the sheer importance of negative freedom, however, Isaiah Berlin at first does not
deny the importance of equality. Distinguished from positive freedom, negative freedom is ―the
area within which a man can do what he wants.‖8 A human being should have an area that is not
coerced by others. Negative freedom thus rejects any coercion that ―implies the deliberate
interference of other human beings within the area in which I wish to act.‖9 It designates the area
of non-interference.
[Negative] freedom is freedom from chains, from imprisonment, from enslavement by
others. The rest is extension of this sense, or else metaphor. To strive to be free is to
7
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seek to remove obstacles; to struggle for personal freedom is to seek to curb
interference, exploitation, enslavement by men whose ends are theirs, not one‘s own.
Freedom, at least in its political sense, is co-terminous with the absence of bullying or
domination.10
Negative freedom provides an individual her private realm free from interference by others.
While he emphasizes the private realm, devoid of interference, Berlin is not ignorant of the
importance of equality; rather, he is sensitive to enslavement, exploitation, and the danger of
unrestrained capitalism: ―The evils of unrestricted laissez-faire, and of the social and legal
systems that permitted and encouraged it, led to brutal violations of ‗negative‘ liberty – of basic
human rights (always a ‗negative‘ notion: a wall against oppressors), including that of free
expression or association.‖11 Berlin thus recognizes that the infringement of negative liberty can
be caused by economic inequality.
However, Berlin asserts that promoting negative liberty is unrelated or, in some cases,
opposed to economic equality. To show that connection, Berlin differentiates liberty from its
condition. When a person cannot exercise her negative liberty because of her poverty, according
to Berlin, it does not mean that she has no negative liberty. What Berlin denies is a direct
connection between liberty and poverty/equality. Poverty/equality is related only to the condition
of liberty, not to the liberty itself: ―The obligation to promote education, health, justice, to raise
standards of living…is not made less stringent because it is not necessarily directed to the
promotion of liberty itself, but to conditions in which alone its possession is of value, or to
values which may be independent of it.‖12 To illustrate the irrelevance of liberty to equality as its
condition, he uses an example of equality in education. Considering social equality, one may
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contend that children should get equal education not ―governed by the financial resources or the
social position of parents rather than the ability and the needs of the children.‖13 When a state
sponsors equal education for all children, if the parents want to choose their own way of
educating their children, in order to guarantee their negative freedom, the liberty of the parents
needs to be respected.14 If equal education for all children denies the parents a choice to educate
their children in their own way, then their negative freedom has been infringed upon. What
Berlin emphasizes through this example is that promoting negative freedom is unrelated to
economically equal conditions and, what is worse, is that economic equality can infringe
negative freedom. Moreover, he argues:
It must not be forgotten that even though freedom without sufficient material security,
health, knowledge, in a society that lacks equality, justice, mutual confidence, may be
virtually useless, the reverse can also be disastrous. To provide for material needs, for
education, for such equality and security as, say, children have at school or laymen in a
theocracy, is not to expand liberty….Indeed,…paternalism can provide the conditions
of freedom, yet withhold freedom itself.‖15
Berlin points out the danger of an equality that is detrimental to negative freedom. While
equality tries to provide for the conditions of negative freedom, it may reduce or negate negative
freedom itself. Thus, he asserts that there is no intrinsic connection between freedom and
equality. For him, equality can at best provide the conditions of negative freedom and at worst
present obstacles to negative freedom. In this respect, equality as a condition of freedom does not
lead to the promotion of negative freedom.
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While Berlin emphasizes the priority of negative freedom and the separation between
negative freedom and equality, he does not provide any persuasive reason not to promote
economic equality in securing negative freedom. As he points out, one must consider that
freedom, without sufficient material provisions, is virtually useless. For example, a person who
is forced to take a low-income job may have negative freedom but cannot exercise this freedom
due to economic constraints. A woman who is poor and has no special skills, for instance, is
employed at minimum wage and cannot meet her expenditures. She longs to enjoy her negative
freedom, i.e., not to be enslaved, but she has no choice other than to accept her economically
enslaved situation. If state-sponsored programs offered some kind of career training school to her,
she might have a chance to avoid economic enslavement. In this case, equality is indispensable
for activating her negative freedom in order to be free from economic enslavement. If equality
provides the conditions of her negative freedom, equality should be promoted in order for her to
enjoy negative freedom. In a similar vein, equality of opportunity in education can promote
negative freedom. As Berlin indicated above, if a state-sponsored education for all is mandatory,
it could be harmful to the liberty of parents who want their children to be educated in their own
way. However, if a state sponsors equal education for all while giving an educational option like
school vouchers to parents, all parents would have access to the enjoyment of negative freedom:
1) parents who selected other educational means would enjoy their negative freedom and 2)
parents who were destitute would be able to educate their children and enjoy their negative
freedom as well. Equality, in this sense, is not only helpful but also necessary in order to secure
negative freedom.
Conversely, if negative freedom is unrelated to equality, there is no persuasive reason not
to promote equality. In terms of negative freedom, Berlin says, ―Everything is what it is: liberty
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is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or culture, or human happiness or a quiet
conscience.‖16 Here, he delineates the difference between liberty and equality. Liberty is
unrelated to private property. He mentions that negative ―liberties are compatible with extremes
of exploitation, brutality, and injustice.‖17 In this vein, he adumbrates that negative freedom does
not include private property, unlike Friedrich Hayek, whose negative sphere includes ―private
property, a right to privacy and secrecy, and the conception of a man‘s house as his castle.‖18 If
one‘s negative freedom is unrelated to whether or not one has her property, promoting equality
does not impact negative freedom. If so, in order to protect negative freedom, there is no
persuasive reason not to promote equality.
In the relationship between negative freedom and equality, I have argued that promoting
equality can be a necessary condition or does no harm to negative freedom. Berlin, however,
contends that promoting equality can be an obstacle to negative freedom. He worries about
paternalism, which ―can provide the conditions of freedom, yet withhold freedom itself.‖19 He is
correct, for instance, if state-sponsored education for all children limits parents‘ freedom to
educate their children in their own way. In the example, in which the state-sponsored education
for all children, I have explained that parents are able to enjoy their negative freedom if they can
select either the state-sponsored option or their preferred educational method. In this regard,
Berlin excludes this choice option. Behind his exclusion of the choice option stands a
misunderstanding of equality.
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There are two kinds of misunderstandings of equality: one is the equation of promoting
equality by expanding freedom and the other is the equation of promoting equality by imposing
equality. Berlin points out that it is dangerous to equate promoting equality with expanding
liberty. It is similar to the situation that a pauper regards freedom as ―a legal right to purchase
luxuries.‖20 As he indicates, it is a sheer misunderstanding of equality. If equality means buying
what everyone wants, no society will succeed. It is an impossible conception of equality since
the scarce resources cannot be given to all. The second type of misunderstanding of equality is
revealed in the case of state-sponsored education for all children. In this case, he seems to think
that equality negates individual negative freedom. The problem in this case is not equality, but
rather imposition of equality. Imposing equality is different from capability equality. While
imposing equality means providing equality without regard to individual choice, capability
equality means providing equality in order to substantially promote individual difference. In a
similar manner, providing equal opportunity stands in opposition to providing the same job. In
the case of education, equal education for all is opposed to the same education for all. Berlin‘s
misunderstood equality is incompatible with negative freedom, but it does not mean that equality
itself is incompatible with negative freedom. Not imposition of equality, but capability equality
is compatible with negative freedom.
Being concerned about imposition of economic equality to be detrimental to negative
freedom, Berlin is insensitive to the problem of negative freedom itself. Negative freedom has an
innate inclination of being indifferent to others. There is no compelling reason for one to care
about the others‘ negative freedom. If one is content with his enjoyment of negative freedom
while neglecting the infringement of the others‘ negative freedom, negative freedom can be
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called sheer egoism. However, it is not evident that he accepts the identification of negative
freedom with egoism. In this respect, his line-of-reasoning remains inconsistent. If one is
indifferent to those whose negative freedom is useless because of their economic hardship, then
negative freedom is synonymous with selfishness. But, Berlin is hesitant to address such
economic inequality in the promotion of negative freedom. In this vein, Berlin justifies the
priority of negative freedom over equality without providing an adequate reason, which betrays
his distorted understanding of equality as well as his inclination toward being unfaithful to the
promotion of the negative freedom of all.
Accordingly, Berlin fails to provide convincing reasons as to why economic equality
negatively affects negative freedom. Rather, as I mentioned, economic equality is helpful and
necessary in order to promote negative freedom. Contrary to the despotism of his era, which
represented a very real obstacle to negative freedom, today‘s laissez-faire economy, the
uncontrolled market economy, and the liberal ultra-individualism are the main threats to
contemporary negative freedom. Without referring to equality, negative freedom had the
potential to challenge despotism at that time. However, currently, negative freedom without
recourse to economic equality is impotent to resist a laissez-faire economy and an uncontrolled
market economy. Clearly, Berlin‘s understanding of a negative freedom that is unrelated to
economic equality, specifically, capability equality, is devoid of any current significance.
3.1.1.2 Robert Nozick
Unlike Berlin, who separates negative freedom from private property, Robert Nozick
asserts that the strictest preservation of individual freedom will protect private property.
According to Nozick, individual freedom is inseparably connected to property rights. A state
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exists to protect individual freedom and, accordingly, to secure individual property. Thus, in
terms of the state, he concludes:
A minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud,
enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified; that any more extensive state will
violate persons‘ rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified; and that
the minimal state is inspiring as well as right. Two noteworthy implications are that the
state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid
others, or in order to prohibit activities to people for their own good or protection.21
For Nozick, a state exists for protecting property rights and preventing unjust redistribution of
property in order for people not to forcibly redistribute their property against their will.
Being against redistribution and aiding others, Nozick has his own view of equality. He
differentiates between an unacceptable view of equality and acceptable ones. An unacceptable
view of equality is need-based equality. Nozick contends that need-based equality is problematic
since need-based equality is overriding an individual‘s goals and entitlement. For instance,
doctors‘ activities can be allocated for ―the goal of medical care.‖22 By allocating and
distributing medical goods according to needs, a society‘s goal overrides the personal goals and
entitlements of the doctors, who ―may decide for themselves to whom they will give the thing
and on what grounds.‖23 As need-based equality infringes upon an individual‘s goals and
entitlement, individual freedom is severely restricted. Need-based equality is incompatible with
individual freedom and thus is perceived by the individual as an unacceptable view.
Equal opportunity, which is the key component of capability equality, is also an
unacceptable view of equality for Nozick since it is incompatible with individual freedom.
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Nozick states that there are two ways of providing equal opportunity: ―by directly worsening the
situations of those more favored with opportunity, or by improving the situation of those less
well-favored.‖24 The former case is plainly unacceptable since it directly restricts the freedom of
individuals who happen to be more favored. While the latter case does not directly restrict the
freedom of those more favored with opportunity, it is still unacceptable because it indirectly
restricts their freedom. The indirect restriction of freedom happens as follows. The latter case
requires resources. The required resources come from the more favored with opportunity. Those
more favored with opportunity need to provide their resources to those less favored with
opportunity. It thus worsens the situation of those more favored with opportunity and
accordingly restricts their freedom. According to Nozick, in both instances, equal opportunity is
unfair to those more favored with opportunity. His rationale behind his rejection of equal
opportunity is stated as follows:
The major objection to speaking of everyone‘s having a right to various things such as
equality of opportunity, life, and so one, and enforcing this right, is that these ―rights‖
require a substructure of things and materials and actions; and other people may have
rights and entitlements over these. No one has a right to something whose realization
requires certain uses of things and activities that other people have rights and
entitlements over.25
The rationale for rejecting equal opportunity is that economic equality for some diminishes the
rights and entitlements of others.
Both need-based equality and equality of opportunity are unacceptable views of equality,
which are nonsense to Nozick in light of his entitlement theory. In order to scrutinize whether his
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rejection of need-based equality and equal opportunity is justifiable, his entitlement theory must
be addressed.
Nozick contends that his entitlement theory identifies just ownership. Stated differently,
the entitlement theory is the only acceptable view of equality for him. There are three processes
through which one can have justifiable holdings:
1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in
acquisition is entitled to that holding.
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in
transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding.
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2.26

The first principle, the principle of justice in acquisition, concerns the original acquisition of
holdings. While criticizing Locke‘s acquisition theory that one‘s property rights in unowned
objects is originated from his labor mixed in the object, Nozick justifies the acquisition of
unowned objects: if it does not worsen the situations of people who are unable to appropriate
them. He rejects the sole criteria of property rights as labor and instead proposes as a justification
of property rights that others are not worsened by the acquisition.27 Private acquisition is justified
as long as it does not worsen the situation of those who are excluded from such an acquisition.
He contends that private property ―increases the social product by putting means of production in
the hands of those who can use them most efficiently‖ in such a way as to provide more
employment and keep resources for future generations.28 In terms of the original acquisition, it is
26
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justified because the Lockean proviso, the ―enough and as good left in common for others,‖ is
not violated, i.e., it does not worsen the situations of people who are unable to appropriate the
acquisition. 29 It will be discussed later whether or not Nozick‘s version of the Lockean proviso is
viable. The second principle, the principle of justice in transfer, addresses the transferring of
holdings from one to another. Through the example of Wilt Chamberlain, Nozick shows that
redistribution (need-based equality) is a violation of the principle of justice in transfer.30 In a
basketball game played by Chamberlain, people paid their money to watch Chamberlain. Thus,
Chamberlain received money without force. Though Chamberlain earned a large sum of money,
there was no injustice, since the transfer of money was done voluntarily. If the state attempted to
redistribute to the needy the money Chamberlain earned, it would have interfered with free
choice, both of the audience and of Chamberlain. Because the redistribution would interfere in
their free choice, it would have been unacceptable. Only voluntary transfer is justified. The third
principle, the principle of rectification, is to rectify the injustice of the first and the second
principles. If there exists an injustice in an original acquisition and/or injustice in transfer such as
theft, fraud, and forced exclusion, it should be rectified. Conversely, if a person‘s holdings are
originally acquired and transferred justly, there is no way to redistribute the acquired property
without violating the property owner‘s rights.
In Nozick‘s entitlement theory, specifically addressed in the second principle, individual
freedom is closely related to property rights. In a sense, for Nozick, promoting individual
freedom is equated with protecting private property. According to Nozick, one‘s natural talents,
endowments, and merits are inseparable from individuality: ―Whether or not people‘s natural
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assets are arbitrary from a moral point of view, they are entitled to them, and to what flows from
them.‖ 31 People have a right not only to their natural endowments, but also the results of such
endowments. Since natural endowments are inseparable from individuality, taxation represents a
kind of forced labor, which amounts to a violation of freedom.32 In Nozick‘s scheme,
infringement of individual freedom is synonymous with encroachment of property rights and
vice versa. According to Sharon Vaughan, such an equation between freedom and property rights
is possible ―because he connects respecting private property ownership rights with respecting
individual as ends in themselves.‖33 Nozick says:
Why not similarly hold that some persons have to bear some costs that benefit other
persons more, for the sake of the overall social good? But there is no social entity with a
good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good. There are only individual people,
different individual people, with their own individual lives. Using one of these people
for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the others. Nothing more. What happens
is that something is done to him for the sake of others. Talk of an overall good covers
this up. (Intentionally?) To use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and
take account of the fact that he is a separate person and his is the only life he has. He
does not get some overbalancing good from his overall sacrifice, and no one is entitled
to force this upon him – least of all a state or government that claims his allegiance (as
other individuals do not) and that therefore scrupulously must be neutral between its
citizens.34
Nozick identifies individuality with property. If an individual‘s property is used for other people,
according to Nozick, it is treating an individual as means for the people not as an end in herself.
That is to say, to treat an individual as an end, we should refrain from using property for our
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advantage. It can be a persuasive argument, however, with the proviso that, on the one hand,
every individual is treated as an end in herself without regard to the amount of the property
possession and, on the other hand, the original acquisition is justified. His theory is not
persuasive since it treats individuals differently based on their private property and since it
provides no justification for the original acquisition.
In Nozick‘s theory of entitlement, the principle of original acquisition is unjustifiable.
Nozick contends that original acquisition is justified if it satisfies the Lockean proviso that one
can have a property rights ―where there is enough and as good left in common for others.‖35
Nozick understands the proviso in the situation that ―others are not worsened.‖36 He understands
the Lockean proviso in two ways: the stringent requirement of the proviso and the weaker
requirement of the proviso. In his view, the stringent requirement of the proviso does not allow
―permanent and inheritable property rights,‖ although a weaker requirement of the proviso can
allow ―appropriation and permanent property.‖37 His version of the proviso is the weaker
requirement proviso. There are two ways of worsening another in the process of appropriation:
―first, by losing [for him] the opportunity to improve his situation by a particular appropriation or
any one; and second, by [his] no longer being able to use freely (without appropriation) what he
previously could.‖38 The stringent requirement of the proviso does not allow both ways of
wronging others through the permanent and inheritable property rights. The weaker requirement
of the proviso, Nozick advocates, allows the second way of wronging others but not the first.
While the acquisition of a certain property does not allow others to use it freely, he thinks that
the first way of wronging others can be addressed by allowing private property rights. He
35
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indicates that the social by-products of private property address the problem of persons who are
wronged by the appropriation and permanent property:
[Private property] increases the social product by putting means of production in the
hands of those who can use them most efficiently (profitably); experimentation is
encouraged, because with separate persons controlling resources, there is no one person
or small group whom someone with a new idea must convince to try it out; private
property enables people to decide on the pattern and types of risks they wish to bear,
leading to specialized types of risk bearing; private property protects future persons by
leading some to hold back resources from current consumption for future markets; it
provides alternate sources of employment for unpopular persons who don‘t have to
convince any one person or small group to hire them, and so on.39
By allowing appropriation and permanent property, as he points out, some propertyless people
might grasp opportunities for addressing their wronged situation as they benefit from social
products by those who can efficiently handle the means of production. However, Nozick‘s
suggestion does not address all the wronged persons. That is to say, allowing appropriation and
permanent property does not give all the wronged persons the opportunity to improve their
situations. For instance, handling efficiently the means of production is an attempt to reduce
labor costs by looking for cheaper labor. If there are two individuals who have the same skills
but ask for different wages, an employer will without doubt choose the one who asks for the
lower wage. In this case, at least the one who is not selected by the employer is wronged and
thus is unable to improve his wronged situation, while the other is able to achieve. If the
wronged situation of all participants cannot be improved, then Nozick‘s principle of original
acquisition is unjustifiable.
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In addition, Nozick‘s illegitimation of equal opportunity erodes his justification of the
original acquisition. The original acquisition is justified only if the wronged persons can improve
their wronged situations. To improve the wronged situations, those who have private property
should provide opportunities to the wronged persons. But his entitlement theory stipulates that it
should be done voluntarily, without forcing the propertied individuals. In order to justify the
original acquisition, however, all the wronged persons should have opportunities to improve their
wronged situations. That is to say, propertied individuals should share their resources to give
opportunity in order to improve the wronged situations of all. Unless all the wronged persons
have opportunities to improve their wronged situations, the original acquisition is unjust. In order
to justify the original acquisition, the propertied individuals should provide all the wronged
persons with opportunities to improve their wronged situation. Under Nozick‘s theory that is
impossible because he rejects the view that one should provide equal opportunity to all. It is,
therefore, impossible to justify the original acquisition premise, since Nozick illegitimizes equal
opportunity for all.
Considering that every wronged person cannot improve their wronged situation because
of the efficient handling of the means of production and the unequal opportunity for all, leaves
Nozick‘s theory with a significant problem, when we consider his understanding that every
individual possesses the same dignity and inviolability:
The minimal state treats us as inviolate individuals, who may not be used in certain
ways by other as means or tools or instruments or resources; it treats us as persons
having individual rights with the dignity this constitutes. Treating us with respect by
respecting our rights, it allows us, individually or with whom we choose, to choose our
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life and to realize our ends and our conception of ourselves, insofar as we can, aided by
the voluntary cooperation of other individuals possessing the same dignity.40
Nozick makes it clear that his theory is based on individuals who are allowed to choose their
lives, to achieve their ends, and to realize the conception of themselves. However, by being
unable to address wronged persons, his theory erodes its fundamental basis: human beings as
ends in themselves. His theory reveals that there is no way to treat every individual as an end in
himself without regard to the amount of his property possession.
To treat a person as an end signifies an avoidance of attaching market value to a person.
But in a society based on the market, that is a value difficult to maintain. Those who happen to
have their natural endowments such as talents or inheritance can have many opportunities, while
those with fewer natural endowments have fewer opportunities. Those with fewer natural
endowments are likely to work, where they are paid less than they want to be paid. There may be
some people who have enough resources to adequately cover their needs; they can voluntarily
choose their jobs. However, there are probably more people who do not have enough resources
to adequately cover their needs; they are unable to choose their jobs as voluntarily as those who
have enough resources. If they cannot voluntarily choose their jobs, they are treated as a mere
means rather than an end. In Nozick‘s entitlement theory, those who have properties can be
easily treated as an end, but propertyless people are hardly treated as an end. Considering there
are a small number of haves and the great number of have-nots in the world, most individuals are
treated as a mere means.
There is another kind of person who is treated as a mere means in Nozick‘s theory. Those
whose situations are wronged by natural disaster, unexpected accident, and inherent/acquired
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diseases cannot be treated as individuals of the same dignity. Since his theory of entitlement is
based on individual voluntariness, individuals are responsible for caring about what they do
voluntarily. If there are people whose situations are wronged by natural disaster, unexpected
accident, or inherent/acquired disease, no one is responsible for improving the situations of the
people wronged by misfortune. That is because there has been no injustice done to those
wronged by misfortune. His principle of rectification works only when injustice of acquisition
and transfer produces wronged people. If they are excluded from the process of rectification,
they are not treated as an end. The wronged by misfortune are, in a sense, nonbeing, whose
existence is not recognized in the process of rectification. If there are such people who cannot be
treated as an end in themselves, Nozick‘s theory of entitlement is far from justifiable.
What is evident in Nozick‘s theory is that the propertied can improve their wronged
situations. As long as they have property, they can be treated as an end in themselves.
Unfortunately, the propertyless are likely to be treated as a mere means. In other words, Nozick
opens ways for those who have property to realize their ends and the conception of themselves,
but not for those who have no property. Those who do not have properties are not individuals as
an end in themselves. Nozick thus reveals the inevitable connection between having property and
being treated as an end. Tibor Machan locates the rights to property at the heart of Nozick‘s
system of individual rights.41 But, I think the property rights for Nozick means more than that.
Put differently, his view of individual rights equates to private property rights. Natural
endowments, talents, and merits are protected as individual properties. Those who have fewer
natural endowments, talents, or merits have nothing to be protected by Nozick‘s entitlement
theory. They become passive individuals who wait for opportunities mercifully or mercilessly
41
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created by those who have property. While Nozick affirms freedom of all individuals, his
individual freedom is only freedom for propertied individuals.
Considering Nozick‘s individual freedom based firmly on private property, there is no
place for equal distribution or even equal opportunity, not to mention capability equality. Nozick
mentions a possibility of using distributive justice and equality. If injustice occurs in the process
of entitlement, Nozick admits that ―distributive justice and equality…play a legitimate role‖ in
addressing such injustice.42 But in his entitlement theory, such distributive justice and
distributive equality remain unnecessary. His entitlement theory refuses equal opportunity,
excludes the accidentally or naturally wronged people from rectification, and allows treating
propertyless people as a mere means rather than an end. Only the results of theft, fraud, or forced
contracts belong to the issue of distributive justice and equality. Other than these cases, as stated
by Nozick, distributive justice and equality are seen as detrimental to individual freedom. Thus,
providing resources for developing individual capability remains impossible.
As I have argued, Nozick‘s theory of entitlement is unjustifiable. His theory cannot treat
individuals as an end in themselves due to his lack of justification for the original acquisition and
his allowance of treating propertyless people as a mere means. In order to provide freedom for
all, he needs to promote, at least, equal opportunity to all. However, he cannot do this since equal
opportunity means an infringement of freedom on the propertied. Nozick protects private
property, not individual freedom.
Isaiah Berlin and Robert Nozick regard equality as unrelated or opposed to individual
freedom. In terms of negative freedom, I have argued that promoting equality is conducive to
exercising negative freedom. In terms of Nozick‘s entitlement theory, I have argued that his

42

Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 153, footnote.

108

theory protects the freedom of only propertied individuals, leaving the freedom of propertyless
individuals unprotected. Nozick‘s entitlement theory is not faithful to his declaration of freedom
for all individuals. Therefore, while Berlin and Nozick contend that equality is unrelated and
opposed to individual freedom, I have shown that promoting equality is necessary and conducive
to exercising individual freedom. As they negate equality, they are unable to protect individual
freedom, but only to secure private property.
3.1.2 Equality necessary and conducive to individual freedom
3.1.2.1 John Rawls
Unlike Berlin and Nozick, John Rawls contends that individual freedom is closely
connected to equality. For Rawls, equality has multi-layered meanings. Simone Chambers
categorizes Rawls‘ equality into three spheres: ―fundamental equality, political equality, and
social and economic equality.‖43 Fundamental equality means that ―all persons are equal‖;
political equality means equal basic liberties such as ―freedom of expression, religion, and
association; equal right to vote and run for office; equality before the law and due process‖; and
social and economic equality means less unequal distribution.44 In this section, I equate equality
with socioeconomic equality and individual freedom with fundamental equality and political
equality.
In terms of freedom, Rawls avoids defining freedom as either negative liberty or positive
liberty. Instead, his view of freedom includes both negative liberty and positive liberty. His view
of individual freedom is more expansive than those held by Berlin and Nozick. His general
description of liberty reveals that his view is not restricted to negative liberty:
43
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This or that person (or persons) is free (or not free) from this or that constraint (or set of
constraints) to do (or not to do) so and so. Associations as well as natural persons may
be free or not free, and constraints may range from duties and prohibitions defined by
law to the coercive influences arising from public opinion and social pressure. For the
most part I shall discuss liberty in connection with constitutional and legal restrictions.
In these cases liberty is a certain structure of institutions, a certain system of public
rules defining rights and duties. Set in this background, persons are at liberty to do
something when they are free from certain constraints either to do it or not to do it and
when their doing it or not doing it is protected from interference by other persons.45
At first glance, Rawls seems to justify only negative liberty, which is protected from interference
by both institutions and other persons. Jean-Fabien Spitz argues that Rawls‘ liberty is a concept
of negative liberty that can be protected through non-interference, that is, ―where there are no
other people around.‖46 But Rawls‘ view of liberty is more than negative liberty. As Rawls
indicates, his view of liberty is discussed in connection with constitutional and legal restrictions.
Constitutional and legal restrictions presuppose the existence of citizens. That is to say,
regarding liberty, Rawls is discussing liberty of citizens. Victoria Costa points out that Rawls‘
basic liberties–―such as freedom of conscience, freedom of association, and political liberties–do
not even makes sense in the absence of other people.‖47 As Costa indicates, political liberty
belongs to Rawls‘ basic liberty.
In protecting and promoting political liberty, Rawls asserts that the constitution ideally
guarantees that ―those similarly endowed and motivated should have roughly the same chance of
attaining positions of political authority irrespective of their economic and social class.‖48 In
order for citizens to have political liberty, they should have equal access to information about
45
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political issues, equal ―position to assess‖ proposals for such issues, and ―a fair chance to add
alternative proposals‖ to the political issues.49 Rawls points out that without such equality,
political liberty will be restricted.50 He explains the danger of unequal political liberty in relation
to economic inequality as follows:
Disparities in the distribution of property and wealth that far exceed what is compatible
with political equality have generally been tolerated by the legal system…. Political
power rapidly accumulates and becomes unequal; and making use of the coercive
apparatus of the state and its law, those who gain the advantage can often assure
themselves of a favored position. Thus inequities in the economic and social system
may soon undermine whatever political equality might have existed under fortunate
historical condition. Universal suffrage is an insufficient counterpoise; for when parties
and elections are financed not by public funds but by private contributions, the political
forum is so constrained by the wishes of the dominant interests that the basic measures
needed to establish just constitutional rule are seldom properly presented.51
Rawls thus emphasizes the intrinsically detrimental relationship between political inequality and
economic inequality. In order to ensure political equality, economic inequality should not affect
political freedom. Unequal political liberty exacerbates the existing economic inequality and vice
versa. In this case, Rawls emphasizes political freedom unaffected by economic inequality rather
than political freedom secured by economic equality.
When Rawls refers to liberty as the achievement of one‘s life, the positive role of
economic equality is more evident. For Rawls, liberty is not just negative liberty and political
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liberty. Achieving one‘s life belongs to his view of liberty. In achieving one‘s life, economic
equality is a necessary condition. Rawls says, ―With more of [primary] goods men can generally
be assured of greater success in carrying out their intentions and in advancing their ends,
whatever these ends may be.‖52 Rawls further says, ―A rational plan must, for example, allow for
the primary goods, since otherwise no plan can succeed.‖53 The primary goods are necessary for
achieving one‘s good life. The primary goods are opportunities, income, and wealth, as well as
rights and liberties.54 To have more opportunities, income, and wealth means to improve unequal
socioeconomic situations. Promoting economic equality is thus conducive to accomplishing
one‘s ends. Costa in this vein states that Rawls ―recognizes the need for economic resources as a
necessary condition on citizens‘ being able to take advantage of their liberties in pursuing their
distinct conceptions of the good life.‖55
In promoting liberty, which includes negative freedom, political freedom, and one‘s good
life, Rawls thus emphasizes the constitutive role of economic equality. However, Rawls neither
equates political freedom with economic equality nor justifies equal distribution for achieving
one‘s good life. He addresses the complicated relationship between liberty and equality with his
two principles of justice. With those principles Rawls clarifies liberty as prior to economic
equality and that difference principle is better than equal distribution. In his two principles of
justice, Rawls takes it for granted that there are social and economic inequalities and also
justifies such inequalities to secure basic liberties such as ―political liberty… and freedom of
speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person…; the
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right to hold personal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the
concept of the rule of law.‖56 These liberties cannot be infringed upon in order to justify ―greater
social and economic advantages.‖57 Thus, Rawls establishes the priority of liberty over economic
equality: ―whenever the basic liberties can be effectively established, a lesser or an unequal
liberty cannot be exchanged for an improvement in economic well-being.‖58 While accentuating
that liberty is prior to economic equality, Rawls admits that liberty is not always prior to
economic equality. There are cases that do not prioritize basic rights: ―It is only when social
circumstances do not allow the effective establishment of these basic rights that one can concede
their limitation.‖59 Even in these cases, ―[t]he denial of the equal liberties can be defended only
when it is essential to change the conditions of civilization so that in due course these liberties
can be enjoyed.‖60 It is evident from this view that economic equality is prioritized for creating
the conditions of liberty. It is always a temporary postponement of liberty when equality is
prioritized. Therefore, he reveals the primacy of liberty over economic equality.
In his difference principle, which deals with the issue of economic equality, Rawls
acknowledges the importance of equal distribution and, at the same time, a preferable case of
unequal distribution, which remains more advantageous than equal distribution. Difference
principle justifies social and economic equality that is arranged ―to the greatest expected benefit
of the least advantaged.‖61 In the original position, Rawls maintains that individuals will accept
an inequality of wealth if it makes everyone better off. Specifically, the veil of ignorance justifies
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such inequality of wealth that makes everyone better off. In the veil of ignorance, everyone will
choose the least unequal distribution based on the maximin rule: ―we are to adopt the alternative
the worse outcome of which is superior to the worst outcomes of the others.‖62 In other words,
―you maximize what you would get if you wound up in the minimum, or worst-off, position.‖63
Through the maximin rule, a self-interested individual behind the veil of ignorance ―achieves
much the same purpose as benevolence,‖ since individuals take their worst-off situation into
consideration.64 Rawls concludes that everyone will choose less unequal distribution that makes
the worst-off better rather than either more unequal distribution or equal distribution that makes
the worst-off worse than the less unequal distribution. Through difference principle, Rawls
shows a way that economic inequality is compatible with liberty that requires economic equality.
It is probable that everyone prefers less unequal distribution rather than more unequal
distribution. However, I am not persuaded by the view that everyone will choose less unequal
distribution rather than equal distribution. Rawls justifies the priority of less unequal distribution
over equal distribution with the proviso that every individual is mutually disinterested in every
other. That is to say, if individuals are not interested in others‘ interests, such as wealth, prestige,
and domination, they will choose less unequal distribution that makes them better off. Clearly,
however, mutual disinterestedness does not always favor less unequal distribution. There may be
cases in which individuals favor equal distribution. For instance, three individuals can have
options of a less unequal distribution like 5, 6, and 10 or an equal distribution like 4, 4, and 4.
Some of them might prefer the less unequal distribution option, while others might prefer the
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equal distribution option.65 Rawls may argue that individuals, mutually disinterested and selfinterested, will choose the less unequal distribution option because the worst-off will be better
off as they choose the less unequal distribution option. But, there are some who think differently
in terms of how the worst-off are better off. Those who have a more principled commitment to
equality might think that the unequal differential between the worst-off and the best-off in the
less unequal distribution is unbearable, as they prefer no differential between the worst-off and
the best-off in the equal distribution. Between the two options, there is no reason that a mutually
disinterested individual prefers the less unequal distribution. For some, the difference principle is
a preference; however, the difference principle might not be the preference of the worst-off.
The more serious problem of the difference principle is that its indifference to the gap
between the worst-off and the best-off can be detrimental to individual freedom. Considering
Rawls‘ view that primary goods ensure the individuals‘ successful lives and political freedom is
restricted by economic inequality, such a gap can erode individual freedom. The difference
principle justifies unequal distribution as long as it benefits the worst-off. Theoretically, if the
worst-off are better off, no one cares whether there is a huge differential between the worst-off
and the best-off. As Norman Daniels points out, ―Rawls sets no moral restriction on the absolute
size of ‗fair inequalities.‘‖66 In this case, it can allow a huge inequality between the worst-off and
the best-off. The huge inequality is then detrimental to the individuals‘ successful lives as well as
their political liberty.67 It is because, in terms of political liberty, ―inequities in the economic and
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social system may soon undermine…political equality.‖68 In relation to the individuals‘
successful lives, Rawls says that ―[w]ith more of [primary] goods men can generally be assured
of greater success in carrying out their intentions and in advancing their ends.‖69 In light of the
amount of primary goods, the best-off are likely to achieve their successful lives, while the
worst-off have difficulties in advancing their ends. The difference principle, if it allows a huge
gap between the best-off and the worst-off, can erode political liberty and interfere with an
individual‘s successful life.
The difference principle can be harmful to political liberty and individuals‘ successful
lives. It seems to be reasonable to have equal distribution for promoting political liberty and
individual‘s successful lives. But, Rawls prefers the difference principle to equal distribution.
Why then does Rawls prefer the difference principle? It is because individuals are innately
different in light of their natural talents and abilities. Rawls says:
The natural distribution of [talents and abilities] is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust
that persons are born into society at some particular position. These are simply natural
facts. What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts.
Aristocratic and caste societies are unjust because they make these contingencies the
ascriptive basis for belonging to more or less enclosed and privileged social classes. The
basic structure of these societies incorporates the arbitrariness found in nature. But there
is no necessity for men to resign themselves to these contingencies. The social system is
not an unchangeable order beyond human control but a pattern of human action.70
According to Rawls, the difference principle is an attempt to redress unequal social structures
brought by the individuals‘ natural talents and abilities. Those who have natural talents and
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abilities will have more primary goods, while those who lack such natural endowments will
acquire less primary goods. If natural talents and abilities are viewed as individual property as in
the case of Nozick, there is no way to redress the unequal social structure brought by individuals‘
natural talents and abilities. Rawls regards the natural talents and abilities as ―a common asset‖
and the ―help [for] the less fortunate.‖71 Rawls is correct in that the difference principle can
address inequality caused by individual‘s different natural endowments. It is clear that in
enhancing the lives of the worst-off, his difference principle is far better than Nozick‘s
entitlement theory. However, the difference principle does not ensure the worst-off the political
liberty and their successful lives as it is indifferent to widening gaps between the best-off and the
worst-off.
Unlike the difference principle, Rawls‘ property-owning democracy might provide a
more favorable condition for the worst-off to achieve the good life. To address the problem of
inequality in a market economy, Rawls is advocating a property-owning democracy ―in which
land and capital are widely though not presumably equally held.‖72 A property-owning
democracy is different from the capitalist welfare systems: ―A welfare state presupposes extreme
inequalities in property ownership and involves taxation of the incomes of the rich to subsidize
directly or indirectly the incomes of the poor; a property-owning democracy involves widespread
distribution of property ownership (pooled through insurance firms, investment trusts, and so on)
so that each citizen receives a part of his or her income from property.‖73 Such a society in a
property-owning democracy prevents ―one fairly small sector [from controlling] the
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preponderance of productive resources.‖74 As land and capital are widely held, inequality in a
market economy can become less severe. Rawls also thinks that a property-owning democracy
can address socialist criticisms. He mentions two socialist challenges: one is that ―a socially
regulated system‖ can address inherently degrading market institutions and the other is that
―social and altruistic motivation‖ can set up better economic institutions.75 In his view, an
economic system regulated by price is more just than a socially regulated one, and social and
altruistic motivation has the limitation in that ―while individuals are willing to act justly, they are
not prepared to abandon their interests.‖76 As he points out, a property-owning democracy that
can address inequality in a market economy to a certain extent is better than a socially regulated
system and seems to be more realistic than a socially and altruistically motivated system.
However, the property-owning democracy cannot support Rawls‘ view of liberty as well
as his premise of economic equality. In a property-owning democracy, there will be both some
individuals who own much property and many who own less or no property. It is because as long
as property is alienable through the market, there are trades of the properties for various reasons.
While there is no small sector that controls the preponderance of productive resources, there will
be individuals of less property or no property at all. The less propertied or propertyless
individuals will surely have less access to primary goods and thus can hardly achieve their
political liberty and successful lives.
Instead of a property-owning democracy, Rawls also proposes a liberal socialist regime.
But, a liberal socialist regime also has limitations in securing individual liberty and economic
equality. Rawls explains a liberal socialist regime in the following way:
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We have only to suppose that the means of production are publicly owned and that
firms are managed by workers‘ councils say, or by agents appointed by them. Collective
decisions made democratically under the constitution determine the general features of
the economy, such as the rate of saving and the proportion of society‘s production
devoted to essential public goods. Given the resulting economic environment, firms
regulated by market forces conduct themselves much as before.77
For Rawls, as long as the system is regulated by market forces, a liberal socialist regime can
address economic inequality. Macpherson criticizes Rawls, mentioning that Rawls does not
consider the power of the exploitative capitalist market forces: ―What is omitted is any
consideration of the absence…of capitalist market forces, the force of which derives from the
desire of entrepreneurs and firms to increase their capital, and their ability to do so by virtue of
the property institutions which facilitate and require exploitation.‖78 Since the capitalist market
force is intrinsically exploitative, there are individuals who are to be exploited by the market
force, even in the liberal socialist regime. If some individuals are exploited, their worst-off
situation provides them less access to primary goods, and, accordingly, they can hardly achieve
their political liberty or a successful life.
Unlike Nozick or Berlin, Rawls endeavors to protect individual liberty through his two
principles of justice and his egalitarian economic system, since he recognizes the importance of
equality in promoting individual liberty. However, his view of economic equality, in his
difference principle and his egalitarian economic system, is unable to ensure individual liberty,
specifically, political liberty and liberty for achieving one‘s good life. It is because his view of
equality allows a huge gap between the best-off and the worst-off, though Rawls denies it. While
Rawls emphasizes the importance of economic equality in promoting individual liberty, his view
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of equality falls short of protecting and promoting his own view of liberty. In order to secure
individual liberty, the gap between the best-off and the worst-off should be minimized.
3.1.2.2 Ronald Dworkin
Unlike Rawls, who proposes the priority of liberty over equality, Ronald Dworkin puts
forward the priority of equality over liberty. For Dworkin, ―justice is pretty much tantamount to
equality once equality is rightly understood.‖79 According to Dworkin, the rightly understood
equality is more important than liberty, since in some cases, liberty should be restricted for
protecting equality. To understand his reasoning, it is important to delve into his understanding
of equality. His view of equality is equality of resources, which is the ambition-sensitive but
endowment-insensitive equality:80
On the one hand we must, on pain of violating equality, allow the distribution of
resources at any particular moment to be (as we might say) ambition-sensitive. It must,
that is, reflect the cost or benefit to others of the choices people make so that, for
example, those who choose to invest rather than consume, or to consume less
expensively rather than more, or to work in more rather than less profitable ways must
be permitted to retain the gains that flow from these decisions in an equal auction
followed by free trade. But on the other hand, we must not allow the distribution of
resources at any moment to be endowment-sensitive, that is, to be affected by
differences in ability of the sort that produce income differences in a laissez-faire
economy among people with the same ambitions.81
In his ambition-sensitive and endowment-insensitive equality, individuals are responsible for
their choices, but not for their ability or circumstances. With relation to ambition, Dworkin
contends that while individuals have resources equally, it is acceptable and necessary that
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individuals have different incomes if they are based on their choices. For instance, there are two
individuals who acquire the same size of land, but who use it differently: Adrian uses the land for
gardening, and Bruce uses the land for his tennis court.82 Adrian amasses wealth through selling
vegetables that he farmed, while Bruce is unable to do that. In this case, it is unjust to redistribute
Adrian‘s wealth to Bruce because by his own choice, Bruce becomes poorer than Adrian.
Everyone is responsible for the unequal results of their choices. Dworkin accepts inequality
caused by such an individual‘s choice.
Individuals are responsible for their choices, but they are not responsible for natural
disadvantages. That is to say, in Dworkin‘s equality of resources, it is necessary and acceptable
to allow inequality caused by choices, but it is unacceptable to allow inequality caused by natural
endowments, poor health, or bad circumstances. To prevent inequality caused by such factors,
Dworkin proposes an income tax system that approximates the insurance scheme, in which
endowment-sensitive inequalities can be addressed. Through certain kinds of income tax, we can
―neutralize the effects of differential talents.‖83 Income tax is in theory able to address an
endowment-sensitive inequality; however, he acknowledges that there are difficulties in
differentiating ambition from endowments. It is because talents and ambitions influence each
other: ―Talents and ambitions are too closely intertwined.‖84 He adds, ―Talents are nurtured and
developed, not discovered full-blown, and people choose which talents to develop in response to
their beliefs about what sort of person it is best to be.‖85 In this sense, it is difficult to separate
talents from ambition. But, he also mentions that ―people also wish to develop and use the talents
they have, not simply because they prefer a life of relative success, but because the exercise of
82
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talent is enjoyable and perhaps also out of a sense that an unused talent is a waste.‖86 In this light,
talents are not subordinated to individual choices. Thus, talents can be separated from individual
ambition, though it can be difficult. In this vein, Dworkin distinguishes unfair differences from
fair differences: ―Unfair differences are those traceable to genetic luck, to talents that make some
people prosperous but are denied to others who would exploit them to the full if they had
them.‖87 He frames talent in the same light as handicaps in such a way that ―the lack of some
skill is just another handicap.‖88 He proposes a hypothetical insurance situation, in which
everyone has the same possibility of lacking some skills and based on the possibility that
everyone will buy underemployment insurance in order to make up for the situation of lacking
such skills. He then connects a tax scheme that is translated from his hypothetical insurance
structure, in which the lack of skills can be compensated according to their degrees. In his tax
scheme, the rich pay a greater premium than the poor: ―a premium fixed as an increasing
percentage of the income‖ instead of the flat-rate premium.89 While he probes into the
hypothetical insurance market that decides redistribution based on individual talents, he
acknowledges the difficulties in measuring the ability to earn. He thus proposes ―a scheme that
tied redistribution to actual earning rather than to ability to earn‖ as ―a better second-best
approximation‖ to the hypothetical insurance market.90 In this way, he thinks that it is possible to
have an equality of resources that is an ambition sensitive and endowment insensitive distribution.
In light of the equality of resources, Dworkin contends that ―liberty becomes an aspect of
equality rather than, as it is often thought to be, an independent political ideal potentially in
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conflict with it.‖91 He thus denies the view that ―liberty is a fundamental value that must not be
sacrificed for equality.‖92 Instead, he puts the relationship between liberty and equality of
resources as follows:
So liberty is necessary to equality, according to this conception of equality, not on the
doubtful and fragile resources, but because liberty, whether or not people do value it
above all else, is essential to any process in which equality is defined and secured. That
does not make liberty instrumental to distributional equality any more than it makes the
latter instrumental to liberty.93
Dworkin emphasizes the inseparable, reciprocal relationship between liberty and the equality of
resources. Because of the inseparable, reciprocal relationship, he rejects the view that liberty is
prior to equality.
Denying the priority of liberty over equality, Dworkin defends the priority of equality
over liberty since he accepts restricting liberty for the promotion of equality. For instance, there
are some freedoms essential to liberty, and ―government must not limit those freedoms without‖
compelling and powerful justification for not protecting them; they are ―rights to freedom of
conscience, commitment, speech, and religion, and to freedom of choice in matters touching
central or important aspects of an agent‘s personal life, like employment, family arrangements,
sexual privacy, and medical treatment.‖94 While mentioning freedoms that must not be limited
by government without compelling reasons whenever there is conflict between liberty and
equality, Dworkin asserts that ―liberty must lose.‖95 It is because ―government must act to make
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the lives of those it governs better lives, and it must show equal concern for the life of each.‖96
For Dworkin, liberty, unlike art, is not intrinsically valuable, but only valuable for the better lives
of people. He stipulates two conditions that justify restricting liberty: ―(1) in spite of the fact that
liberty is valuable to people‘s lives, the position of some group within the community would
nevertheless be improved, on balance, by eliminating some liberty; and (2) equal concern for that
group requires that this be done.‖97 For instance, a government can abolish private medical care.
In this case, freedom of individuals who want to have private medical care is restricted. Such a
restriction of individual freedom is justified since the government should give the poor equal
concern, so they can have access to better medical care. Dworkin thus seems to justify priority of
equality over liberty when considering only the abstract egalitarian principle, i.e., treating each
individual as an equal.
However, the priority of equality over liberty is not evident when Dworkin considers both
the abstract egalitarian principle and the principle of the equality of resources. The two principles
endorse the principle of abstraction, which ―insists that an ideal distribution is possible only
when people are legally free to act as they wish except so far as constraints on their freedom are
necessary to protect security of person and property, or to correct certain imperfections in
markets.‖98 Thus, he proposes that freedom of an individual should not be infringed upon, even
when the abstract egalitarian principle demands it. He mentions two cases that justify restricting
individual freedom: one case is to protect property and the other is to correct imperfections in the
markets, that is, the redistribution of property. The former case allows a restriction of freedom
for those who do not have property; they have no freedom to seize property from the propertied.
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The latter case allows restricting freedom of the propertied in order to address the market
imperfections. While both cases stipulate when freedom of a certain group is restricted, the two
cases can be incompatible with each other. For instance, while the propertied try to protect their
property, the propertyless request a redistribution of property in order to address the market
imperfections. Dworkin thus endeavors to address the predicament of the priority of equality
over liberty.
Dworkin elaborates on when liberty is restricted for promoting equality. He calls
restricting liberty victimization. He offers the principle of victimization to stipulate which
restrictions of liberty are acceptable in promoting equality.99 While the strongest principle of
victimization requires no infringement on freedom, he advocates a weaker and more sensible
form of the principle: ―I shall assume that it requires that no one‘s position be made worse, with
respect to the liberty in question, than it would most likely have been in a defensible
distribution.‖100 The defensible distribution is the initial situation when the equality of resources
makes all individuals have equal resources and use them according to their liberty. In other
words, if one has more liberty than allowed by defensible distribution, his liberty can be
restricted to the extent that his liberty is the same as or little more than he is supposed to have
under the terms of defensible distribution. Dworkin separates liberty that is uninfringeable and
liberty whose infringement is acceptable. Thus, Dworkin reveals a complicated view of the
relationship between liberty and equality. On the one hand, as he allows a compromise of liberty,
he accepts priority of equality over liberty; on the other hand, as he stipulates uninfringeable
liberty, he rejects the priority of equality over liberty. While Dworkin consistently contends that
equality and liberty ―are mutually reflecting aspects of a single humanist ideal,‖ by separating
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uninfringeable liberty from compromising liberty, he reveals at least reluctance to accept
consistent priority of equality over liberty.101
Dworkin‘s principle of victimization reveals uninfringeable liberty. What is
uninfringeable liberty? As he explained, it is liberty that people have in the defensible
distribution. It is, however, still ambiguous when considering the two incompatible restrictions
of liberty: the restriction of liberty for protecting property and the restriction of liberty for
addressing imperfections of the markets. He does not clarify what uninfringeable liberty is, but
the equality of resources makes uninfringeable liberty visible, since the equality of resources
justifies a certain kind of equality while it illegitimates another kind of equality. The equality of
resources is an ambition-sensitive and endowment-insensitive distribution. On the one hand, the
equality of resources as endowment-insensitive distribution can solve what Rawls‘ difference
principle is unable to address. Kymlicka points out that the difference principle is indifferent to a
handicapped person.102 Imagine that there are two worst-off persons: one is handicapped and the
other is not. When the two worst-off persons become better off than before, the difference
principle is no more active. It ignores the fact that the handicapped worst-off person needs to pay
at least the extra medical costs. But, Dworkin‘s equality of resources, which is endowmentinsensitive, addresses inequality caused by natural and unexpected disadvantage. In this light, his
view is more sensitive to inequality than Rawls‘ difference principle. As Dworkin is more
sensitive to inequality of the worst-off by misfortune, he is concerned about the restricted liberty
of the worst-off by misfortune. On the other hand, Dworkin‘s equality of resources is ambitionsensitive distribution. According to ambition-sensitive distribution, inequality caused by
101

Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 134. ―[L]iberty and equality are not independent virtues but aspects of the
same ideal of political association, so that when we declare our faith in liberty we are only affirming the form in
which we embrace equality, only declaring, that is, what we mean by it.‖ Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 182.
102
Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 72.

126

individual choice is justifiable. As long as wealth is accumulated by individual choice,
redistribution of such wealth is against his equality of resources. It thus shows how he
conceptualizes uninfringeable liberty: individuals have the liberty to keep their property, which
was accumulated by choice, and this liberty is uninfringeable.
As Dworkin postulates on uninfringeable liberty in order to protect accumulation by
one‘s choice, his theory is faced with the same problem that Rawls‘ difference principle cannot
address. While the difference principle allows the unlimited gap between the best-off and the
worst-off, the equality of resources permits an unlimited economic disparity between the rich and
the poor as long as the disparity is the result of individual choice. In a highly capitalized world,
Dworkin‘s uninfringeable liberty can be a serious problem in respect to its denial of his principle
of the priority of equality over liberty. Specifically, Dworkin‘s uninfringeable liberty allows for
an inequality created by individual choice such as in financial speculation. In a highly capitalized
world, the financial market has brought about a deterioration of the lives of the poor and a
widening of the gap between the poor and the rich. As long as he allows for the widening gap
between the poor and the rich, Dworkin is unable to promote the liberty of all.
3.1.3 Failure of liberal theories in protecting individual freedom
This discussion has grappled with the relationship between liberty and equality of several
liberal theorists, such as Isaiah Berlin, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, and Ronald Dworkin. Isaiah
Berlin admits the possibility that inequality can make negative liberty useless but emphasizes the
danger that promoting equality is harmful or indifferent to negative liberty. I argue that
promoting equality can be a necessary condition for protecting negative liberty and accordingly
Berlin‘s priority of liberty over equality is unjustifiable. Robert Nozick refutes any claim of
economic equality since economic equality can only be achieved by restricting individual liberty.
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His entitlement theory protects only the freedom of the propertied people and accordingly is
unable to protect the freedom of all individuals, who are an end in themselves. Because not all
individuals are treated as an end in themselves, his entitlement theory is unjustifiable. As long as
he neglects equality, he is unable to treat all individuals as an end in themselves, that is, to
protect the individual freedom of all. John Rawls proposes the difference principle to address the
infringement of liberty of the worst-off in a given society, acknowledging that equality is
essential to promoting liberty. However, John Rawls‘ difference principle can allow a huge gap
between the best-off and the worst-off, which results in the restriction of the liberty the worst-off.
Thus, the liberty of all is not secured by his difference principle. Ronald Dworkin‘s equality of
resources emphasizes equality in such a way that equality is prior to liberty. His view of equality
seems to ensure the equality and liberty of all. His endowment-insensitive equality can address
problems to which Rawls‘ difference principle is indifferent, but his ambition-sensitive equality
allows for an unrestricted inequality between the poor and the rich, whose choices produce their
wealth. Inequality caused by individual choice then justifies the limited liberty of the poor by
their choice. Therefore, all of the liberal theorists try to protect the liberty of all, but it is my
position that they fail because liberal theories are only able to protect the liberty of the propertied
while they allow for an infringement of the liberty of the propertyless. Liberal theorists work
toward protecting the liberty of all, but their theories end up protecting the liberty of the
propertied

3.2 Private Property and Liberal Individualism
If liberty is so important for individuals in liberalism, it is really difficult to understand
why liberal theorists come to protect only the liberty of propertied individuals. If everyone
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should be treated as equal, anything that restricts liberty of all individuals needs to be negated or
refuted. However, whenever there is an issue of property, individual liberty is restricted for the
preservation of property, although there are different opinions of what kind of property is to be
preserved, as I have shown above. When they assert the priority of liberty, what liberal theorists
clandestinely support is the importance of individual property rights rather than individual liberty.
In a sense, liberal theories covertly justify the priority of individual property over individual
freedom. It means that the assumed liberal priority of liberty over equality is an obscuration of
the real priority of property over individual freedom. I will argue that such obscuration is the
corollary of the liberal understanding of human beings, that is, liberal individualism: human
beings as self-interested asocial individuals.
3.2.1 Individual as a self-interested asocial being
It is difficult to define liberalism‘s understanding of human beings because there is no
one definition of liberalism. Instead, there are diverse definitions of liberalism and different
developments of liberalism in history. However, there is an overarching theme in the
development of liberalism, which is individualism: ―The metaphysical and ontological core of
liberalism is individualism. It is from this premise that the familiar liberal commitments to
freedom, tolerance and individual rights are derived.‖103
Liberalism has a specific conception of individualism: an individual as an asocial and
self-interested being. To identify liberal individuals as asocial beings is much too sweeping a
label. There are liberal theorists such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin who take socialness of
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individuals into consideration. Nonetheless, I identify liberal individuals as asocial beings since
liberal theorists deny a constitutive, fundamental role of individual socialness in shaping a
human individual. Anthony Arblaster says that liberal individualism regards ―the individual as
primary, as more ‗real‘ or fundamental than human society and its institutions and structures.‖104
According to Bhikhu Parekh, ―Liberalism takes the natural physical individual as the ultimate
social reality.‖105 Liberal individualism separates individuals from the empirical world and from
the society. Liberal individualism, according to Arblaster, is based on the separation between
facts and values.106 With the development of modern science, moral values are detached from the
empirical world. According to Iris Murdoch, ―Values which were previously in some sense
inscribed in the heavens and guaranteed by God collapse into the human will. There is no
transcendent reality. The idea of the good remains indefinable and empty so that the human
choice may fill it.‖107 The empirical world comes to exist as facts without values; only
individuals have values based on their will. Arblaster mentions two reasons why the distinction
between facts and values is so important to liberalism: one is moral consensus and the other is
individual freedom.108 The second reason is that ―it provides for the idea of the moral autonomy
of the individual.‖109 Stated differently, individuals have the freedom to choose their moral life
without interference from outside organizations/institutions such as religion, culture, or state. For
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a long time, community had been a real body, whose moral value overrode individual freedom or
autonomy. But after values became separated from facts, the community lost its moral values.
Jeremy Bentham explains the relationship between individual values and the community value in
the following way:
The interest of the community is one of the most general expressions that can occur in
the phraseology of morals: no wonder that the meaning of it is often lost. When it has a
meaning, it is this. The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual
persons who are considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the
community then is, what is it?—the sum of the interests of the several members who
compose it.110
The community has no its intrinsic moral values but consists of the aggregated values of its
members. As the community loses its intrinsic moral values, individuals within the community
are no longer restricted by its values. The separation between facts and values allows individuals
to separate themselves from the empirical world as well as from their society and community.
Liberal individualism sees an individual as a being independent of the world and society.
Therefore, individuals are asocial beings.
Individuals as asocial beings, who are independent of the world and the society, are also
separated from their fellows. Everyone is ―ultimately alone, above all before the fearful fact of
death.‖111 Through death, individuals are thought to experience ultimate disconnection from their
relationship with others whether they are family, relatives, or friends. Individuals are ultimately
alone, having no empirical connection with others after death. Individuals are separated from
their fellows as well as the world and the society. Individuals are completely asocial beings.
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A completely asocial individual is a being who has its own body. The body denotes the
boundary of an individual: ―The limits of his body are considered the limits of his self.‖112
Individuals ―have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink, and such
other things as nature affords for their subsistence.‖113 An asocial individual is a self-interested
being in that she has a primary interest in preserving her own body. An asocial individual is thus
―an essentially possessive and private being shut up in his own subjectivity.‖114 Put differently,
an individual is a possessive being in the sense that a man‘s life is his property, ―not the property
of God, or society, or the state.‖115 Since a human being is a possessive being, to possess
material property is the corollary of human nature. It does not mean that individuals become selfinterested beings with the birth of individualism. Instead, it means that an individual is
recognized as a self-interested being in a positive way. Liberal theorists agree that ―man is
naturally self-interested,‖ while they differ in their view of what individual self-interest brings
about.116 That is to say, the fact that human beings are naturally self-interested justifies neither an
individual anti-social tendency nor an individual social-harmony tendency. Nonetheless liberal
theorists take it for granted that individuals are self-interested beings. For example, Hobbes
contends that ―every man is enemy to every man‖ in the state of nature since individuals are selfinterested beings.117 Locke quite contrarily argues that though human beings are self-interested,
―no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions‖ in the state of nature.118
They both agree that human beings are naturally self-interested, though Hobbes asserts that there
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is a direct connection between individual self-interestedness and the state of war, while Locke
denies it. But the self-interestedness of individuals plays a positive role in constituting
commonwealth. McDonald thus contends that the advent of individualism justifies individual
greed as ―a universal necessity,‖ which has been ―universally condemned.‖119 Liberalism affirms
individual self-interestedness.
Liberalism endorses an individual as a self-interested asocial being. Individuals are
asocial beings as lonely beings separated from their fellows, society, and the world. Individuals
are also self-interested beings whose greed is positively viewed by some liberals or tolerated by
others. The view that individuals are self-interested asocial beings has both negative and positive
connotations. In a positive sense, on the one hand, it ensures that individuals are equal, without
regard to their group identity. Everyone should be treated as equal. In contrast, the view that
individuals are asocial self-interested beings neglects social influence and the formation of
individual identities and individual production.120 Individuals cannot be themselves without any
interaction with their fellows, their society, and their culture. When it comes to production,
though it is not totally impossible for an individual to make products by herself, every individual
is deeply interacting with her fellows and society in production. Neglecting the social dimension
of individual identity and production, liberalism has an innate tendency toward absolutizing the
freedom and property of certain individuals to the extent that it endorses the infringement of the
others‘ freedom, specifically, the freedom of the propertyless. It is the corollary of the priority of
private property over individual freedom.
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3.2.2 The Priority of Private Property over Individual Freedom
The priority of private property over individual freedom is evident in Locke‘s view of a
commonwealth and property. In general, Locke regards life, liberty, and estates as property. The
sole end of a commonwealth is protecting private property. If it protects life, liberty, and estates,
Locke‘s view is far from asserting the priority of private property over individual freedom. If,
however, a commonwealth is protecting only estates, it endorses the priority of private property
over individual freedom.
In terms of property, Locke‘s position reflects some confusion whether property includes
lives, liberties, and estates, or it just designates estates. In some places he identifies property with
individual lives, liberties, and estates.121 Locke asserts, ―By property I must be understood here,
as in other places, to mean that property which men have in their persons as well as goods.‖122 In
the sections dealing with the extent of the legislative power, on the other hand, ―he is clearly
using property in the more usual sense of lands and goods…, as he is throughout the chapter ‗Of
Property.‘‖123 It is thus difficult to decide whether in Lockean property one‘s person is included
or not. Macpherson contends that Locke‘s ambiguity in defining property displays that he kept
two different values. According to Macpherson:
To Locke life was still sacred and inalienable, though labour, and one‘s ‗person‘
regarded as one‘s capacity to labour, was a commodity. Locke‘s distinction between life
and labour is a measure of his retention of the traditional values. His confusion about
the definition of property, sometimes including life and liberty and sometimes not, may
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be ascribed to the confusion in his mind between the remnant of traditional values and
the new bourgeois values.124
For Locke, an individual is a commodity due to his having labor power, but an individual is still
a sacred and inalienable being. An individual is a sacred being as well as a commodity. This
ambiguity invites all individuals to civil society: ―Everyone…is included [in civil society], as
having an interest in preserving his life and liberty.‖125 As property includes individual life and
liberty, individuals are under a commonwealth.
While everyone is included in civil society, there are differences between the propertyless
individuals and the propertied individuals. While individuals without property are just its
members, rulers are those who have property: all individuals exist ―as members for purposes of
being ruled and only the men of estate as members for the purposes of ruling…[, because the
men of estate] are given to the decisive voice about taxation, without which no government can
subsist.‖126 All individuals are under a commonwealth, but only the men of estate control the
commonwealth. Therefore, Lockean ambiguity in defining property ends up with a denial of the
autonomy of those who have no estate. Macpherson puts this phenomenon as follows:
―The ambiguity about membership concealed (from Locke himself, I have suggested)
the contradiction in his individualism, in which full individuality for some was
produced by consuming the individuality of others. Locke could not have been
conscious that the individuality he championed was at the same time a denial of
individuality. Such consciousness was not to be found in men who were just beginning
to grasp the great possibilities of individual freedom that lay in the advancement of
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capitalist society. The contradiction was there, but it was impossible for them to
recognize it, let alone to resolve it. Locke was indeed at the fountain-head of English
liberalism. The greatness of seventeenth-century liberalism was its assertion of the free
rational individual as the criterion of the good society; its tragedy was that this very
assertion was necessarily a denial of individualism to half the nation.‖127
Half of the citizens in the nation cannot help but lose their individual freedom, as their autonomy
is restricted by a government, which is governed by propertied individuals. Locke thus allows a
commonwealth to give disadvantages to propertyless individuals, as they are subordinated by
propertied individuals. Lockean private property innately leads to the infringement of individual
freedom of the propertyless. While emphasizing the importance of individual freedom and
individual sacredness, Locke endorses property ownership as the decisive factor in limiting
individual freedom. What Locke reveals in restricting individual freedom of the propertyless is
the priority of private property over individual freedom. Liberal individualism is unable to
protect individual freedom of all.
3.2.3 Priority of private property over individual freedom and liberal
multiculturalism
I have shown that liberal individualism prioritizes private property over individual
freedom. What is the implication of the private property prioritization to liberal multiculturalism?
Liberal multiculturalism promotes equality between groups and freedom within groups. By
promoting equality between groups, liberal multiculturalism can ensure freedom of groups.
Contrarily, by promoting freedom within groups without advancing equality, liberal
multiculturalism can only partially ensure freedom within groups. In the dimension of group,
liberal multiculturalism can promote difference and equality; in the dimension of individuals
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within group, however, it is incapable of promoting even its advertised freedom or difference.
For instance, members of a minority group can be easily swayed by their elites, as the members
have insufficient resources to participate in the decision-making process of the group. In terms of
their individual freedom, without capability equality and least-gap equality members can enjoy
only very limited freedom. Liberal multiculturalism thus reveals its inadequacy of protecting and
promoting freedom of concrete others.
If liberal multiculturalism has the innate inability to promote freedom within groups and
its inability is based on liberal individualism, it needs to find a different foundation, that is, a
different understanding of human beings, which reverses the priority of private property over
individual freedom and the priority of freedom over equality. In order to substantially promote
individual freedom, private property needs to be restricted. In the next chapter, I propose social
individuality as a replacement of liberal individualism. The view that human beings are social
individuals undergirds restrictions on private property in order to substantially promote
individual freedom.

3.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have addressed liberalism‘s purported priority of freedom over equality.
Reviewing liberal theorists such as Isaiah Berlin, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, and Ronald
Dworkin, I contend that while assuming individual freedom is unrelated, opposed, closely
connected, or inseparably connected to equality, they are unable to protect individual freedom
without recourse to promoting equality. In addition, I contend that while they seem to claim the
priority of freedom over equality, they are in reality advocating the priority of private property
over individual freedom. As protecting private property and negating equality, liberal theorists

137

are able to protect individual freedom of the propertied but not of the propertyless. They cannot
protect the individual freedom of all because they do not treat people as equals or as an end in
themselves. Their inability to protect the individual freedom of all is the corollary of liberal
individualism, viewing individuals as self-interested asocial beings. Liberal individualism has
both positive and negative connotations. In a positive sense, liberal individualism enlightens the
importance of individuals as an end in themselves without regard to their group identities. On the
other hand, in a negative sense, liberal individualism justifies the protection of private property
to the extent that freedom of propertyless individuals can be severely restricted. Liberal
individualism thus has an innate weakness in protecting the freedom of all individuals,
neglecting economic equality, specifically, capability equality and least-gap equality. Therefore,
any theory concerning rights, which is based on liberal individualism, is destined to protect the
freedom of only some individuals and ignore economic equality. Even liberal multiculturalism is
unable to avoid such a destiny: it protects freedom of groups, not freedom of individuals within
groups. In order to protect freedom of all, an alternative understanding of human beings is
needed, which has not been provided by the liberal individualism of the aforementioned theorists.
However, much will be gathered from the subsequent discussion of the literature and constructs
of human being as concrete totality.
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Chapter 4
Social Individuality and Its Implication for Rights of Concrete Others

I have shown that liberal individualism is unable to protect or substantiate the individual
freedom of all. Individual freedom is inextricably connected to capability equality and least-gap
equality. Liberal individualism, which presupposes asocial human beings, prioritizes property
rights over individual freedom and accordingly denies the constitutive role of equality in
promoting the individual freedom of all. To substantiate the freedom of all requires an alternative
to liberal individualism. As an alternative view of human beings, I will propose social
individuality based on the view that human beings are concrete totalities. Social individuality,
with a reconfiguration of the relationship between property rights and individual freedom, will
provide the foundation of the rights of concrete others by ensuring economic equality that
substantiates individual freedom of all.
Social individuality does not refute that human beings are individuals, but it rejects the
view that individuals are asocial beings. An individual can be an asocial being, if an individual
shapes and develops herself without constitutive interaction between herself and society. I will
argue that to say human beings are asocial beings is untenable. A human being is an individual
being and, at the same time, a social being. Social individuality means that individuals as
concrete totality are constituted only through a dialectical relationship between the individual
and the social. In a dialectical relationship between her individuality and the social, the social
plays a fundamental role. I will show that human beings are deeply and broadly social in light of
biology, survival, identity formation, and production. Because of the depth and breadth of
socialness that constitutes individuality, I will contend that property rights are not absolute rights
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but should be restricted to the extent that the every individual can enjoy the basic conditions of
human life such as provision of basic needs, education, and medical care.

4.1 Concrete totality as methodology
The concept of concrete totality is the frame within which I understand human beings.
This is not just a frame within to understand human beings. That is to say, it is not just an
anthropological frame. It is also an epistemological frame for understanding reality. Reality can
be understood in three different ways. One can perceive reality through its concreteness. This
approach focuses on the distinctiveness of a reality without considering its relationship to its
totality as well as its surroundings. Another approach comprehends a reality through its totality
and its surroundings without paying due attention to reality per se. These two approaches are
inadequate for fully understanding reality, since the two approaches ignore constitutive roles of
the other. Concrete totality, the third way to understand reality, incorporates the two discrete
approaches. Simply speaking, concrete totality views reality as concrete and whole, thus
constituting reality in a dialectical way.
Understanding the concreteness of a reality is not difficult, since reality‘s concreteness,
i.e., its particularity or difference, is well recognized as discussed in the section on liberal
multiculturalism. With relation to totality, however, two misunderstandings are possible. One
involves the incomprehensible relationship between totality and the concrete (this will be fully
discussed later); the other is related to the concept of totality itself. Since the powerful in human
history have abused the concept of totality―such as in the case of totalitarianism―in order to
manipulate their common people and exclude others, suspicions arise when the concept of
totality is used. Such suspicions are based on the view that totality encompasses and delineates
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―all aspects, features, properties, relations and processes of reality.‖1 Without a doubt, totality
literally means the whole of reality. However, totality can be more specifically understood in an
ontological way and an epistemological way. Ontologically, totality as encompassing all aspects
of a reality is correct; epistemologically, totality as encompassing all aspects of a reality is not
only incorrect but also impossible. In other words, in concrete totality, totality does not denote a
complete understanding of an object. Human beings can have only partial images of reality. As a
result, the grasped totality is destined to be a partial and parochial identification of reality. In this
epistemological sense, human beings are unable to acquire totality. Thus, it is incorrect to say in
light of epistemology that totality encompasses all aspects of reality. However, the fact that
human beings are epistemologically unable to arrive at the totality of reality does not justify the
view that totality of reality is non-existent ontologically. In fact, human beings exist because of
the totality of reality, such as society, culture, nature, and the universe that are beyond human
episteme. Totality as an ontological concept means that a reality exists even when human beings
are able to grasp it in only a partial and limited way. The concept of concrete totality rejects the
identification of epistemological totality with ontological totality. Concrete totality is, instead, a
concept of reality, approximating its full grasp, rather than blatantly asserting its complete
cognition.
The concept of concrete totality is an attempt to bridge between epistemological totality
and ontological totality, while refusing the reduction of ontological totality to epistemological
totality. If we know all aspects of a reality we then have its totality. However, with a concrete
totality, the sum of all aspects of its reality falls short of its whole; aspects of reality are
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understood as moments of a reality, which synchronically and diachronically constitute the
whole. According to Karel Kosik,
[Concrete totality] implies that every phenomenon can be conceived as a moment of a
whole. A social phenomenon is a historical fact to the extent to which it is studied as a
moment of a certain whole, that is, to the extent to which it fulfills that two-fold role
which makes it a historical fact in the first place: the role of defining itself and of
defining the whole; of being both the producer and the product; of determining and
being determined; of exposing while being decoded; of acquiring proper meaning while
conveying the sense of something else. This interconnectedness and mediatedness of the
parts and the whole also signifies that isolated facts are abstractions, artificially
uprooted moments of a whole which become concrete and true only when set in the
respective whole.2
A moment and a whole cannot be properly understood without considering both. The effort to
juxtapose all aspects of reality to understand that very reality is not only impossible but also
incomplete: impossible because we cannot recognize all aspects of a reality; incomplete because
a part cannot be understood without its relation to the whole. Concrete totality presupposes that
the concrete as a moment of its totality is intermediated by and has a constitutive relationship
with its totality.
In what way, then, is totality formed in light of concrete totality? Totality is a dialectical
relationship between a concrete and a whole. A dialectical relationship of concrete totality
―means that the parts not only internally interact and interconnect both among themselves and
with the whole, but also that the whole cannot be petrified in an abstraction superior to the facts,
because precisely in the interaction of its parts does the whole form itself as a whole.‖3 Totality
remains non-existent without its constitutive interaction with a moment and vice versa. Neither
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totality nor its moment negates the other in forming a whole. Rather, each sublimates the other in
forming a whole. In short, concrete totality is a totality in its dialectical process between a
moment and a whole through sublimating the other.
Between a moment and a whole, which one has primacy over the other? Since the very
process of forming totality lies at the core of concrete totality, neither a moment nor a whole has
primacy: ―the question is not whether to recognize the priority of totality over contradictions or
vice versa, precisely because such a division strips both totality and contradictions of their
dialectical character: without contradictions, totality is empty and static; outside totality,
contradictions are formal and arbitrary.‖4 When either has primacy over the other, they both
expose their own problem. By neglecting a whole, a moment becomes an arbitrary abstraction;
by ignoring a moment, a whole becomes a false totality.
Three kinds of false totality need to be avoided in order to reach concrete totality: empty
totality, abstract totality, and bad totality. First, empty totality is a totality ―which lacks reflection,
the determination of individual moments, and analysis.‖5 Empty totality ―treats the wealth of
reality as an irrational ‗residue‘ beyond comprehension.‖6 Accepting only rational and
comprehensible reality as its constituents, it remains a partially concrete, because a rational and
comprehensible concrete is equated with totality while an irrational and incomprehensible
concrete is excluded from a totality. Second, abstract totality ―formalizes the whole as opposed
to its parts and ascribes a ‗higher reality‘ to hypostatized ‗tendencies.‘‖7 Abstract totality
―ignores facts and violates them in the name of a ‗high reality,‘‖ neglecting the concrete as a low,
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secondary reality.8 Third, in bad totality ―the real subject has been substituted by a mythologized
subject,‖ involving ―the autonomous movement of structures‖ such that ―totality arises from the
interaction of autonomous series of structures‖ without participation of the concrete.9 The
concrete is always slave to the totality. In a sense, the concrete is nonexistent. Empty totality,
abstract totality, and bad totality all display the broken relationship between a moment and its
whole. Specifically, the concrete is neglected, ignored, or negated.
How can concrete totality avoid degenerating into false totality? Most of all, the details of
reality, that is, the wealth of reality should seriously be considered. Concrete totality carefully
considers the historicity and the objectivity of reality. Kosik delineates the process of
understanding concrete totality in this way:
Destruction of the pseudoconcrete, i.e., of fetishist and fictitious objectivity of the
phenomenon, and cognition of its real objectivity; further, the cognition of the
phenomenon‘s historical character which in a peculiar way reveals the dialectic of the
unique and of the generally human; and finally, the cognition of the objective content
and meaning of the phenomenon, of its objective function and its historical place within
the social whole.10
In order to understand reality as concrete totality, Kosik emphasizes objectivity, historicity, and
the interaction between objectivity and historicity. The first process is cognition of real
objectivity of a phenomenon. Critical and analytical thinking is required in this cognition of real
objectivity. Admittedly, it is impossible to understand, in its literal sense, real objectivity from a
phenomenon. Our cognition is always an approximation of real objectivity. In order to have the
cognitive approximation of real objectivity, we need to destruct the pseudoconcrete. The
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pseudoconcrete is either reified as absolute and universal or neglected as nonsense or nonexistent.
The pseudoconcrete is formed as the historicity of a moment is neglected. Put differently, it is an
ahistorical cognition of a moment. Devoid of the historical sense of a moment, a moment
becomes a pseudoconcrete as it is accepted as ―the absolute only as non-historical, and thus as
eternal, in the metaphysical sense.‖11 A historical approach destroys a reified, absolute concrete
and relativizes it through unearthing a negated and neglected concrete. This process of
destroying the reified and unearthing the neglected helps to work toward understanding the real
objectivity of a phenomenon. While concrete totality adopts a historical approach to understand
reality, it rejects historicism that ―culls the absolute and the universal out of history altogether.‖12
Although a historical approach in concrete totality relativizes the objectivity of a phenomenon, it
does not deny the existence of absolute or universal. In concrete totality, the universal and the
absolute are understood only through and with relation to history. Rejecting both the ahistorical
approach and historicism, concrete totality ―considers history to be unity of the absolute in the
relative and of the relative in the absolute, a process in which the human, the universal, and the
absolute appear both in the form of a general prerequisite and as a specific historical result.‖13
Considering both a moment and a whole through history as a dialectical process of making a
totality, one can approximate a reality as a concrete totality.

11

Kosík, Dialectics of the Concrete, 82.
Kosík, Dialectics of the Concrete, 82.
13
Kosík, Dialectics of the Concrete, 82-83.
12

145

4.2 Social individuality based on Human beings as concrete totality
4.2.1 Kosik’s view of human beings
How can human beings be framed through concrete totality? Let me begin with the
relationship between human transhistoricity and historicity. A human being can be a
transhistorical being only when she is based on historical reality. Concrete totality does not deny
the view that human beings are tanshistorical beings. While it acknowledges the possibility of
human beings as transhistorical beings, it has a proviso: There is no ahistorical or universal
human reality that exists ―in the form of an immutable, eternal, transhistorical substance, without
relation to history….The universally human is reproduced in every epoch as a particular outcome,
as something specific.‖14 It is history that shapes any transhistorical characteristic of human
beings. With regard to the relationship between human transhistoricity and historicity, Kosik
explains as follows:
Human reality is not a pre-historical or a transhistorical and unvarying substance. It is
formed in the course of history. Reality is more than conditions and historical facticity;
but neither does it ignore empirical reality. The dualism of transient and emptied
empirical facticity on the one hand, and the spiritual realm of ideal values rising
independently above it on the other hand, is the mode in which a particular historical
reality exists: the historical reality exists in this duality, and its entirety consists of this
split.15
Human reality as a concrete totality contains such duality of the empirical realm and the spiritual
realm. Human reality is ―the unity of events and their subjects, a unity of events and the process
of forming them, a practical-spiritual ability to transcend conditions.‖16 A human being is not
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only an ―event-formative and history-formative being‖ but also an ―onto-formative being‖ who
has the ability to overcome conditions and his historical form.17 While human beings are
historically shaped, they can overcome their historical form through the process of critical
incorporation. Human beings bring the past into the present, criticize and appreciate it, and
incorporate it into the present.18 The past is the basis of self-formation of a human being‘s
present. By critically incorporating his historical form, a human being can be a transhistorical
being in a dialectical sense.
In terms of the relationship between a human being and a system (e.g. social, political,
cultural, or economic system), duality is crucial and indispensable. In other words, individuality
and socialness together constitute the duality of an individual. On the one hand, human beings
belong to and are shaped by a system: ―[A human being] does not exist without ‗conditions‘ and
is a social being only through ‗conditions.‘‖19 Conditions constitute who and what a given
human being is. A human being becomes a reality as she belongs to a certain system. Without
belonging to a certain system, a human being becomes an angelic being or an invisible being in
the system. When a human being plays her part she is recognized in the system. She is real as
long as she has a certain role within the system, even when she does nothing in it. She is one of
the constituents of her family, group, economic system, and political community.
On the other hand, a human being cannot be reduced to conditions or a system. Put
differently, a human being can neither be equated with nor a slave to her social, political, cultural,
or economic systems. Kosik puts it in the following way:
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[A human being] always exists in a system, and being one of its components he is
reduced to certain aspects (functions) and to certain (one-sided and reified) forms of
existence. At the same time, he is always more than a system, and as man he cannot be
reduced to one. The existence of the concrete man spans the distance between his
irreducibility to a system and the possibility to transcend it, and his actual location and
practical functioning in a particular system (of historical circumstances and relations).20
Even when a human being exists in and through society, her role in her social participation is
insufficient to fully represent her reality. Her role is only a part of her reality. Even though she is
in the system, it is impossible for the system to subsume her. She is more than what the society
recognizes her to be. Her reality exists within a system and at the same time beyond it.
Myriad dualities exist in human reality such as individuality and socialness, immanence
and transcendence, animality and humanness, to name a few. Such dualities do not remain in
human reality as mere juxtapositions. The dualities are in an active dialectical relationship. A
human being, through the dialectical relationships within the duality, is ―an onto-formative
being.‖21 That is to say, human beings form reality in history, through ―constantly renewing,
practically constituting unity of man and world, matter and spirit, subject and object, products
and productivity.‖22 Kosik defines a human being as ―an anthropo-cosmic being‖ who in history
mediates ―spirit and matter, culture and nature, man and the universe, theory and action, existents
and existence, epistemology and ontology.‖23 A human being constitutes herself through
dialectical relationship among a myriad of dualities. In this sense, with relation to duality of
socialness and individuality, a human being is both social and individual in her dialectical
relationship in forming concrete totality.
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4.2.2 Anselm Min’s view of human beings
Anselm Min more concretely deals with Kosik‘s view of a human being as an anthropocosmic being. A human being is intrinsically constituted by her cosmic, social, and personal
circumstances. He, thus, frames a human being as a moment of cosmic totality, socio-historical
totality, and personal totality.24 These three totalities are not of the same rank: Cosmic totality is
the ultimate foundation of socio-historical totality and personal totality; socio-historical totality
is the constitutive foundation of personal totality.
First, a human being is a moment of cosmic totality. A human being exists in the world
which ―is an indeterminate totality of already existing things related to one another and
interacting in a myriad of ways, some well known or partially known, others only vaguely
surmised, still others not even suspected yet operative behind our backs.‖25 Such a world is
called as nature, cosmos, or universe. While we have only a limited ability to understand the full
reality of nature, the cosmos, or the universe, human beings are located in cosmos, originated
from universe, and survive only within nature. Though unable to survive without the world,
human beings are not reducible to mere constituents of nature. They have the ability to objectify
nature in such a way as to utilize and manipulate its resources according to their needs. However,
nature is utilized and manipulated only ―on the basis of its immanent possibilities, and in
accordance with its structural requirement.‖26 Sheer misunderstanding of their place within
nature has led human beings to believe they have unlimited ability to transform nature. Human
critical consciousness and transformative praxis allow human beings to transcend the world; but
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such transcendence is only a moment of cosmic totality. Emphasizing the immensity of cosmic
totality, Min explains it in the following way:
Nature or cosmos is not reducible to the merely material as in scientific positivism, for
it also includes the element of self-transcendence and self-consciousness in human,
however limited this might be. Nature includes both continuity of evolutionary history
and interaction of intrinsically related beings on the one hand and discontinuity of the
novum and irreducible transcendence on the other, both of which are moments within
nature as totality, which therefore contains principles of otherness and transcendence
within itself.‖27
A cosmic human being experiences cosmos as totality that is beyond her manipulation and grasp
because of its immensity and transcendence. The fact that a human being is a cosmic being,
existing within cosmic totality, limits the boundary of viable anthropology. Human ability of
transformation and transcendence is not infinite or boundless; rather, what human does and can
do belongs to cosmic totality.
A human being as a moment of cosmic totality is mediated by a moment of sociohistorical totality. A human being as a cosmic being is constituted by a socio-historical being:
―Our physical, intellectual, aesthetic, and religious relations to the cosmos are mediated by our
economic, political, and cultural struggles and categories in the social world.‖28 Both cosmic
existence and socio-historical existence are moments of concrete totality; but, cosmic existence
is more fundamental than social existence. ―[C]osmic existence constitutes the ultimate source,
limit, and condition of our social existence,‖ while cosmic existence is shaped and defined
―through the mediation of our social existence.‖29
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Human beings as socio-historical beings are born into a social world wherein they have
―innumerable relationships with their fellows, their families, their clans and tribes, their friends
and enemies, their economic, political, and cultural communities and institutions, each with a
particular structure and at a particular stage of historical development.‖30 A human being is
located in such a social world as a moment of socio-historical totality. The social world as a
concrete totality is this:
Society is ―concrete‖ in the sense that it is internally differentiated into ―relatively‖
autonomous spheres of activity as well as groups and classes, each of which is at the
same time intrinsically related to one another and shapes itself in a dialectic
contradiction and reconciliation in relation to both other parts and the whole. Society is
a ―totality‖ in the sense that it is both the a priori condition for the process or ―becoming‖
of the parts and the a posteriori result shaped in its turn by such becoming, often
collapsing as a totality as when it could no longer sustain the conflicts and
contradictions among its parts.31
A human being as a moment of socio-historical totality is located in such a social world as
concrete totality. A human being is shaped through the social world that is in a dialectical
relationship with contradiction and reconciliation of many conflicting conditions and factors.
In the social world, the economic condition is a central factor constituting human
existence. The economic condition is important in three ways. Firstly and most important, human
existence is fundamentally dependent on economic and material conditions. In other words,
without material provisions human beings cannot exist. A human being can survive only when
she has at least enough food, drinkable water, appropriate clothing, safe shelter, adequate
medical service, and the like. Secondly, the economic condition is also crucial for a human being
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because it creates ―the sphere of social interdependence.‖32 Economic conditions make
individuals depend on one another. Because of her economic interdependence on other human
beings, for instance, a person can be located in the production system as an unskilled worker, a
skilled worker, or a capitalist, to name a few options. She plays her proper role in producing
social wealth, which benefits human beings in general. Human beings are dependent on one
another in organizing and operating the economic system conducive to all. The economic
condition, thirdly, affects power relationships and cultural formation.33 Political inequality and
cultural (de)formation are closely related to economic conditions as I have explained in chapters
2 and 3. The economic condition is a totalizing factor in socio-historical totality. The economic
condition as a totalizing factor does not mean that human beings are determined exclusively by
socio-historical totality. Rather, it means that without the constitutive role of socio-historical
totality, human beings are unfathomable.
A human being is a personal totality, that is to say, an individual. When considered in
relation to concrete totality, an individual human being is not a starting point. That is because a
human being is an individual with the proviso that a personal totality is subordinated to and
mediated by socio-historical totality and cosmic totality. In other words, personal totality as the
unity of body and soul, matter and spirit, and transcendence and immanence should be
considered in light of socio-historical totality and cosmic totality. A human being is different
from an animal or an angelic being in that a human being has the potentiality of being a human:
―This potentiality, defined as rational animality, is further analyzed in terms of such powers as
intellect, rational and irrational appetites, emotion, and sense.‖34 But potentiality is only
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potentiality. If the human potentiality is not actualized in an individual human being, we are
unable to distinguish the being from an animal or other living being. Actualization of potentiality
is crucial in order for a human being to concretely exist. Where then is the human potentiality
actualized? According to Anselm Min,
It is only by being-in-the-world-as-this-concrete-totality that the potentiality of human
nature becomes actual. Humans are ―in‖ the world, not like chairs in a room but more
like fish in the water. The ―in‖ does not primarily denote a spatial but an ontological
relationship to the world as an internal, constitutive condition of human existence. The
potentialities of intellect, will, emotion, instinct, and sense are intrinsically ―intentional‖
or related to objects in a socio-historical totality and become actual – discovered,
developed, or underdeveloped, distorted – only through their mediation. That is, human
nature is both actual and intelligible only as the nature of a human being whose
―essence‖ lies not in abstract human nature or individual ―existence‖ (Heidegger) but in
social existence as a concrete totality.35
Actualization of human potentiality happens in and through socio-historical totality. Human
beings cannot be human beings without being exposed to and having interaction with sociohistorical totality. I will more concretely discuss how socio-historical totality affects an
individual human being when I deal with a human being as a social being. Suffice it to say here
that personal totality is mediated by socio-historical totality.
In understanding a human being as personal totality, recognizing a human being as an
individual, there are three pitfalls. The first one is sociological determinism, which renders a
human being ―infinitely malleable,‖ with no ―determinate characteristics,‖ determined by social
influence.36 In this case, a human being as an individual is unrecognizable, since sociological
determinism reduces an individual human being to the social as if an individual is shaped and

35
36

Min, ―Praxis and Liberation,― 111.
Min, ―Praxis and Liberation,― 112.

153

manipulated exclusively by the social. Without their distinctive individuality, individuals are
lumped together along the line of social, economic, cultural, political identities. Sociological
determinism is in line with Kosik‘s bad totality, since it mythologizes the subject by regarding
the social as the overriding subject in relation to the individual. While it is true that an individual
is unable to make significant changes to her social conditions, Min points out that ―the person is
no merely passive recipient of external influences like a cog in a machine.‖37 The second pitfall
is idea of the priority of an individual human being over the social. In this case, the social is
reduced to the individual human being.38 Society is the sum of human individuals. Quite contrary
to the first pitfall, this one sees the social as infinitely malleable since it regards society as shaped
by human individuals and totally dependent upon human individuals who constitute it.
Individuals are ―already developed and mature in their isolation, coming together to associate
with one another and form a society out of pure individual wills.‖39 The view that the social is
infinitely malleable is in line with abstract totality, to use Kosik‘s word, that a human being is
abstracted and absolutized in such a way that society is determined by its constituting individuals.
The third pitfall posits a dualism between a human being and society. In this view, the individual
and society are ―mere juxtaposition, externality, and equality between the two.‖40 For human
beings, in this case, society is no more than ―secondary, accidental or extrinsic additions,‖
without which they already have complete totality.41 Individuals engage in society entirely on a
voluntary, non-essential basis. As Kosik states, it is an empty totality, or more exactly an
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insufficient totality, which denies the crucial role of intrinsic and constitutive social existence in
the shaping of personal totality.
These three pitfalls ignore the dialectical relationship that individuals have with the social.
On the one hand, in light of concrete totality a human being is an individual, forming her
concrete personal totality. On the other hand, a human being is a social being, forming her
concrete personal totality thoroughly based on the social. A human being as an individual and a
social being denies two views: that the social has a unilateral impact on an individual or vice
versa, and that the social and the individual are juxtaposed. The individual and the social have a
dialectical relationship in forming concrete personal totality. A human being as concrete totality
is an individual and social being in a dialectical relationship. I would call this understanding of
human beings social individuality.
4.2.3 Human beings as social beings
Social individuality refutes the view that human beings are asocial individuals. Human
beings are social individuals. In terms of the view that human beings are social beings, what is
the evidence? If human beings are social individuals, what is the depth and breadth of human
socialness? I will show that human beings are social biologically, existentially, and identityformationally, which reveals the depth of human socialness. I will also demonstrate that human
beings are globally interdependent, which indicates how breadth of human socialness. I will also
deal with the relationship between individuality and socialness of an individual human being.
What makes human beings social beings? What is the concrete, observable basis of the
assertion that a human being is a social being? In order to answer these questions, I am going to
compare human beings and other higher mammals.
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Human species belong to the classification of higher mammals. Though having species
specific characteristics, humans share at least two characteristics that other higher mammals have:
loving care and precocial-ness. The most conspicuous common characteristic of mammals is
―loving care of the young and nursing.‖42 Like human beings, parents of higher mammals care
for their newborns until the newborns can survive independently. The other common
characteristic of higher mammals is precocial-ness. According to Adolf Portmann,
Newborns of all highly organized mammalian groups are precocial, and their sensory
organs are well developed and capable of functioning. In form, apart from some slight
proportional deviations, particularly in the size of the head, these newborns are
miniature versions of the mature form, and their behavior and locomotion are to a large
extent the same as their parents‘. The infant also has command of the means of social
communication that are typical for its species. This is the state at birth for ungulates,
seals, and whales, as well as for anthropoids43
Newborns of higher mammals possess a shape similar to their parents, species specific behavior,
and social communication skill. Like many mammal newborns, human newborns are precocial,
which means that they have developed the central nervous system through a long gestation
period.44
Although being precocial like other higher mammals, human beings also have differences.
The noticeable difference between human newborns and other newborn mammals is that it takes
one year for human newborns to attain ―the degree of formation in keeping with its species that a
true mammal must have already realized by the time of its birth.‖45 In other words, ―at birth, the
human has not yet attained the type of movement, the body posture, or the power of
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communication typical for its species at maturity.‖46 In this sense, while human beings are
basically a precocial type, Portmann contends that human beings are a secondarily altricial type,
since human newborns during their first year should have developed crucial capacities that are
already developed in other mammals at birth.47 Considering that the true mammalian mode is
literally a precocial type, Portmann asserts that human ―pregnancy would have to be longer than
it is by about that one year; it would have to last for about twenty-one months.‖48 Portmann, thus,
accentuates that human newborns, before they should have developed their crucial capacities, are
exposed to the open world other than their mothers‘ closed, inner womb. The open world to
human newborns is not the world of nature, but the unnatural, social world.
What happens in the first year of human newborns after their birth when they are
prematurely exposed to the social world? The first year is the duration for ―the attaining of erect
posture, the learning of an actual verbal language, and the entrance into the realm of technical
thinking and behaving.‖49 This happens when human newborns are exposed to their social
environment. While other higher mammal newborns learn species specific behaviors in a natural
environment, human newborns learn the behaviors in an unnatural, social environment. In
addition, the way to acquire species specific behavior differentiates human beings from other
mammals. Unlike other mammals who develop their species specific behaviors ―simply through
practice, using a predisposition already inherent in the structure,‖ human newborns develop such
species specific behaviors, ―through special acts of striving, learning, and imitation peculiar to
the organism.‖50 In human attainment of species specific behaviors, Portmann emphasizes the
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importance of mimicking. In terms of language and insightful behavior, human newborns start
simple mimicking sounds and gestures, but they gradually acquire speech and insightful
behavior.51 Without other adult members of their own species to mimic, human newborns can
hardly acquire species specific behaviors. Thus, the fact that human newborns learn their species
specific behaviors through mimicking presupposes an already established unnatural circumstance,
unlike mammals who acquire their species specific behaviors through simple practice using their
inherent locomotion and predisposition. Portmann also points out the differences between human
language and animal sounds. While human language is categorized as signs, animal sounds fall
short of being categorized as signs, with which human beings can ―describe [their] perceptions,
judgments, wishes, and so on.‖52 Though animal sounds are ―expressions of inner states,‖ they
have no ―organized structures of sound and sign appearing in various meaningful
combinations.‖53 That human speech has an organized structure of sound and sign presupposes
an already established system of communication.
The first year for newborn mammals is an adaptation period to the natural world; for
human newborns, the first year is a period of being shaped socially, which is far from adapting to
the natural world. Portmann says that ―one becomes aware, from the very beginning, of the
extent to which these human qualities of posture, language, and behavior are phenomena with a
social stamp, and it becomes obvious how much circumstances of social contact contribute to
their formation right from the outset.‖54 He, thus, summarizes the first year for human newborns
as follows:
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In humans, maturation processes, which did indeed begin within the mother‘s body, go
through their most important phases in combination with the experiences offered by a
much richer environment with many sources of stimulation to the organism capable of
development. Thus, in humans, courses of events ordained by natural law take place
during the first year of life not in the all-purpose environment of the womb but under
unique circumstances; each phase of postpartum life intensifies this uniqueness by
increasing the possibilities for divergent, individual situations. And so it is that already
during its first year of life, the human child is subject to the laws of ―history,‖ at a time
when the human as a true mammal would still have to be developing within the
darkness of the womb, in conditions governed exclusively by natural law.55
The unnatural, social world with the law of human history shapes human newborns in the first
year. A human being is, from the beginning, shaped by unnatural, socio-historical reality. While
this does not mean that a human being is quarantined from natural reality, suffice it to say that a
human being is a social being biologically.
Compared to Portmann, who renders human beings as secondarily artricial beings,
Arnold Gehlen regards human beings as deficient beings. Portmann emphasizes social influence
on human newborns; Gehlen accentuates the lack of ability for human beings to survive in their
natural states. According to Gehlen,
In terms of morphology, man [sic] is, in contrast to all other higher mammals, primarily
characterized by deficiencies, which, in an exact, biological sense, qualify as lack of
adaptation, lack of specialization, primitive states, and failure to develop, and which are
therefore essentially negative features. Humans have no natural protection against
inclement weather; we have no natural organs for defense and attack but yet neither are
our bodies designed for flight. Most animals surpass man as far as acuity of the senses
is concerned. Man has what could even be termed a dangerous lack of true instincts and
needs an unusually long period of protection and care during his infancy and childhood.
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In other words, under natural conditions, among dangerous predators, man would long
ago have died out.56
Human beings are deficient beings who have difficulty in surviving with what they have
biologically. In order to survive, human beings re-create nature as is evident in the human world
and human society which exists with weapons, fire, artificial food, shelter, and cooperation.57
This re-created, restructured nature which becomes the ―second nature‖ of human beings, Gehlen
calls culture. It is second nature for human beings because culture as an unnatural human
construction ―exists for man in exactly the same way in which the environment exists for an
animal.‖58 Through culture, human beings ―convert the disadvantages of their initial biological
condition into advantages.‖59 Culture is the result of human beings as deficient beings and, at the
same time, the foundation of the existence of human beings, without which human beings can
neither survive nor exist. Culture becomes indispensable for human beings. Gehlen, thus, asserts
that ―man is a cultural being.‖60 For Gehlen, culture is a broad concept: ―Culture is thus firstly
the totality of physical and intellectual means and techniques including institutions by which a
specific society ‗maintains itself;‘ secondly, it is the totality of all resulting institutions based on
it.‖61 His view of culture encompasses what we call society. In this vein, a cultural being is
interchangeable with a social being. A human being, for Gehlen, is a social being existentially.
A human being is a social being biologically as well as existentially. If a human being,
like Robinson Crusoe, was left alone on an island as a newborn baby or an infant, she could
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hardly be a human being with species-specific behavior that a social being exhibits. She would
probably die or survive as a non-human higher mammal. Such a non-social higher mammal is
different from a human being as a social being. A human being is shaped in and through a
society. According to George Mead, it is evident that as human beings ―who and what we are
develops from the outside in rather than from the inside out.‖62 He emphasizes the social in
shaping the individual identity of human beings.
As society and culture are essential and indispensable for human beings in their
development and survival, social influence seems to unilaterally determine their individual
identity. It then raises a question of individual identity. Though an individual is a social being,
without doubt, she can recognize herself as a being irreducible to purely external social
determination. Mead is one who tries to address the issue of the relationship between the
individual and the social. For Mead, an individual recognizes herself through society: ―The
individual experiences [her]self as such, not directly, but only indirectly, from the particular
standpoints of other individual members of the same social group, or from the generalized
standpoint of the social group as a whole to which [s]he belongs.‖63 An individual recognizes
and objectifies herself through her social relationships. In recognizing and objectifying herself,
communication plays a crucial role: An individual ―talks and replies to [her]self as truly as the
other person replies to [her].‖64 Recognizing oneself presupposes a social and linguistic process.
The self, the recognized individual self by herself, ―is essentially a social structure, and it arises
in social experience.‖65 For Mead, social influence is the decisive factor in understanding an
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individual as the self. But, Mead does not accept the view that social influence is unilaterally
shaping an individual self.
Mead uses the concepts of the ‗I‘ and the ‗me‘ as phases of the self, in order to show that
an individual self is not unilaterally shaped by a society.66 The self is ―an ongoing social process
with two distinguishable phases, the ‗I‘ and the ‗me‘.‖67 The ‗I‘ and the ‗me‘ are separated in
forming the self but they belong together to the self.68 Mead explains the relationship between
the ‗I‘ and the ‗me‘ in terms of functions such as self-reflection and action. In self-reflection,
―[t]he phase of the self which remembers is the ‗I,‘ the phase of the self which is remembered is
the ‗me.‘‖69 The ‗I‘ is ―the spokesman of the self of the second, or minute, or day ago,‖ whereas
the past ‗I‘ is the ‗me.‘70 In this sense, the ‗I‘ is a subject of self-reflection; the ‗me‘ is an object
of self-reflection. The ‗I‘ is also differentiated from the ‗me‘ as a subject of action. The ‗I‘
becomes a subject of action, responding ―to the attitudes of the others; the ‗me‘ is the organized
set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes.‖71 Mead ascribes an active function to the
‗I,‘ while associating the ‗me‘ with passive function.
When the ‗I‘ responds to others there is always, uncertainty, unpredictability, and novelty.
Such indeterminacy of individual response is the reason why Mead denies the unilateral
influence of the social on the individual. According to Mead, even the self cannot predict the
response of the ‗I‘.72 In terms of the unpredictability of the response, Mead says,
[Response] is the answer which the individual makes to the attitude which others take
toward him when he assumes an attitude toward them. Now, the attitudes he is taking
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toward them are present in his own experience, but his response to them will contain a
novel element. The ‗I‘ gives the sense of freedom, of initiative….We are aware of
ourselves, and of what the situation is, but exactly how we will act never gets into
experience until after the action takes place.73
Mead emphasizes the separation of the ‗I‘ from the ‗me‘ and of the unpredictable response of the
‗I‘ from the social influence on the ‗I‘. Such separation of the ‗I‘ and the ‗me‘ is understandable
since without the separation there are neither conscious personal responsibilities nor personal
novel responses.74 At first, Mead starts his view of self as social construction and reflection. But,
he ends up emphasizing the autonomous role of the ‗I‘ in the self. As he points out, individual
responses to others are no doubt unpredictable without the autonomous role of the ‗I‘. But, it is
not evident whether such an autonomous role of the ‗I‘ is sustainable in his view of the socially
constructed self.
Pannenberg questions the possibility of the ‗I‘ unmediated by society and social
relations.75 For Mead, the ‗I‘ and the ‗me‘ are the phases of the self that are mediated through
social relations. The self is the picture of an individual by the generalized other (in this sense, the
‗me‘ is not different from the self), while the ‗I‘ is a subject of self-consciousness and response
to others. Through self-consciousness, the ‗I‘ recognizes the self. What is interesting is that the
self, recognized by the ‗I‘, is the same self that is pictured by the generalized other. The same
self is recognized by both the ‗I‘ and the generalized other. This is to say that the ‗I‘s act of selfreflection is identical with the picture by the generalized other. If this is true, how can the ‗I‘ be
different from the generalized other? Such identification of the self by both the ‗I‘ and the
generalized other is impossible without presupposing the influence of the society to the ‗I.‘ In
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constituting the self, in addition, development of the ‗I‘ is taken for granted. Without the
development of the ‗I,‘ there will be no development of the self. How then does the ‗I‘ develop
itself? One answer is the dialectical relationship between the ‗I‘ and the ‗me‘. In this case, the
‗me‘ is society‘s picture of an individual. In its own development, then, the ‗I‘ is unable to be
free from social influence.76 In Pannenberg‘s view, the ‗I‘ is mediated by social relations. In its
self-consciousness and its development, the ‗I‘ is unable to be free from social influence.
While Pannenberg accepts that the ‗I‘ is mediated by society, he does not deny the
creative role of the ‗I‘ in identity formation. For instance, if the ‗I‘ ―does not ‗accept‘ the social
self and thus falsifies its claim to be integrative,‖ the ‗I‘ can modify ―the classification and
expectations‖ assigned by others.77 Although he assigns the ‗I‘ an identity modification role, he
minimizes the autonomic role of the ‗I‘ and accordingly does not approve of a socially
unmediated ‗I‘. He, thus, shows that in their identity formation human beings are thoroughly
affected by the social.78
In a similar vein, Saba Mahmood contends an individual is produced through social
relations, rather than precedes them. Following Judith Butler and Michel Foucault, Mahmood
regards a social relationship as a power relationship ―that permeates life and is productive of new
forms of desires, objects, relations, and discourses.‖79 Mahmood alludes to the view that ―the set
of capacities inhering in a subject―that is, the abilities that define her modes of agency―are not
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the residue of an undominated self that existed prior to the operations of power but are
themselves the products of those operations.‖80 Society, thus, ―constitute[s] the very substance of
[an individual‘s] intimate, valorized interiority.‖81 Mahmood argues convincingly that
individuals are thoroughly shaped by society.
Human beings are social beings biologically, existentially, and even in their identity
formation. Biologically, human beings develop themselves through their mimicking within their
social environment. Existentially, human beings can survive with the help of already established
social structures. In their identity formation, human beings are constantly affected by social
contacts. The nature of human beings shows how deeply social human beings are.
Considering the depth of socialness of human beings, human beings can be separated and
grouped by their languages and cultures. The depth of socialness may justify the view that
human beings are affected by only an immediate group or society, such as their extended family,
their tribe, and their own language group, to name a few. Thus, some might assert that human
beings are not social beyond the boundary of extended family, tribe, or language group. If human
beings do not share the same language and culture they have no common social denominator that
can lump them together as the same kind of social beings. In addition, while there are some
interactions among language groups and cultural groups in such a way as to modify some
features of their languages and cultures, such modifications are very limited. The core structure
of languages and cultures will remain unchanged as long as the groups preserve them. In light of
language and culture, there is social discontinuity among human beings. Considering such a
discontinuity, human beings are social beings fractured by languages and cultures. But, human
beings as social beings have not only depth but also breadth of socialness.
80
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The breadth of socialness of human beings is related to their production. Human beings
are social beings in light of production. Individual human beings have survived as they
exchanged what they produced with other human beings. Karl Marx puts it this way:
The human being is in the most literal sense a , not merely a
gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of
society. Production by an isolated individual outside society – a rare exception which
may well occur when a civilized person in whom the social forces are already
dynamically present is cast by accident into the wilderness – is as much of an absurdity
as is the development of language without individuals living together and talking to
each other.82
In production, human beings are interconnected and interdependent with one another and their
society. Unlike the biological, existential, and identity formative nature of human beings, the
productive nature of human beings reveals different dimensions of social beings. It reveals how
broadly social they are and that human beings are not restricted by their immediate groups.
Throughout their history humans have established immediate self-sufficient communities, such
as extended families, regional communities, and polities. Human beings have been social beings
within their unique and restricted community as they produced and distributed their products
within each group‘s limited boundary. Through specialized productions, however, human beings
have extended the boundary of their self-sufficient communities. In other words, individual
human beings belong not only to their immediate communities but also to wider communities.
Reinhold Niebuhr puts it in this way:
[Human beings] have never been individually self-sufficient; but older pastoral and
agrarian societies had smaller units of self-sufficiency than are possible today. Every
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specialization of unique gifts in the life of the individual, every elaboration of special
skills means that a larger community is required to support the individual. It also means
that instruments and skills are created which can bind a larger community together in
one unit of cooperation….83
As skills are differentiated and specialized, human beings need larger and broader communities
to operate their specialized skills and works. Diversification of jobs is proof that human beings
belong to and are incorporated into a larger community. Human beings have expanded the
boundary of production and consumption to the extent that we now refer to a global economy for
all with rare exceptions for reclusive groups.
According to Thomas Pogge, human beings have a worldwide connection on three
different grounds. He explains that connection by means of three types of injustice: ―the effects
of shared social institutions, the uncompensated exclusion from the use of natural resources, and
the effects of a common and violent history.‖84
First, human beings around the globe share social institutions. These institutions are
―shaped by the better-off and imposed on the worst-off.‖85 These institutions decide the price of
primary goods, allocate natural resources, and maintain international relationships among nations.
The survival of the global poor ―often crucially depends on our consumption choices, which may
determine the price of their foodstuffs and their opportunities to find work.‖86 The corruption of
many developing countries, whose power is based on natural resources and military power, are
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closely related to the manipulation of affluent countries, such as bribes and the international arms
trade.87
One of the most powerful forces controlling the world‘s people and economy today
comes under the group heading of transnational corporations (TNCs). TNCs subsume almost all
human beings under one global economy. Without a doubt, TNCs aim at making a high-profit.
Reducing labor costs is the most efficient way to ensure high-profits. TNCs make desperate
efforts to find cheaper labor costs and their efforts result in expanding the social boundaries of
human beings. TNCs move their manufacturing factories from their original place to wherever
they can secure cheaper labor. The Export Processing Zone (EPZ) is the place where cheaper
labor is present and products of TNCs are made.88 EPZs are located in poor countries. As people
in wealthy countries use TNCs‘ products, they become interdependent on those who are in the
EPZs of poor countries. When TNCs move their factories to poorer countries to get cheaper labor,
consumers of the TNCs‘ products are interdependent on people in the poorer countries. The
movement of TNCs‘ factories broadens the socioeconomic relations of human beings.
Second, from their birth, the global poor are excluded from the use and compensation of
natural resources. For instance, while affluent people use natural resources such as oil, the
payment for them goes to the elites, not to the poor, of oil exporting countries.89 Considering
environmental pollution, the global poor share the burdens of consumption of natural resources
―while having to watch helplessly as the affluent distribute the planet‘s abundant natural wealth
amongst themselves.‖90
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Third, the global poor are thrown into devastating circumstances which ―are significantly
shaped by a dramatic period of conquest and colonization, with severe oppression, enslavement,
even genocide, through which the native institutions and cultures of four continents were
destroyed or severely traumatized.‖91 While human history has created social wealth and goods,
they have come with systematic violence, which has led to global inequality. The fact that
innumerable people throughout many generations of history have been affected by colonialism,
oligarchic international systems, and the maldistribution of natural resources and wealth
demonstrates how broadly human beings are connected by social interactions.
In the global world, as I explained in Chapter 1, we witness ―stretched social relations‖
across nation-state boundaries, ―intensification of flows,‖ and ―the emergence of global
infrastructures and networks.‖92 In today‘s world almost all human beings are interconnected and
interdependent on one another through global socio-economic and political networks. We are
social beings whose connections are broad enough to include us all in one global system.
I have explained the depth and breadth of socialness of human beings. Michael Hardt and
Antonio Negri point out the social nature of human beings. According to Hardt and Negri, nearly
all human beings live within a biopolitical world that controls every facet of human life,
including economic, cultural, and political life. The biopolitical world, ―subsumed within a
power that reaches down to the ganglia of the social structure and its processes of development,
reacts like a single body. Power is thus expressed as a control that extends throughout the depths
of the consciousnesses and bodies of the population – and at the same time across the entirety of
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social relations.‖93 No human being can escape from and remain unaffected by the biopolitical
world, i.e., Empire. That is to say, human beings are thoroughly social beings beyond territory
and relational boundaries.
Individuals are deeply and widely influenced by the social as Hardt and Negri indicate.
Social individuality thus indicates that the social plays a very constitutive role in shaping
individual identity, individual capacity, individual production, and individual freedom. Though
the individual and the social have a dialectical relationship with each other, social individuality
emphasizes the foundational role of socialness. Without the social, an individual human being is
unable to be a member of the human species. Compared to liberal individualism, social
individuality prioritizes the social over the individual. Nonetheless, social individuality does not
deny the individuality of social individuals. It is because the social in its configuration and
reconfiguration is also affected by the individual. Negation of the individual means petrification
of the social, the petrification which would lead to the demise of the social as well as the
individual. Social individuality rejects the petrification of the social. While individuality is
inseparable from the social, an individual can have a transcendent moment beyond as well as
within the social: A transcendent moment moves beyond the social because an individual reveals
novelty in responding to the social; a transcendent moment is within the boundary of the social
since the novel response takes place within society and reconstitutes it, either visibly or invisibly.
Social individuality, therefore, views a human being as an individual in a dialectical relationship
between the individual and the social, acknowledging the crucial, constitutive role of the social
and, at the same time, the non-negligible role of the individual, which remains irreducible to the
social, in the dialectical relationship.
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4.3 Implication of social individuality for rights of concrete others
I have argued that human beings are thoroughly interdependent in such a way that
individual talents, identity, ability, wealth, and production are products of social labor and
cooperation. The general idea that human beings are thoroughly interdependent does not
designate specific policies, which are contingent on particularities of a given society.
Nonetheless, the general idea that human beings are thoroughly interdependent imposes on a
society some minimum requirements such as assuring the basic needs of all human beings and
the basic conditions of social life including education, law enforcement, medical care, national
defense, and the like. These conditions constitute the common good. Thus, social individuality
induces some minimum requirements as the common good for all.
What specific implication does social individuality have for the rights of concrete others?
Social individuality redefines the relationship between individual freedom and individual
economic equality. While liberal individualism prioritizes individual freedom over economic
equality, it gives priority to private property over individual freedom. I have shown that because
of this limitation liberal theories can protect freedom of the propertied but not of the propertyless.
Social individuality reverses the priority of private property over individual freedom. Thus,
social individuality prioritizes individual freedom over private property. This reverse of priority
opens a way to restrict private property. In order to promote individual freedom, private property
can be restricted. By imposing restrictions on private property, social individuality is able to
secure resources for substantiating individual freedom of all. In this vein, social individuality is
not the negation of the goal of liberal individualism, i.e., promoting freedom of all individuals.
Rather, social individuality lays the foundation for the approximation of the very goal of liberal
individualism through promoting economic equality such as capability equality and least-gap
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equality. What justifies the restriction on private property? The restrictions are based on two
reasons: One is individual dignity and the other is individual socialness. I will show that
individual dignity necessitates the restriction of property rights, while individual socialness
justifies restriction.
How does individual dignity necessitate the restriction of property rights? I contend that
the vulnerable are concrete others. Concrete others are those who have a transcendental
dimension, which dictates respect for individual dignity. Respecting individual dignity means
that individuals are to be treated as an end, not a mere means. Can individual dignity be
protected without restricting private property? As I have shown in Chapter 3, individual freedom
is so important that, in order to promote it for all, property rights are restricted to a certain extent,
as revealed by John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. Will Kymlicka‘s liberal multiculturalism also
accepts restrictions on property rights. Individuals have both group differences and individual
differences. Promoting the two kinds of differences is a way of respecting individual dignity.
Liberal multiculturalism substantially promotes minority group differences by providing
resources, which are made available through restrictions on property rights of those who belong
to its majority group. Within a liberal tradition, thus, there is ample evidence that individual
dignity restricts private property rights.
Nonetheless, liberal proposals of restricting private property are limited, since liberal
theorists are in general reluctant to consider fully socialness of individuals. Macpherson points
out the possessive quality of liberal individualism in the following way:
Its possessive quality is found in its conception of the individual as essentially the
proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them…. Society
becomes a lot of free equal individuals related to each other as proprietors of their own
capacities and of what they have acquired by their exercise. Society consists of relations
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of exchange between proprietors. Political society becomes a calculated device for the
protection of this property and for the maintenance of an orderly relation of exchange.94
As long as individuals are proprietors of their own capacity, property rights have priority over
individual dignity. If property rights are prior to individual dignity, the dignity of the propertied
can be secured but the dignity of the less propertied or the non-propertied will be exposed to
negligence. The possessive quality, as long as it prioritizes property rights over individual
dignity, is detrimental to individual dignity and individual freedom.
Social individuality challenges the possessive quality of liberal individualism, which
justifies priority of private property over individual dignity. Most of all, social individuality
challenges the view that an individual is the exclusive proprietor of her person and/or capacities.
As I have shown above, individual personality is shaped through interaction with people, society,
and history. An individual is the result of her constant interrelationship with society and history.
In addition, individual capacities are recognized, developed, and expanded through social
interaction on the basis of social accumulation of knowledge and capital. Social accumulation of
knowledge and capital deepens and widens individual capacities and abilities. Individual
capacities and abilities are profoundly influenced and conditioned by their surrounding society,
whether it is an agricultural society, a nomadic society, or a technological society. Considering
that different societies provide diverse options for embodying individual talents and abilities, an
individual cannot be a sole proprietor of her capacities. By delving into individual capacity,
individual choice, and production process, I will contend that social individuality requires more
restricted property rights.
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John Rawls rejects an individual as sole proprietor of her capacities. Rawls regards the
natural talents and abilities as ―a common asset‖ and the ―help [for] the less fortunate.‖95
Considering individual natural talents and abilities as a common asset, he rejects absolute
individual property rights. However, he contends that ―the more advantaged are entitled to
whatever they can acquire in accordance with the rules of a fair system of social cooperation.‖96
That is to say, as long as the difference principle is observed, it is legitimate for the more
advantaged to accumulate goods without limitation. The unlimited accumulation allowance for
the more advantaged minimizes the social dimension of individual talents and abilities. Social
individuality rejects Rawls‘ justification of unlimited accumulation of goods for the more
advantaged. In understanding human beings, Rawls focuses on natural talents and abilities of the
more fortunate. Focusing on natural talents and abilities, he neglects the crucial importance of
the social dimension in the development and utilization of the talents and abilities, though he
mentions the role of social circumstances in developing the talents and abilities.97 In social
individuality, society in general and social influence such as language, culture, and material
provision in particular play a constitutive role in shaping and developing individual natural
talents and abilities. Without social interaction and support, natural talents and abilities of
individuals will remain idle. While society cannot create natural talents and abilities of
individuals, it hatches them out, develops them, and makes them useful. Because of the social as
a crucial factor in developing individual natural talents and abilities, individual property rights
should be more considerably restricted than Rawls proposes.

95

Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 87.
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 89.
97
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 89.
96

174

Individual choice has been the ground of absolute property rights in the thinking of
Ronald Dworkin. Since individual is a proprietor of the person, individual choice justifies
individual property rights. Ronald Dworkin justifies property rights based on individual choice
through his ambition-sensitive and endowment-insensitive distribution.98 Like John Rawls,
Dworkin restricts property rights. Nobody can claim exclusive property rights on endowment,
which belongs to society. However, individual choices do not belong to the social. He contends
that the result of an individual choice is her responsibility, if resources are equally distributed. As
long as one‘s property is accumulated or dispersed by her individual choice, she is responsible
for its accumulation or dispersion. On Dworkin‘s justification of property rights based on
individual choice, the crucial question is whether there is an individual choice that is quarantined
by the social. When an individual makes a decision, its outcome is dependent on her knowledge,
preference, and situation, as well as other factors. Individual knowledge and preference are not
made in a vacuum, but are shaped by social constitutive interactions such as education, family
history, friendship, culture, and so on. It is correct that an individual decision is made ultimately
by an individual but it is incorrect to say that the social has no role in the decision-making
process. Rather, whether it is the worst or best decision, a decision is made by an individual
through the process of social interaction both within herself, as the interaction between the ‗I‘
and the social self, and without herself, as the interaction between herself and others. Individual
choice always accompanies the social. If an individual choice is accompanied by social
interaction, it is difficult to assign full property rights to the result of an individual choice. For
that reason, social interaction is an inseparable factor of an individual choice. Thus, the
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inseparable social dimension of individual choice would require more restricted property rights
than Ronald Dworkin proposes.
I have discussed that individual capacities as well as individual choice cannot be a
foundation of individual property rights, since the social permeates individual choice, talents,
and abilities. Considering the social dimensions of individual choice and capacities, property
rights need to be more restricted than either John Rawls or Ronald Dworkin allows. There is yet
another reason why property rights are restricted: with only rare exceptions, every property is a
social production.
Production is a social accomplishment made by social individuals. In other words,
property is created through the interactions among labor, capital, means of production, and other
social entities. These property producing elements are socially developed, accumulated,
transmitted, and utilized. In terms of labor, individual labor power is closely connected to
individual talents and abilities as well as individual choice. As I have shown above, the social
plays a constitutive role in shaping individual capacities and choice. The quality and quantity of
individual labor power is molded through an institutionalized system of education, which is
based on the generational accumulation of human knowledge and techniques. In our days,
information is the salient example of inseparable interaction between social accumulation and
individual labor power. Producing information shows how individual labor power is based on
and affected by social accumulations. According to Michael McFarland,
Because it is the product of human thought and not itself corporeal, information is
constantly changing, growing, combining, and creating offshoots. An intellectual work
never springs pure and original from a single human mind. There are always influences.
The language, the characters, the themes, and the structure of a novel all have their
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predecessors. Programmers always learn from other programmers, as anyone who has
followed their intense conversations can appreciate.99
Without social accumulations and interactions, there can hardly be new products. Considering
the importance of social accumulations and interactions in production, individual labor is
innately social labor and accordingly property rights should take the social dimension of labor
into consideration.
Another component of production is capital. Capital is objectified and alienated human
labor. According to Marx, ―Capital is, among other things, also an instrument of production, also
objectified, past labour.‖100 Though capital is objectified labor, it alienates the human laborer
from itself. Marx emphasizes that ―the progress of civilization…enriches not the worker but
rather capital ….‖101 While capital originates from human labor, it alienates human laborers from
its ownership. Specifically, capital as objectified, past labor evokes colonial history and
exploitation of innumerable people who as the colonized or slave laborers had never received
adequate compensation. In its origination, capital has social dimension, which denies its sole
ownership by a few people. In addition, capital is not productive by itself. Unlike fruit trees,
capital is unable to produce anything by itself. Instead, for its increase and accumulation capital
always needs human labor. That is to say, production is the result of human labor as well as
capital. Nonetheless, capital owners take surplus value as well as their own portion, whereas
laborers receive only their wages. Though capital is objectified human labor, i.e., social
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production, only capital owners take extra benefits from interaction between capital and laborers.
Laborers should, at least, share in surplus value created by the interaction between capital and
their labors. Since capital itself is objectified past labor and its increase is also dependent upon
objectified labor, capital should be owned by all those who have participated in it, that is, society
in general.
The last component of production is means of production. Like human labor and capital,
the social plays a constitutive role in making the means of production. Means of production is
the result of science, inventions, human labor, and social institutions, and other participants.
Such constitutive factors of means of production are formed by accumulation, distribution, and
utilization of human knowledge through social institutions such as education system and the
market. Because it is a product of society, the means of production cannot be a property of a few
people. Rather, means of production should be owned by society.
The fact that individual capacity and choice are inevitably shaped by society and that
production is social production justifies restrictions on individual property rights. Since society
fundamentally influences individuals and production, a corollary view of property rights might
be common ownership of all properties and distribution of them according to individual need.
According to Karl Marx, it might be a production and distribution system ―from each according
to his ability, to each according to his needs.‖102 In order to achieve this utopian vision,
individual property rights need to be abolished. However, this utopian view is not persuasive in
at least two respects: 1) though ethically appropriate, it is practically impossible; 2) while human
beings are social beings, they are individual beings irreducible to their society. On the one hand,
any economic system can hardly provide benefits to ―all citizens at a level sufficient for a single
102

Karl Marx and others, Critique of the Gotha Programme (New York,: International Publishers, 1986),

10.

178

person to live comfortably.‖103 The result would be an unsustainable economic system as we
have witnessed from the failure of Communism. On the other hand, since individuals cannot be
subsumed by the social, the restriction of property rights cannot be equated with the abolition of
all property rights. Even Marx denies the abolition of all property rights. Marx differentiates
personal property from productive property and he proposes individual rights of personal
property:
It is important to understand that Marx defines the word property in two senses, as
personal property and as productive property. By personal property, Marx means
objects people owned privately which did not produce social wealth, such as clothing,
furniture, or cosmetics. By productive property, Marx means objects people owned
privately which did produce social wealth, such as oil wells, coal mines or steel mills.
The crucial aspect to Marx‘s approach to the question of private property relates to that
property which contributes to total social value. From this frame of reference, when
Marx calls for the abolition of property he does not call for the abolition of private
property, clothing or cosmetics, but for the abolition of productive property: private
possession of steel mills and coal mines.104
Marx acknowledges individual rights to personal property that are unrelated to social wealth.
Marx, thus, at least partially recognizes the individuality of social individuals. While his view of
the abolition of individual productive property rights is persuasive in light of his understanding
of human beings as species beings, social individuality does not accept abolition of owning
productive property, because such abolition denies individuality of social individuals in
productive property. Instead, social individuality allows both personal property and at the same
time, to a certain extent, individuals‘ differential appropriation of productive property.
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If neither abolition of owning productive property nor absolute property rights is
acceptable, to what extent and on what criterion can an individual own property or justify his
acquisition? Absolute confiscation of individual property is as absurd as absolute allowance of
individual property rights. In addition, it is impossible to fathom the portion of the individual and
the social in every production. Accordingly, it is difficult to draw specific policies from the
general view that human beings are thoroughly interdependent. Nonetheless, we can draw
minimum requirements of a society from the general view of human beings as social individuals.
Based on human interdependence in production and identity formation, every human being owes
to one another a society that provides basic human needs for all and the basic conditions of social
life such as education, law enforcement, national defense, medical care, to name a few. These
basic conditions of social life constitute the common good, through which we can protect and
respect dignity of all human beings. In order to respect dignity of all, the common good
necessitates capability equality and least-gap equality. Every individual should have capability
equality that guarantees resources for developing individual capabilities. In addition, every
individual should have least-gap equality in such a way that primary goods are accessible to each
and every one as equally as possible. Capability equality and least-gap equality are criteria for
designating individual portion and social portion in appropriating social production. I will have
more detailed discussion on this in Chapter 5.

4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown that human beings as concrete totality are social individuals,
who constitute themselves through a dialectical relationship between the social and the
individual. While human beings are shaped by this relationship, a more fundamental role is given
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to the social. Human individuality is possible only through the social, though it is not reducible
to the social. The fact that human beings are social biologically, existentially, and in their
identity formation reveals the depth of socialness of human beings; the fact that human beings
are affected by human history and production indicates the breadth of socialness of human
beings. Considering the depth and breadth of socialness of human beings, the social plays a
constitutive role in shaping individual choice, individual capacity, and production, on which
individual property rights are based. Because of the constitutive role of the social in individual
formation and production, property rights need to be restricted. The criterion that decides the
extent of property rights is the common good, which protects and promotes individual dignity of
all. Social individuality thus justifies priority of individual freedom over individual property
rights. Whereas liberal individualism‘s priority of private property over individual freedom
protects freedom of the propertied, social individuality‘s priority of individual freedom over
private property promotes freedom of all. The next chapter, as I propose rights of concrete others,
will deal more concretely with the extent to which property rights ought to be restricted and how
to promote freedom of social individuals.
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Chapter 5
Rights of Concrete Others: Social Multiculturalism

What is meant by the ―rights of concrete others‖? Best defined, it is the rights of concrete
others who are social individuals. The view of human beings as social individuals denotes that
individuals are both social and individual in a dialectically constitutive relationship. The rights of
social individuals, accordingly, are based on their socialness and individuality. Considering the
socialness of human beings, on the one hand, the rights of concrete others takes note of the
cultural and group identity of individuals as well as their economic equality. On the other hand,
with relation to the individuality of human beings, the rights of concrete others accentuates
individual dignity, though it is inseparably connected to an individual‘s social and cultural
identity. I will argue that the rights of social individuals that address both individual dignity and
individual socialness are best recognized and protected by what I refer to as social
multiculturalism. Compared to liberal multiculturalism that promotes freedom within groups,
social multiculturalism promotes equality within groups in order to substantiate freedom of all.
Social multiculturalism has two principles: equality between groups and equality within
groups. The two principles have different connotations. Equality between groups promotes group
difference, in order for different groups to have sufficient resources for their internal or external
self-determination. In other words, equality between groups is unrelated to equalization of
income or resources between groups. Equality within groups works toward the least economic
gap between group members (least-gap equality) at the same time it promotes their individual
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differences (capability equality).1 These two dimensions of equality help individuals participate
substantially in determining group difference and developing their individual differences. I will
propose a reconfigured basic income guarantee (RBIG) as a concrete form of both least-gap
equality and capability equality.
The section of equality within groups deals mainly with an RBIG. An RBIG is a basic
income guarantee (BIG) supplemented by public education, public healthcare, and linguistic
diversity. In the previous chapter, I have contended that property rights need to be restricted in
light of individual dignity of all. I propose an RBIG as a concrete form of property rights that is
restricted in light of individual dignity of all. This RBIG is based on the BIG proposed by
Philippe van Parjis. His BIG focuses on equality that substantiates freedom of all through basic
income. However, BIG only partially substantiates freedom of all since it is indifferent to group
difference and linguistic diversity as well as public education and public healthcare. I reconfigure
BIG in such a way that individuals are able to promote both individual difference and group
difference.
While an RBIG can promote both individual and group difference, it also comes into
conflict with group self-determination. For instance, social multiculturalism in principle
emphasizes that an external self-determination-seeking group has a responsibility to provide its
members least-gap equality and capability equality. Without the provision of those two
dimensions of equality, a group will inevitably be swayed by its elites and accordingly bring
about the internal minority problem. However, minority groups such as indigenous peoples,
national minorities, and immigrants are unable to realize the two dimensions of equality but they
nevertheless aspire to their self-determination. Social multiculturalism, then, appears to be an

1

Capability equality means that individuals should have food, clothing, shelter, public education, and
public healthcare in order to have substantial freedom.
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obstacle to a minority group‘s self-determination. The section on equality between groups
focuses on this conflict. Although every minority group that has experienced discrimination and
oppression because of its cultural and linguistic difference can claim self-determination, I will
contend that an external self-determination-seeking minority group should be able to provide at
least capability equality to their members in order to claim their external self-determination.
Social multiculturalism, with equality between groups and equality within groups, is an
appropriate proposal for the rights of concrete others as it promotes both group difference and
individual difference of all by substantiating individual freedom of all. In proposing social
multiculturalism, I will first deal with social multiculturalism in relation to liberal
multiculturalism, then reconfigure a basic income guarantee in such a way as to promote both
individual difference and group difference, and finally address possible conflicts between
equality between groups and equality within groups.

5.1 Social Multiculturalism
I advocate social multiculturalism as a proposal for the rights of concrete others. Social
multiculturalism is based on social individuality. It emphasizes the crucial role of equality played
by equality in promotion of freedom. In contrast to liberal multiculturalism, which adopts two
principles, that is, equality between groups and freedom within groups, social multiculturalism
accepts the same principle of equality between groups but interprets the principle of freedom
within groups differently. I have argued that freedom within groups can be achieved when
capability equality substantiates freedom. In promoting freedom within groups, social
multiculturalism adopts equality within groups. Equality between groups and within groups
works toward equality that substantially promotes both group difference and individual
difference.
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Why should liberal multiculturalism be replaced by social multiculturalism? Liberal
multiculturalism‘s principle of freedom within groups is unable to achieve its goal of promoting
the freedom of internal minorities. Put differently, the principle of freedom within groups
protects only formal freedom but not substantial freedom of internal minorities. When liberal
multiculturalism protects freedom within groups, its goal is to protect individual members from
being persecuted or involuntarily excluded by the group. In terms of internal minority, for
instance, Will Kymlicka asserts that liberal multiculturalism should challenge illiberal practices
of minority groups. In making that challenge, Kymlicka emphasizes liberal multiculturalism‘s
support for internal reforms of illiberal practices such as oppression and unjust hierarchy.
Liberals have a right, and a responsibility, to speak out against such injustice. Hence
liberal reformers inside the culture should seek to promote their liberal principles,
through reason or example, and liberals outside should lend their support to any efforts
the group makes to liberalize their culture. Since the most enduring forms of
liberalization are those that result from internal reform, the primary focus for liberals
outside the group should be to provide this sort of support.2
While recommending internal reform, Kymlicka justifies external intervention in cases of
genocide or expulsion.3 Liberal multiculturalism treasures individual freedom in such a way as to
allow external intervention. Through external intervention, without doubt, liberal
multiculturalism can protect individual freedom from being infringed by illiberal groups.
My concern about liberal multiculturalism has to do with its silence on the issue of
equality within groups. This silence is the single most critical drawback of liberal
multiculturalism. Protecting freedom without equality offers no more than a half-solution and in
some cases becomes a major barrier to promoting freedom. Ironically, in liberal multiculturalism,
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promoting economic equality between groups is the very reason for promoting freedom of
minority groups. As Kymlicka admits, multiculturalism without equality has allowed the abuse
of minority groups because it acknowledges the different identity of minority groups in the case
of ―‗corporate multiculturalism,‘ ‗consumerist multiculturalism‘, ‗boutique multiculturalism‘,
‗neo-liberal multiculturalism,‘ or ‗Benetton multiculturalism.‘‖4 Such types of multiculturalism
are purportedly promoting differences of minority groups, while in reality they commodify
differences of minority groups. Commodified differences of minority groups can at best offer a
formal protection of their differences, but not substantial protection. In order to substantially
protect differences of minority groups, liberal multiculturalism adopts equality between groups
to the extent that groups can have self-determination. For instance, Kymlicka mentions
indigenous people. In order to protect their difference, indigenous people are allowed to ―have
the promise of rights to land, control over natural resources, political self-government, language
rights, and legal pluralism.‖5 Such a provision of equality is necessary for protecting and
promoting group difference. This logic needs to be consistently applied to individuals within
groups. Just as minority groups must have equality that substantially promotes their group
difference, individuals in minority groups should have at least equality that substantiates their
freedom. Unfortunately, Kymlicka is silent on equality within groups, and without that
protection, the freedom of internal minorities is, in some cases, negated. For example, without
the substantial participation of individuals, self-determination of the group may be swayed by its
elites, who have economic and political resources to manipulate the group‘s goals. As I have
discussed in Chapter 2, culture is not an unchangeable entity; it is constantly being made through
the participation of its members. Thus, the substantial participation of group members is crucial
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in the process of shaping their culture and group differences, in order to prevent elites from
exclusively determining its culture and identity. As another example, women in a minority group
may have less opportunity to promote their freedom because of economic inequality. They might
have to engage in reproductive work, as their livelihood is dependent upon male spouses.6 Their
dependence on male spouses allows only limited freedom to achieve their goals. Without
providing equality within groups, thus, liberal multiculturalism opens the door to infringing on
individual freedom within groups. This is the reason why liberal multiculturalism needs to be
replaced by social multiculturalism.
Social multiculturalism addresses the critical problem of liberal multiculturalism:
inequality within groups.7 With the provision of economic equality, individuals within a group
can substantiate their freedom. For instance, the poor individuals of a minority group can
challenge the manipulation of the elites in deciding political matters that impact the minority
group. As another example, women with economic equality can challenge an oppressive
patriarchal system and promote their freedom, severing dependency on their male spouses. In the
section on basic income I will delve into these issues.
However, the fact that social multiculturalism works toward promoting equality between
groups and within groups may raise the question whether social multiculturalism degenerates

6

In a similar vein, Susan Moller Okin points out that liberal multiculturalism should pay attention to
inequality between sexes in promoting cultural minority group rights. ―When liberal arguments are made for the
rights of groups, then, special care must be taken to look at within-group inequalities.‖ Susan Moller Okin, "Is
Multiculturalism Bad for Women?," in Women's Rights : The Public/Private Dichotomy, ed. Jurate Motiejunaite
(New York: International Debate Education Association, 2005), 108.
7
There may be a case in which a minority group claims its self-determination but is unaware of the liberal
value of equality. If a minority group is insulated from its majority group or its larger group, there seems to be no
conflict between inequality within groups and equality between groups (its self-determination). If a minority group
is quarantined from a liberal larger group, there is no way that outsiders can challenge its hierarchal custom. It is an
exceptional case. However, a minority group is in general exposed to liberal value of equality through public
education or social media. As minority groups are exposed to liberal value of equality its traditional value such as
hierarchical or patriarchal values are challenged. Those minority groups are faced with challenges and tensions
caused by the conflict between the liberal value of equality and their self-determination. When I deal with equality
within groups, I have in mind those minority groups that are exposed to the liberal value of equality.
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into an imbalanced focus on social, economic, and cultural rights in such a way as to neglect
civil and political rights. As economic equality is the core principle in promoting social
multiculturalism, the question seems to be unavoidable and legitimate. Equality in social
multiculturalism, however, is not equality negating freedom. Like liberal multiculturalism, social
multiculturalism acknowledges the importance of individual freedom within groups. In social
multiculturalism, thus, it is unacceptable for minority groups ―to maintain their own dominance
over women, religious minorities, migrants, lower caste groups, and so on.‖8 Nonetheless, social
multiculturalism accentuates equality within a group, the equality that can only ensure and
promote freedom of women, religious minorities, migrants, and lower caste groups, since
without promoting equality, freedom of internal minorities remains formal freedom. Equality
within groups, composed of capability equality and least-gap equality, substantiates freedom of
internal minorities. In social multiculturalism, therefore, equality is essential in substantiating
freedom: Without equality, freedom remains only partial.
The question remains: How to implement social multiculturalism? Like liberal
multiculturalism, which adopts progressive implementation, social multiculturalism uses a
similar method. Several similarities and dissimilarities can be found between the implementation
methods of the two. In terms of similarity, social multiculturalism adopts equality in progressive
stages. Social multiculturalism cannot be achieved all at once, since economic equality in the
form of basic income, public healthcare, and public education, to name just a few of its aspects,
cannot be achieved at once. For instance, such economic equality requires a considerable amount
of resources, the introduction of new legislative bills, and a major restructuring of the taxation,
education, and healthcare systems. Some might say that revolution can bring forth such equality
all at once. But, revolution would be an inappropriate choice because it is usually accompanied
8
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with armed conflict, which is detrimental to the powerless. Armed conflict will result in endless
wars between and within groups, taking a heavy toll on innocent lives. Thus, to prevent armed
conflict, such equality needs to be achieved in progressive stages.
In terms of dissimilarity in implementation, social multiculturalism places primacy on
equality within and between groups. In achieving liberal multiculturalism, on the contrary,
Kymlicka‘s progressive implementation prioritizes freedom:
The model of progressive implementation would presumably not permit states to forbid
peaceful and democratic forms of minority mobilization and expression, or to
constitutionally entrench prohibitions on the future adoption of liberal
multiculturalism….It would lower the immediate expectations put upon some states, but
would not allow those states to fix in stone their preference to remain unitary, unilingual
nation-states. On the contrary, it would impose a duty on such states to progressively
put in place the conditions that would enable the peaceful and democratic pursuit of
liberal multiculturalism over time.9
The progressive implementation model of liberal multiculturalism opens a way for a state to
manipulate the process of its minority group claims in such a way that it decides whether it
grants its minority groups generic rights or indigenous rights. Because of its discretionary power
in its current political system, a state is allowed not to grant indigenous rights to its minority
groups. According to the progressive implementation model adopted by liberal multiculturalism,
equality is secondary because a state ―would start with weak generic minority rights, but would
then move into more robust models of targeted minority rights, as the various preconditions and
risk factors are addressed.‖10 Kymlicka thus reveals a passive solution for promoting equality.
On the contrary, in relation to freedom, he advocates an aggressive approach: He allows
outsiders to challenge illiberal practices imposed on internal minorities. Those challenges would
9
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allow external interventions in the cases of ―slavery or genocide or mass torture and
expulsions.‖11
I agree with Kymlicka that illiberal practices should be challenged, and in the
aforementioned cases external interventions would be justified. Nonetheless, in light of social
multiculturalism, his progressive implementation needs to be redirected in two ways. First,
equality needs to be primary; second, external challenges and interventions should be directed
toward inequality, not just illiberal practices. I have explained why equality should be primary in
promoting multiculturalism. In terms of external challenges and interventions, considering that
outsiders need massive resources to challenge and intervene in illiberal practices, his silence on
intervention in inequality is quite inconsistent. As I have shown in Chapter 1, there are yearly
deaths of more than twelve million people because of insufficient medical treatment, not to
mention lack of resources to cover a minimum standard of living.12 Saving a huge number of
people from dying because of insufficient food and healthcare is just as important as protecting
freedom of internal minorities from illiberal practices of the majority. Considering the huge
number of victims of economic inequality compared to those of non-life threatening illiberal
practices, priority should be given to addressing economic inequality. That is, outsiders‘
resources and attentions should be preferentially given to address the inequality of the physically
vulnerable. In its progressive implementation, thus, social multiculturalism prioritizes equality
within groups over freedom within groups.
The principle of equality between groups and equality within groups emphasizes the
priority of equality and at the same time respect for individual dignity. Since individual dignity is
respected when individual freedom is substantiated, I would reframe the principle of social
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multiculturalism as equality that substantiates freedom of all. This principle of equality that
substantiates freedom of all promotes both equality and freedom of minority groups and internal
minorities. The concept of rights of concrete others is then equated with equality substantiating
freedom of all in general and freedom of the vulnerable in particular. Therefore, social
multiculturalism promotes both social, cultural, and economic rights, and civil and political
rights.

5.2 Equality within groups
I have argued that property rights need to be restricted in light of the individual dignity of
all, i.e., equality that substantiates individual freedom of all. I have shown that equality that
substantiates individual freedom of all has two dimensions of equality: capability equality and
least-gap equality. The two dimensions of equality accentuate individual dignity and substantial
equality for promoting individual difference and group difference of all. In this section, I propose
a reconfigured basic income guarantee (RBIG), which is a view of distribution of wealth or
income that protects and promotes individual dignity and substantial equality for promoting
group difference as well as individual difference. An RBIG is a basic income guarantee (BIG)
that is supplemented by public education, public healthcare, and linguistic diversity. Before
reconfiguring a BIG, let me first introduce the concept of basic income.
Basic income is an income paid by the state to each full member or accredited resident
of a society, regardless of whether he or she wishes to engage in paid employment, or is
rich or poor or, in other words, independently of any other sources of income that
person might have, and irrespective of cohabitation arrangements in the domestic
sphere.13
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First of all, a basic income is given to all residents recognized by a political community. A
political community can be a regional self-governing village, a nation-state, or a larger political
entity such as European Union.14 Different kinds of political communities exist, ranging from
regional, to national, and even global. Second, all members are, without exception, recipients of
basic income in principle. All adults receive the same basic income, but children receive less
than adults, based on the assumption that children require fewer resources than adults do. Third,
a basic income is given to all ―on an individual basis.‖15 It is thus different from family income.
Whether or not one belongs to a family, one receives a basic income. Fourth, it is given to all
members ―without means test or work requirement.‖16 It is different from a targeted welfare
benefit, which is given only to, for instance, those who are under the poverty line and/or who are
at least employed receiving less than the minimum cost of living. Fifth, it is given to all
irrespective of income. A basic income ―is given in full to those whose income exceeds the
stipulated minimum no less than to those income falls short of it….though [t]axable ‗means‘ may
need to be taxed at a higher average rate in order to fund the basic income.‖17 Like an
undifferentiated social wage, a basic income is given to all.18 However, unlike an
14
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An undifferentiated social wage is a social wage which is given to all without regard to individual
difference in social production. I think a social wage proposed by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri is an
undifferentiated wage. See Hardt and Negri, Empire, 401-03. With relation to individual differences, an
undifferentiated social wage is problematic in two ways: it leads to low productivity and neglects individual
differences. In Hardt and Negri‘s view of production system, all individuals receive the same social wage. If the
same wage is given to one who worked four hours and the other who worked eight hours in the same job, low
productivity is unavoidable. It makes the economic system unsustainable. Worse, individuals would not choose
difficult jobs that require more hours and resources. Under an undifferentiated social wage system, only selfsacrificing persons have compelling reasons to spend more years to get higher skills or specified knowledge. As
people avoid getting jobs requiring higher skills and special knowledge, the economy degenerates into a more
simple and plain economy. That skilled jobs disappear is detrimental to individual talents and freedom. Fewer
diversified job opportunities reduce the freedom options available to individuals and cause more waste of individual
talents. Some may say that a social wage leads more people to engage in diverse voluntary works rather than
economically efficient and technically developed works. While increase of voluntary works is commendable, a
15

192

undifferentiated social wage, the rich have more income, since they get the basic income plus
their income after income tax. With relation to optimum basic income, it is ―at the highest level
that is economically and ecologically sustainable, and on the highest scale that is politically
imaginable.‖19 According to Van Parijs the minimum amount of basic income is the level of
subsistence.20 It is known as basic needs or fundamental needs. It includes food, shelter, clothing,
education, healthcare, and the like. Nonetheless Van der Veen and Van Parijs conjecture that in
OECD countries basic income ―corresponds to about one half of per capita domestic income.‖21
In short, basic income is funded by taxation, given by a political community to all members to
satisfy basic needs.
Since a basic income is given to all without regard to their income differential, it would
seem to make the rich richer, because while the poor receive the money as their only basic
income, the wealthy who already have an income, also receive the same amount of basic income.
Against such a view, Van Parijs contends that because it is based on tax-and-benefit systems,
―the comparatively rich would need to pay both for their own basic income and for much of the
basic income of the comparatively poor.‖22 It seems then that there would be no differences
between basic income and targeted social welfare that supports those whose income is below
poverty line. He mentions three advantages of basic income. First, the poor can have a better
chance to get benefits compared to a means test social welfare. In a means test social welfare
society needs also diversified skilled works and economically productive works. For instance, without
diversification and development of technology, human beings cannot have a chance to enjoy a physical, material,
and cultural well-being. If social wage brings about wasting individual talents and hindering skilled job
diversification, it ultimately reduces individual freedom of all. While social wage engenders formal equality, it is
equality neglecting individual difference and probably dismantling diversified social system.
19
Van Parijs, "Basic Income: A Simple and Poweful Idea for the Twenty-First Century," 23.
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Critics," theory and society 15, no. (1987): 730. They mention that ―about 30 percent of GDP currently [is] spent on
welfare in OECD countries.‖
22
Van Parijs, "Basic Income: A Simple and Poweful Idea for the Twenty-First Century," 9. He also
mentions different types of funding the basic income such as a progressive income tax, a flat tax, and a regressive
consumption tax. These kinds of tax systems will redistribute wealth of the haves to the have-nots.
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system, recipients of the benefit would be informed whether or not they are eligible for the
benefit. As long as the recipients are not informed, they can be excluded from receiving such a
benefit. In contrast, a basic income is given to all without any means test or requirement. No one
is excluded from receiving the basic income as long as she is enlisted as a member. Second, a
BIG is less humiliating than a targeted social welfare system because it is provided to all: ―From
the standpoint of the poor, this may count as an advantage in itself, because of the lesser stigma
associated with a universal basic income.‖23 In this sense, the poor can overcome the view that
they are unworthy passive recipients of benefits. Third, a BIG does not reduce productivity. A
basic income is given to all without regard to their earned income. By comparison, targeted
social welfare benefits are given only to those who are unemployed or underemployed. Since
they lose such a benefit when they get a job that provides a similar amount of minimum income,
they are disincentivized to get such a job. It is ―one aspect of the unemployment trap commonly
associated with conventional benefit systems.‖24 A BIG removes such an unemployment trap,
because when recipients work, they end up better off than when out of work, because they keep
their full basic income. Compared to a targeted social welfare and an undifferentiated social
wage, a basic income sustains productivity, gets rid of social stigma, and becomes more
accessible to the poor. It means that a basic income is sustainable and at the same time conducive
to improving the conditions of the poor.
While a basic income is better than a targeted social welfare benefit or an undifferentiated
social wage, the question needs to be raised whether it approximates equality substantiating
freedom of all. Figure 1 shows the relationship among tax rate, basic income grant, and total
social product. There are two ways of maximizing basic income. One way maximizes it in
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absolute terms and the other in relative terms. The former case Van Parijs refers to as the
Rawlsian criterion. In the figure 1, the Rawlsian criterion is (2) when the amount of basic income
is absolutely maximized. That is, everyone gets the maximized basic income whereas income
differential between the rich and the poor is wider than (3). (3), which he names the Marxian
criterion, is the relatively maximized basic income. In this case, everyone gets a basic income
less than that of (2), but because of higher tax rates, net income differential between the rich and
the poor is minimized.
Figure 1 also shows quality of freedom and quantity of freedom. Quality of freedom
means the amount of social production that an individual can use with her income, while quantity
of freedom means the amount of free time that an individual can have. Selections (2) and (3)
represent better quality of freedom and better quantity of freedom, respectively.25 Van der Veen
and Van Parijs explain that since the total social production in the case of (2) is more than that of
(3), people have more options to use social production. In this sense, (2) provides more quality of
freedom than (3) does. On the other hand, (3) provides more quantity of freedom than (2),
because the reduced amount of social production is in inverse proportion to working hours. More
tax will induce people to spend fewer hours in paid work. Thus, (2) represents more basic
income, less quantity of freedom, and more quality of freedom; while (3) represents less basic
income, more quantity of freedom, and less quality of freedom.
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G*
GMax

uniform tax rate
taxable social product
total social product
aggregate universal grant
level of G covering everyone‘s basic need
maximum sustainable level of G

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Growth-oriented criterion
Rawlsian criterion
Marxian criterion
Equality-oriented criterion

Figure 1: Static criteria of choice and the Laffer curve26
Which one of them is the approximation of equality substantiating freedom for all? The
right to have equality substantiating freedom is, to begin with, the right for everyone to have a
basic income that covers basic needs. Van Parijs points out four criteria that provide that basic
income. Among them, (1) is excluded, since it maximizes inequality between the rich and the
26
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poor and it provides the least quantity of freedom, compared to (2) and (3). (1) occurs when an
abundance of social products is available to all. Nonetheless, the poor have to observe the rich
enjoying such abundance; the poor have the least quantity of freedom while the rich take
advantage of the huge income gap. As (1) allows a huge inequality gap between the poor and the
rich, it can hardly ensure equality substantiating freedom of all. Compared to (1), (2) provides
less abundance of social products but the maximized basic income. In addition, (2) supplies more
quality of freedom to the poor than (1) does, because more people can have purchasing power of
social products and results in less inequality between the poor and the rich. Finally, (3) provides
less basic income and the least abundance of social products compared to (1) and (2), but it
maximizes quantity of freedom.
Between (2) and (3), which one of them best approximates equality substantiating
freedom of all? At a glance, it is difficult to decide because two different kinds of freedom are
maximized: quality of freedom and quantity of freedom. Some will prioritize quality of freedom
over quantity of freedom, while others will prefer the other. There is a case when (2) is the
approximated equality substantiating freedom of all. It is the case when only GMax is equal to
G*, because of the low total social product. If (3) is below G*, it means that many poor people
are unable to cover their basic needs. In this case, stubbornly insisting on a (3) redistribution is
inadequate in light of equality substantiating freedom of all. In any circumstance, basic needs of
all should be met or should be approximated in dire situations. When both (2) and (3) are above
G*, in principle, (3) is preferable. When both (2) and (3) are above G*, citizens might consider
an alternative between quality of freedom and quantity of freedom. Because of the different
preferences, (4) seems to be the option that each political community selects. Nevertheless, as I
have shown in Chapter 3, since the gap between the rich and the poor is the primary cause of
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infringing on freedom of all, (3) is the best approximation of equality substantiating freedom of
all.
Still, on other factor affects equality that substantiates freedom of all: the income tax rate.
Equality substantiating freedom of all prefers progressive income tax to a flat income tax. Figure
1 and Figure 2 are calculated based on a uniform tax rate. It means that every member has the
same income tax rate, without regard to their income differential. As long as a flat income tax is
applied, the income gap between the poor and the rich can hardly be reduced, with the exception
that the poor receive basic income. Figure 3, based on different progressive income tax rates,
shows different income distributions. Depending on the progressive income tax rate, basic
income can be the highest one like a, or the lowest one like c. Line A shows less unequal income
distribution and the highest basic income, while the line C shows more unequal income
distribution and the lowest basic income. If everything is equal, an income distribution (line A) is
better than any other income distribution (either line B or line C) in approximating equality that
substantiates freedom of all. The lower the net income gap between the poor and the rich, the
better equality substantiating freedom of all is approximated.
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Net income

Basic income

Gross income
Figure 2: Basic income combined with flat tax27
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Net income

Line C
Line B
Line A
a
b
c

Gross income

Figure 3: Income distribution after basic income with progressive tax
In a BIG situation, a crucial problem is how to ensure the fund for basic income to all. A
given political community should have high-income brackets requiring payment of more taxes
than low-income brackets pay. Figures 2 and 3 reflect that some who receive less net income
than gross income and others who receive more net income than gross income. The bold dot line
shows the break-even point. More gross income earners after the break-even point are the
contributors for basic income for all. Because of income taxes collected from high-income
workers, those who are unemployed and underemployed can receive basic income. A basic
income system is sustainable when high-income brackets can cover low income brackets or
when those who receive less net income than gross income are greater than those who receive
more net income than their gross income. When every political community has the same tax rate
and provides the same basic income, high-income brackets will stay in their country. But, it is
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impossible to make all political communities have the same tax rate and provide the same basic
income, since every political community is in a different economic condition.
Suppose that every state in the world can provide basic income to all its members,
resulting in a global basic income. Depending on its economic condition, each state has a
different tax rate and thus affords a different basic income. Some states may provide a basic
income well above everyone‘s basic need, whereas others can merely provide a basic income
that just covers everyone‘s basic needs. In such different state situations, people in general are
attracted to wealthy states: the poor have a better basic income and the wealthy carry a lower tax
burden in wealthy states. In terms of emigration to wealthy countries, the extremely poor are less
likely to be allured by migration as they can satisfy their basic needs at home. As long as basic
income is provided worldwide, there will be less migration of the poor than in a world without
basic income.
Nonetheless, wealthy countries desperately need immigrants. According to Raventós, rich
countries such as in the European Union need more immigrants in order to sustain their
economic system, that is, to support their aging populations.
In the next 45 years [from 2007], the European Union will see a reduction in its
working-age population (15-64 years of age) of almost 50 million people while the
population aged 65 and over will increase by 58 million. These variations are highly
significant, given that the nominal dependency ratio is expected to be 51 per cent
(presently, at 24.5 per cent, it is not even half this); in other words, for each retired
person there will only be two people of working age, while the present proportion is
four. With regard to immigration, and confining ourselves to cold, hard figures, ‗in
order to maintain the real dependency ratio constant, 183 million more immigrants will
be needed or, in other words, 40 per cent of the population of the European Union in
2050, which will be 454 million.‘28
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If better basic income and better jobs are available, many in poor countries are probably lured to
migrate to rich countries. If the unemployed and the underemployed migrate to rich countries
and find jobs, it would benefit both poor countries and rich countries. This is because poor
countries can reduce their burden of supporting basic income for them and rich countries can
relieve the shortage of labor power.29 Emigration from poor countries, in this sense, is conducive
to a global basic income system. In the case of emigration of skilled workers from poor countries,
however, it worsens the BIG of the poor countries.
Why, then, are skilled workers so important in funding basic income? Skilled workers are
more important than natural resources in the current economic system and they play a crucial
role in their countries‘ economic development: ―in a world in which technical and organizational
talent is ever more crucial to a country‘s economic success, the creaming off of the world‘s
human capital may amount to a plundering of the asset-poor countries by the asset-rich of a
magnitude which dwarves the earlier plundering of their natural resources.‖30 Put differently,
talented human beings are the engine of economic development and growth. Skilled worker
emigration prevents poor countries from developing their economy and accordingly makes their
basic income systems unstable.
In reality, skilled workers are prone to migrate to wealthy countries. For instance, Van
Parijs refers to the fact that three countries, ―(the USA, Canada, and Australia), totaling hardly
more than 5 per cent of the world‘s population, house nearly 75 per cent of the world‘s
‗expatriate brains‘, defined as those graduates of tertiary education who are not currently
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domiciled in their country of birth.‖31 These three countries almost monopolize skilled human
resources of the world.32 In addition, the OECD has 12 million expatriate brains.33 Skilled
workers are apt to stay in wealthy countries, while poor countries should try to retain them for
funding basic income.
If skilled workers are inclined to stay in wealthy countries, one might suggest that a
global political community can distribute global basic income to all in the world through taxing
wealthy countries. The wealthy countries could gather skilled workers who could efficiently
coordinate the economy and technology and accordingly they could produce more output and
better production. A global political community could share such abundance of production to
poor countries through a global BIG. This suggestion seems to be reasonable, but it has serious
flaws. First of all, it widens not only the economic gap but also the technological gap between
wealthy countries and poor countries. As talented persons emigrate from poor countries to
wealthy countries, poor countries become countries of the untalented and unskilled. Second,
technology and information will be quarantined within the boundary of wealthy countries. Poor
countries then remain backward and underdeveloped. Third, people in poor countries become
passive recipients of basic income without contributing to a basic income fund, because they
have low productivity as well as an educational and lingual barrier to accessing advanced skills
and knowledge. Thus, monopolization of skilled workers by wealthy countries perpetuates and
worsens the separation and segregation between wealthy countries and poor countries. It may
result in the poor in poor countries regarding themselves as second-class human beings. If they
31
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identify themselves as inferior human beings, a basic income system would be useless in
promoting equality that substantiates freedom of all. A global basic income distributed
exclusively by a global political community is therefore inappropriate. Rather, a regional or
national political community should be a main distributor of basic income, although with the
help of a global political community.
In order to provide basic income to their members and raise the level of basic income,
poor countries should prevent such plundering of skilled workers and monopolization of skilled
workers by wealthy countries. While poor countries have a good reason to prevent emigration of
skilled workers, it is absurd to coercively prohibit their skilled citizens from migrating to wealthy
countries, since it is an infringement of the freedom to move, one of the fundamental individual
human rights. Nonetheless, poor countries cannot be indifferent to the migration of the skilled
with regard to basic income.
To address the drain of skilled citizens in poor countries, Philippe Van Parijs and
Yannick Vanderborght propose ―solidaristic patriotism,‖ which means ―some territorial, nonethnic patriotism, i.e. some sort of attachment to a place, some sort of allegiance or fidelity to the
political community it houses and the solidarity it achieves, that makes high-earners wish to live,
work, contribute there, rather than shop around for the highest return to their human capital.‖34
With compatriot priority, skilled workers can overcome the allurement of high income and
thereby could stay in their native countries. Instead of staying in wealthy countries, skilled
people could contribute to their political community economically and technologically.
Solidaristic patriotism, however, can cause problems. For instance, when capitalists in
asset-rich countries buy solidaristic patriotism, it could cause lay-offs of the poor in poor
34
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countries. Van Parijs mentions that it can prevent the asset-rich country capitalists from using ―a
less productive but also less demanding labour force‖ of asset-poor countries.35 For asset-poor
countries it means that their citizens would lose their opportunity to work. When poor citizens
lose work opportunities, their countries have more financial burdens for basic income. But such
fears are groundless, since capitalists will find ways to hire people in asset-poor countries that
are compatible with solidaristic patriotism. Consider a situation in which a labor outsourcing
increases unemployment of asset-rich countries. It becomes a serious problem if unemployed
asset-rich workers cannot receive basic income because of a labor outsourcing. Even when
capitalists outsource labor force, however, unemployed asset-rich workers will get their basic
income, as long as profits earned through labor outsourcing are taxed in the asset-rich country.
The unemployed might lose some quality of freedom but they would gain more quantity of
freedom. This does not mean that there would be no resistance from the unemployed in the assetrich country; rather, it means that their resistance would be far less fierce than in the case of no
basic income provision.
Solidaristic patriotism can cause a more serious problem, when the asset rich use
solidaristic patriotism for themselves: ―the asset rich can escape high redistribution…by
collectively ‗exporting their countries,‘ that is, by seceding.‖36 If within a political community
the asset rich secede from the asset poor, the collapse of basic income system is quite likely. Van
Parijs tries to address this dilemma by restricting the range of solidaristic patriotism: ―The choice
of the locus of desirable solidaristic patriotism is not left to the vagaries of spontaneous popular
sentiment. It must be nurtured in those places, and only in those places, in which it helps to
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protect an existing or emerging redistributive patria.‖37 Put differently, solidaristic patriotism is
only allowed to promote redistribution. It is, however, doubtful whether such selective
promotion of solidaristic patriotism is workable, since as long as solidaristic patriotism is
encouraged there is no persuasive reason for the asset-rich not to use it for themselves. In reality,
there is evident example of a weaker case of such a secession or segregation between the asset
rich and the asset poor. An example is an attempt of the rich to control the education system,
focusing more on the private education system than the public education system. While the asset
rich prefer and support the private education system to which their children belong, the public
education system experiences lack of funds and resources. The children of the asset poor then are
left with an education system with deficient resources, whereas those of the asset rich enjoy
education with superior resources. It cannot be said to be a territorial secession, but it is no less
than an educational secession. Considering that the present world economy is a knowledge-based
economy, equal opportunity of education for all is crucial for the next generation of the poor to
develop their talents. I will elaborate this point below.
Since solidaristic patriotism is insufficient to hold the skilled workers in poor countries,
Van Parijs and Vanderborght suggest a strengthened language barrier and regime relaxation. A
strengthened language barrier is ―maintaining or strengthening linguistic obstacles to
migration.‖38 That is, making the local language as the official language in such a way as to
make difficult acquisition of other languages, specifically, a lingua franca. By making the local
language the official language, they assume that to a certain extent, migration is to be deterred.
In other words, having linguistic obstacles seems to be better than accepting English as an
official language, because if a country adopts English as its official language, it probably
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increases migration of its citizens to English-speaking wealthy countries. As long as different
languages survive, ―these linguistic differences and the associated cultural differences will
remain a major brake on transnational migration.‖39 In a world of globalized communication,
however, strengthening linguistic obstacles does not seem to be an effective option, since almost
every global citizen is exposed to a lingua franca, such as English. Specifically, high tech and
skilled workers are well exposed to the lingua franca.
In order to keep high tech vocation and skilled workers, as a second suggestion, Van
Parijs proposes regime relaxation.40 In contrast, regime relaxation weakens the language barrier.
Setting up strengthened linguistic obstacles is, as he says, the work of a coercive regime. Unlike
a coercive regime, regime relaxation allows ―‗linguistically free zones in which the constraints of
the territorial linguistic regime are lifted, at least as regards the lingua franca.‖41 According to
Van Parijs, such a provision of linguistically free zones relieves high-tech workers and their
families of ―the heavy ‗tax‘ of having to learn the local language.‖42 As those who get higher
education in English can easily adjust in linguistically free zones, they do not have to migrate to
wealthy countries. That is to say, regime relaxation will secure taxes for basic income in poor
countries as it helps skilled workers and their families make a soft landing on the countries.
In order for the poor countries to hold onto skilled workers, Van Parijs proposes, on the
one hand, strengthening the language barrier and, on the other hand, relaxing the language
barrier. These two conflicting proposals expose his impasse in securing skilled workers in poor
countries. Considering that skilled workers would prefer relaxation of the language barrier and
skilled workers are important for the economy of poor countries, strengthening the language
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barrier seems to be a temporary expedient. While the conflicting suggestions can secure skilled
workers, their children who stay in linguistically free zones have no reason to stay in the country,
since they are quarantined from the strengthened language barrier. His solution is a temporary
expedient but not a sustainable remedy.
Van Parijs‘ unsustainable solution is based on his understanding of language. For him,
language is a mere means of communication: ―the preservation of a language is not a fetish to be
imposed on its native speakers on the ground that loyalty to their ancestors requires it, or that it
would enable them to lead a more authentic life, or that linguistic diversity is an invaluable part
of the human heritage that should not be squandered.‖43 Considering language as a mere means
of communication, he even contends that linguistic diversity is a stumbling block to economic
equality.
On the one hand, linguistic diversity makes identification more difficult: a different
language makes one part of the population perceive another as alien, as not belonging to
the same kind, and hence as less trustworthy, less likely to reciprocate, and less likely to
have reciprocated had the roles been reversed. Lesser identification makes both the
better-off more reluctant to accept economic solidarity and the worse-off less capable of
organizing collectively to press for it. On the other hand, linguistic diversity can also be
expected to affect solidarity by making communication more laborious: in the absence
of an effective medium, it is more difficult for the better-off to be persuasively exposed
to arguments of fairness in favour of the worse-off, for the worse-off to coordinate
effectively their struggle against the better-off, and for all to settle on the fine grain of
the organization of solidarity.44
In his explanation, Van Parijs presupposes a political community in which different languages
are used by the better off and the worse off. In order to have economic solidarity between the
better-off and the worse-off, he contends that both of them need to use the same language.
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Following his logic, the worse-off should give up their own language in order to get basic
income. In other words, the language of skilled workers should be the language of the unskilled
or the unemployed. This view seems to carry a colonial connotation, when the language of the
more skilled is imposed on the unskilled and the unemployed without their approval. But, he
denies that his view has a colonial implication. On the contrary, he suggests that the promotion
of linguistic diversity is appropriate when there exists colonial attitude: ―If [immigrants] do not
bother to learn the local language, if instead they require the locals to use their own language
when interacting with them, and even to learn it if they did not know it before, the suspicion can
legitimately arise that there is some arrogance involved, some lack of respect, a denial of parity
of esteem, not fundamentally different from the one associated with the relationship between a
colonizer and the population being colonized.‖45 He, thus, sees imposition of a hegemonic
language to local language users as illegitimate. Nonetheless, he still maintains that the transition
from linguistic diversity to a unified language is necessary for economic solidarity. How then is
economic solidarity possible without coercively replacing local languages by hegemonic
language? In his thinking, the transition from linguistic diversity to unified language is simple
and natural as linguistic diversity disappears. Based on the view that there is always the
asymmetric relationship between languages, he contends that
The generalization of the asymmetric bilingualism it implies can be expected to
gradually reduce the extent to which the identity of the dwellers of a territory is linked
to the local language. We may then be approaching a situation analogous to the terminal
state of many ‗dialects‘, whose native speakers were led to identify with a more or less
distant national language. As identification with their ancestral language declines and
the cost of protecting it rises – owing to the ground floor effect, to migration pressure,
and also to the fact that immigrants can increasingly get away with knowing nothing but
the lingua franca – more communities may judge that the preservation of their linguistic
45
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distinctiveness is no longer worth the cost and the coercion it requires and may decide
to waive in turn their right to protect it. Under such hypothetical circumstances,
linguistic diversity in all the senses considered in this chapter would wither away
without offending parity of esteem, and it would ipso facto stop hindering – to the
extent that is still does at that stage – the pursuit of global distributive justice as real
freedom for all.46
In his scheme, the clash between linguistic diversity and economic solidarity will be resolved as
linguistic diversity is replaced by efficiency of a lingua franca. Considering the cost of keeping
local languages, he thinks that local languages will necessarily be replaced without coercion. A
lingua franca precipitates economic solidarity and accordingly a basic income system will
naturally follow. In short, while linguistic diversity is an obstacle to basic income, a lingua
franca will bring about a basic income system. Therefore, there is no compelling reason to
support linguistic diversity or strengthen the language barrier.
I agree that a lingua franca may facilitate economic development, considering a
globalized economic system. Without knowing the languages of the economically and
technologically advanced countries, it is impossible for poor countries to develop their economy.
I also agree that to a certain extent a lingua franca produces economic solidarity, since without
effective communication economic solidarity is unattainable. However, I disagree with Van
Parijs in that eventual linguistic convergence on lingua franca is improbable and at the same time
inadequate for promoting equality substantiating freedom of all. In his view of linguistic
convergence, Van Parijs takes two presuppositions for granted: one is that a basic income
suffices to equality substantiating freedom for all, and the other is that language is a mere means
of communication. To my mind, these two presuppositions are seriously flawed.
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Let me first deal with the second presupposition. Is a language truly a mere means of
communication? If that is true, then linguistic diversity is just diversification of communication
methods. A language is, without doubt, a means of communication. Yet it means more than that
because a language is inseparable from its culture. Considered apart from culture, language may
be a mere means of communication. Languages are, however, innately connected to their
cultures: ―Specific languages are related to specific cultures and to their attendant cultural
identities at the level of doing, at the level of knowing and at the level of being.‖47 Since culture
guides how to live and what to do, different cultures provide different options and opportunities
for how individuals spend their lives. Different cultures are not just arbitrary human productions,
which can be easily replaced. They are human productions generated over centuries by
continuous interaction with their socially, historically, and territorially concrete circumstances.
Language contains concrete cultural features, which challenge the first presupposition that basic
income suffices to provide equality substantiating freedom of all.
Does basic income cover the kind of equality that substantiates freedom of all?
Considering that equality that substantiates freedom of all has two dimensions, that is, least-gap
equality and capability equality, does basic income cover both least-gap equality and capability
equality? When it comes to basic income, Van Parijs points out two kinds of freedom that can be
differently provided: quality of freedom and quantity of freedom. While least-gap equality is
related to the quality of freedom, capability equality is germane to the quantity of freedom. One
the one hand, quality of freedom that is provided by basic income can satisfy the requirements of
least-gap equality, since basic income works toward the least gap between the rich and the poor.
On the other hand, the quantity of freedom granted by basic income is insufficient to satisfy the
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requirements of capability equality, because it is indifferent to group difference that an individual
should have for her capability development.
Between the two types of freedom, linguistic and cultural diversity is closely related to
quantity of freedom, while quality of freedom is intimately related to the amount of basic income.
One can maximize the quality of freedom as basic income is maximized; on the other hand, one
can maximize the quantity of freedom with varied options that are provided by cultural diversity.
When the quantity of freedom is maximized, it means that everyone has freedom to do diverse
things. If linguistic diversity disappears as it is overruled by lingua franca, freedom options are
diminished in direct proportion to the shrinking cultural diversity. Without abundant freedom
options, it is useless to maximize quantity of freedom. André Gorz recognizes in the BIG the
possible lack of quantitative freedom options and stipulates that ―[t]here must be a policy of
promoting unpaid community or co-operative work, and giving it social and political
recognition.‖48 In order to maximize the quantity of freedom, options must include works tinged
with social and political recognition. These are available through cultural diversity, not through
basic income.
In order to ensure cultural diversity, education needs to be given to all primarily in their
own native language but secondarily in foreign language(s) in order to promote economic
development and world-wide communication. Native languages contain reservoirs of
traditionally accumulated knowledge, some of which cannot be translated. Native language, with
its inherent traditional knowledge and customs, is surely a resource for supplying various options
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to optimize quantity of freedom. Linguistic diversity is thus necessary for ensuring quantity of
freedom.49
I have mentioned above the importance of equal opportunity of education for all when
basic income is provided. Providing basic income without public education does not contribute
toward equality substantiating freedom of all; instead, it may exacerbate the gulf between the
skilled and the unskilled. Without a provision for public education the poor can hardly have
opportunities to develop their skills. André Gorz points out class division that will be perpetuated
by a basic income system as follows.
The working population must be expected to go on segmenting itself into a shrinking
labour aristocracy of people holding skilled, stable, well-paid full-time jobs on the one
hand, and on the other a growing proletarian underclass of expendable unskilled
workers who will be hired and fired every few weeks from their part-time, short-term
jobs. Basic income is thus to underpin the tendency towards flexible working hours and
a flexible workforce, making it more acceptable. Basic income will help the
proliferation of casual odd jobs – all those irregular and very badly paid jobs consisting
of personal services rendered by the underclass to those who can afford to buy
themselves a supplement of leisure and comfort by having little slaves take care of the
daily chores. Basic income would thus be a way of subsidizing the employers and
would-be employers who want very cheap labour and no kind of commitment
whatsoever to the people who work for them. They will feel encouraged to offer jobs as
a mere way of supplementing the basic income.50
Gorz emphasizes the possibility of an unbridgeable gap between skilled and unskilled workers.
By itself, basic income is insufficient to bridge this gap. He thus proposes an education system
through which skilled jobs are available to unskilled workers: ―a consistent and effective
educational and retaining policy‖ should be provided to all in order ―for everyone to acquire new
49
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skills and know-how at any time and any age.‖51 A basic income can ensure equality
substantiating freedom through the provision of public education for all.
Basic income may also perpetuate gender inequality. Nancy Fraser points out that basic
income itself is unable to address gender maldistribution. While Gorz indicates the gap between
the skilled and the unskilled, Fraser emphasizes the gap between male workers and female
workers. According to her, ―Unconditional Basic Income grants would not, in the abstract, be
transformative with respect to gender….Basic Income would serve to consolidate a ‗Mommy
Track,‘ a market in flexible, noncontinuous, largely female labor, thereby reinforcing, instead of
transforming, the deep structures of gender maldistribution.‖52 She contends that women are
unable to address gender inequality, even with the provision of basic income. I agree that gender
inequality is unsolvable through basic income. However, basic income addresses some gender
maldistributions of education opportunity. As everyone in a family gets a basic income, a girl
can be free from compulsory work for her family. If there is no basic income, school has to
―[offer] monetary compensation to parents for the loss of their daughters‘ time‖ and provide
―flexible schedules for instruction‖ in such a way that school schedules do not coincide with
their working schedule.53 Considering the difficulties in providing monetary compensation and
adjusting school schedules, girls can hardly have equal opportunity of education in poor
countries. With the provision of basic income, however, girls have more opportunity to attend
school. Basic income, thus, addresses gender maldistributions of education opportunity to a
certain extent.
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Nonetheless, there are also cultural barriers that prevent girls from having equal
opportunity to education. In some cultures without female teachers, parents do not send their
daughters to school. For girls in those cultures, female teachers should be provided.54 In other
cases, when school is located far away from their home, parents are unwilling to send their girls
to school while they are less hesitant to send their boys. For those girls, ―governments need to
build schools or provide school places within culturally acceptable distances from home that
offer culturally appropriate safety measures (for example, boundary walls) as well as sanitary
and water facilities…For example, one-room or two-room schools should be encouraged in some
contexts (such as low population density areas) as the best strategy for making school places
available to girls.‖55 Such specific provisions of public education can mitigate unequal gender
division. Basic income needs to be supplemented with public education. Considering gender
inequality and the gap between the skilled and the unskilled, basic income is by itself unable to
provide equality that substantiates freedom for all. It needs to be coupled with public education
in order to promote equality between skilled workers and unskilled workers, and males and
females.
One more crucial provision remains to be addressed to make basic income adequate for
equality that substantiates freedom for all—public medical service. Without basic income, the
lives of the poor, with relation to health, have been as follows:
the poor suffer worse health and die younger. [F]or poor people especially, health is
also an extremely important economic asset. Their livelihoods depend on it. When a
poor person becomes ill or injured, the entire household can become trapped in a
downward spiral of lost income and high health care costs. The cascading effects may
also include diverting time from generating an income or from schooling to care for the
54

King and Hill, Women's Education in Developing Countries, 294.
Mercy Tembon and Lucia Fort, Girls' Education in the 21st Century: Gender Equality, Empowerment,
and Economic Growth (Washington DC: World Bank, 2008), 288.
55

215

sick. And illness in the family may force the sale of assets – livestock or land required
for livelihoods. More prone to disease and with limited access to health care and social
insurance, poor people are more vulnerable to this downward spiral.56
With basic income, however, the poor can defer such a downward spiral to a certain
extent. While the family takes care of the ill person, they can survive and send their children to
school although the family might have to sell their assets. They can avoid the worst harm they
might have faced, such as starvation, had they not received basic income. But the present
medical system will soon deprive the family of their basic income, specifically, those who live in
poor countries. Such occurrences are based on the fact that the medical system is more hurtful to
the poor in poor countries than in wealthy countries. For instance, the price of medicine is higher
in some developing countries than in developed countries; this is because of ―the logic of profit
maximization.‖57 In addition, public health spending is curtailed by structural adjustment policies
under the pretext of improving the stability of fragile economies of the developing countries. 58
Without addressing the logic of profit maximization in the medical sector, basic income would
soon be useless although it could momentarily postpone a downward spiral.
Without addressing medical issues, basic income is only a half-solution to global
inequality. A humanitarian approach would address global medical issues through medical
voluntarism such as individual donation and public-private partnership without changing the
logic of profit maximization. Petchesky indicates the inability of a humanitarian approach to
address global medical issues. He provides two reasons why humanitarianism and public-private
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partnerships are not workable. The first reason is that since a humanitarian approach is based on
good will and kindness, it does not recognize ―the principle of health as a human right superior to
corporate property rights over life-saving medicines (or services).‖ 59 Without such a whole new
normative system that prioritizes human healthcare over corporate property rights, voluntarism
will end up as an irrelevant humanitarian gesture to helping the ill poor. Even when there is
medical voluntarism, for instance, ―[i]n Zimbabwe, the imposition of user fees for public health
services has been linked to the doubling of maternal mortality in that country, while structural
adjustments have entailed lay-offs of thousands of nurses and doctors.‖60 On the one hand,
voluntary donation and work help the ill poor; on the other, medical system increases user fees
and reduces medical personnel. Criticizing the humanitarian approach, thus, Petchesky concludes,
Humanitarian gestures by drug companies and donor agencies to create ‗equitable‘
responses to health crises are inadequate because they fail to address the systemic roots
of those crises or to require reliable mechanisms of enforcement and accountability,
much less democratic participation in defining solutions by the people most affected
(like pregnant women and all people with AIDS). They continue to treat health as a
commodity and to assume that markets – albeit ‗tiered‘ and adjusted for the poorest –
are sufficient to meet basic health needs. Focusing on AIDS or other epidemic diseases
and defining these as ‗national emergencies‘ or ‗security risks‘ creates an aura of
exceptionalism that ultimately serves to normalize the arbitrary pricing of medical
goods and services and their unequal distribution in nearly all other areas of preventive
and curative health, including reproductive and sexual health61
A humanitarian approach can shield only a few of the ill poor from, but exposes most of them to,
the deadly price of medical goods and services.
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The second reason why a humanitarian approach is inadequate is that ―like many forms
of foreign aid, it lacks long-term sustainability.‖62 In order to have a sustainable medical system,
poor countries should have medical infrastructures that cannot be covered by donation and
affordable drugs. To develop medical infrastructures, resources such as scientific and medical
information, which the poor countries can use freely, are needed. But, there is a fundamental
impediment to the infrastructure development—―the conviction that knowledge and ideas are
private property and greed is the sole force driving the human quest for knowledge.‖63 As long as
property rights are secured in the medical sector, poor countries can hardly have long-term
medical sustainability. Without long-term medical sustainability, the poor will surely be put into
a downward spiral, in spite of a basic income.
In order for the poor to have adequate medical service, medical service should be
transformed into a public service. Observing the inadequacy of medical voluntarism, Petchesky
concludes that ―sustainable solutions to the problems of health and disease that plague Southern
countries and poor people everywhere may be ones that go outside capitalist markets altogether
and return to old-fashioned concepts of the public domain, or the common good, including
essential medicines and health services as a ‗global public good.‘‖64 Put differently, the concrete
others should have a right to public health service, in addition to a basic income. Though we are
a long way from health services as a global public good, many political communities such as
Germany, Scandinavian states, and some East Asian states provide public health service. If every
state adopts public healthcare systems, then all states will have a public health care system and
accordingly proving all individuals health services as a global public good.
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I have reconfigured a basic income guarantee. A basic income guarantee adopts a
differentiated social income in order to be sensitive to individual dignity and to provide
substantial equality for promoting individual difference. However, a differentiated social income
is still inadequate for providing equality that substantiates freedom of all. It needs to be
supplemented by public education and public healthcare as well as by linguistic diversity. The
reconfigured basic income guarantee (RBIG) can provide equality that promotes individual
difference and group difference of individuals.

5.3 Equality between groups
Equality between groups is different from equality within groups. Between groups,
equality promotes group difference, in order for different groups to have sufficient resources for
their internal or external self-determination. In other words, equality between groups is unrelated
to equalization of revenue and resources between groups. In the case of equality within groups, I
explained that equality means least-gap equality and capability equality. Between the two
equalities, only capability equality can be applicable to equality between groups to the extent that
groups can have their external self-determination. Why is least-gap equality not applicable to
equality between groups? What happens when least-gap equality is applied to equality between
groups? It is correct that individuals can achieve least-gap equality whether they belong to the
same group or different groups. If it is applicable to individuals, why is it not applicable to
groups? Primarily because least-gap equality between groups is incompatible with equality
within groups. Groups are different in terms of size of population. Least-gap equality between
groups, then, means that without regard to their size they have the same amount of revenues and
resources. In that case, those who belong to a big group have less income and resource while
those who are members of a small group have more. For instance, a big political community
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needs more resources to provide basic income to its members than a small political community.
However, the least-gap between groups prevents a big political community from having more
resources. Accordingly, least-gap equality between groups is detrimental to equality within
groups, specifically, capability equality. Least-gap equality between groups makes equality
between groups incompatible with equality within groups. In this sense, least-gap equality is
inappropriate for equality between groups. Equality between groups promotes group difference,
which is unrelated to least-gap equality.
If equality between groups means that minority groups can retain their self-determination,
which groups deserve self-determination, either external self-determination (secession) or
internal self-determination (devolution) and on what grounds? When there is a conflict between
self-determination and equality within groups, what is a solution of social multiculturalism?
What groups are eligible for equality between groups? The differentiation between minorities by
force and minorities by will is helpful to identify eligible groups for equality between groups.
Minorities by force are those who want to be assimilated into their majority groups but are
discriminated against by the majority groups. Minorities by will are those who want to preserve
their group differences, which are not respected by their majority groups. Equality between
groups is not necessary for minorities by force; they need only equality within groups. Since
minorities by force experience discrimination by dissimilation, what they need is not selfdetermination but assimilation without discrimination. On the other hand, equality between
groups is necessary for minorities by will who work toward their self-determination, whether it is
external self-determination or internal self-determination.
Among diverse minorities by will, what kind of self-determination is appropriate to each
group? While the perfect solution of a minority by will is ultimately external self-determination,
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that is, an independent state, practical solutions are allotting different degrees of internal selfdetermination to different types of groups. Kymlicka mentions three different types of groups:
indigenous peoples, national minorities, and immigrants. Indigenous peoples are, for instance,
―the Indians and Inuit in Canada, the Aboriginal peoples of Australia, the Maori of New Zealand,
the Sami of Scandinavia, the Inuit of Greenland, and Indian tribes in the United States.‖65
According to Kymlicka, Indigenous people can have a full package of rights such as rights of
land, self-government, language, customary law, and representation in the central government.66
The full package of rights is practically equated with external self-determination. However, since
indigenous people live within their host state, the full package of rights is the strongest form of
internal self-determination. As examples of national minorities, Kymlicka enlists ―the Quebecois
in Canada, the Scots and Welsh in Britain, the Catalans and Basques in Spain, the Flemish in
Belgium, the German-speaking minority in South Tyrol in Italy, and Puerto Rico in the United
States.‖67 For national minorities, equality between groups ensures rights of federal territorial
autonomy, language, representation in the central government, and international recognition.68
The rights of national minorities are weaker than those of indigenous people. Nonetheless,
national minorities with rights can ensure their internal self-determination to a greater extent. In
the case of immigrants, migrants who want to be dissimilated can claim equality between groups
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to a limited extent. The dissimilating migrants are North Africans in Italy, Kosovars in
Switzerland, Turks in Germany, to name but a few.69 For dissimilating immigrants, equality
between groups promotes at least bilingual education and recognition of cultural differences. 70
While these three different degrees of internal self-determination are assigned to three different
types of groups, such an assignment is not fixed one. As Kymlicka admits it is impossible to
preserve a sharp distinction between national minority and indigenous people because they are
―differences of degree, not the difference in kind.‖71 Even immigrants have differences of degree
not in kind, compared to indigenous people or national minorities. As long as immigrants aspire
to be minorities by will by preserving their culture and language, their differences are differences
of degree rather than difference in kind. If differences among indigenous people, national
minorities, and immigrants are differences in degree, assigning fixed types of self-determination
to the three different groups is unjustifiable. In addition, though I agree with him that the main
targets of equality between groups are indigenous people, national minorities, and immigrants in
a current political system, I think that equality between groups is also applicable to groups such
as guest workers and refugees, who have experienced discrimination and/or oppression from
their dominant host groups because of their cultural/linguistic difference. Every
cultural/linguistic group, if it is a minority by will, is eligible for self-determination, not only
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different degrees of internal self-determination, but also ultimately external self-determination.
Nonetheless, there are prerequisites for requesting external self-determination.
I propose two preconditions that justify a minority group‘s request for external selfdetermination: (1) aspiration for external self-determination and (2) ability to sustain equality
within groups. In discussing eligibility of external self-determination of minority groups, I
assume that minority groups belong to their host states that provide least-gap equality and
capability equality. Though there are diverse minorities by will, groups having the aspiration of
external self-determination can request their external self-determination. There may be
minorities by will who may satisfy their internal self-determination given by their host states. For
instance, immigrants, guest workers, or refugees can satisfy their internal self-determination such
as multicultural recognition, bilingual education provision, support of their cultural activities,
and the like. If, however, minorities by will are not satisfied with internal self-determination
provided by their host states, they can request external self-determination.
The other precondition for external self-determination is a group‘s ability to sustain
equality within groups. Suppose that a group of poor guest workers claims their external selfdetermination. The poor guest workers‘ group can request external self-determination, if they
conclude that their discrimination and oppression can only be addressed when they are separated
from the rich employers. However, I have shown in the section of equality within groups, a
political community should have high-income brackets in order to support a basic income
guarantee. The poor guest workers can have self-governance but their members will surely suffer
from lack of resources in providing capability equality and least-gap equality. In this sense,
external self-determination by the poor guest workers is unsustainable and accordingly is
inapplicable to them. For those minority groups who do not have the ability to provide capability
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equality and least-gap equality, different degrees of internal self-determination seem to be
appropriate from the perspective of social multiculturalism.
In light of social multiculturalism, thus, external self-determination (secession) is difficult
for a minority group to achieve. In general, however, minority groups have difficulty in
providing capability equality and least-gap equality to their members since they are economically
disadvantaged groups such as indigenous people, national minorities, immigrants, guest workers,
and refugees. The requirement of equality within groups, then, seems to give minorities no
chance of external self-determination. Why is equality within groups so important for minority
groups to achieve external self-determination? Without the provision of equality within groups, a
group is prone to be swayed by its elites, which produces the internal minority problem. Social
multiculturalism, thus, approves self-determination of a minority group when the group is
prepared to provide its members equality within groups.
Social multiculturalism, in this sense, reveals the conflict between equality between
groups (specifically, external self-determination) and equality within groups (least-gap equality
and capability equality). This conflict leads to an impasse like the situation in which an absolute
majority of a group that is unable to provide equality within groups aspires to external selfdetermination but is not allowed to do so. Since social multiculturalism requires a secessionseeking minority group to provide equality within groups, the group is purported to be ineligible
for secession though an absolute majority of the group claims its secession. In this dilemma,
because an absolute majority of the group claims external self-determination, social
multiculturalism may allow the group to have external self-determination with the proviso that
the group provides at least a minimum of capability equality to its members. In Figure 1, I
identified (1) as a growth-oriented criterion, which is inadequate for equality within groups.
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However, when an absolute majority of a minority group which cannot provide equality within
groups aspires to secession, (1) can be an acceptable criterion as long as it meets basic needs of
members. On the other hand, on the assumption that a host state provides equality within groups
to its contained minority groups, a secession movement of a minority group that cannot meet
even (1) is an unacceptable attempt of equality between groups. Therefore, the minimum of
capability equality is the bottom line within which a minority group can claim its external selfdetermination.
Social multiculturalism, thus, treats unequally its two principles of equality, that is,
equality between groups and equality within groups. Equality within groups is prior to equality
between groups. While priority of equality within groups does not negate equality between
groups, equality within groups is a more fundamental equality than equality between groups. As
long as equality within groups is promoted, equality between groups can be maximized in such a
way that groups can claim their external self-determination. However, when equality between
groups is at odds with equality within groups, the latter has priority over the former. If a group
works toward equality between groups, specifically, its external self-determination, it should
provide at least the minimum of RBIG to its members.
An example of external self-determination that is detrimental to equality within groups
occurs when an independent political community such as a poor country is unable to provide
capability equality and least-gap equality to its own people. Minority groups who belong to their
host states can request equality within groups to the host states. However, if the economy of an
independent political community is not strong enough to provide RBIG to its people, no political
community has direct responsibility for providing basic income to those people. For instance,
there are poor countries in which people are unable to satisfy basic needs. Among poor countries,
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those who have natural resources such as oil and natural gas can provide the minimum of RBIG
to their people. For instance, with oil and natural gas revenue East Timor can provide a monthly
basic income of US$30, which is more than the poverty line (US$20).72 However, some lack
natural resources. Many of Sub-Saharan countries belong to this group. Who is responsible to
provide RBIG to those poor countries? The responsibility goes to the global community in
general and affluent states in particular.
Social multiculturalism requests affluent states to provide at least the minimum of RBIG
to the poor countries. It can be justified by three types of injustice that have shaped a current
world system mentioned by Tomas Pogge: ―the effects of shared social institutions, the
uncompensated exclusion from the use of natural resources, and the effects of a common and
violent history.‖73 Two among the three types of injustice are the responsibility of the global
community: the effects of shared social institutions and a common and violent history. Social
institutions decide the price of primary goods, allocate natural resources, and maintain
international relationships. The survival of the global poor ―often crucially depends on our
consumption choices, which may determine the price of their foodstuffs and their opportunities
to find work.‖74 Poverty and economic crises of poor countries are closely related to a worldwide economic system that is shaped by affluent countries and imposed on poor countries.
Moreover, the global poor are thrown into devastating circumstances which ―are significantly
shaped by a dramatic period of conquest and colonization, with severe oppression, enslavement,
even genocide, through which the native institutions and cultures of four continents were
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destroyed or severely traumatized.‖75 The fact that countless numbers of people and generations
have been affected by a history of colonialism and oligarchic international systems provides
sufficient reason for assigning to the global community in general and affluent countries in
particular the responsibility for providing the minimum of RBIG to poor countries.
The idea of such a responsibility is not a new burden either to the global community or to
affluent countries. For example, ―between 2002 and the end of 2006, East Timor received
US$3.5 billion in aid from the UN and international agencies.‖76 East Timor received annually
US$ 800 million in aid. Considering that monthly US$30 basic income takes US$432 million
annually, East Timor does not need extra international aid.77 What East Timor needs is a counter
to the policies of the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and IMF, since their policies
benefit foreign companies and investors.78 Thus, the responsibility of affluent countries is not
about placing on them a heavy financial burden but to bring about a major restructuring of the
international aid system that mainly benefits foreign companies and investors. Without a large
increase of international aid, the global community can provide a minimum RBIG to poor
countries by restructuring policies of international financial agencies and inducing the poor
countries to adopt an RBIG economic system.

5.4 Conclusion
I have proposed social multiculturalism as the rights of concrete others. Social
multiculturalism promotes equality between groups and equality within groups, unlike liberal
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multiculturalism, which adopts equality between groups and freedom within groups. Social
multiculturalism acknowledges the importance of freedom within groups. However, I have
contended that in liberal multiculturalism freedom remains formal, partial freedom without being
substantiated by equality. Thus, social multiculturalism promotes equality within groups, in order
to substantiate freedom of internal minority. Since equality is thoroughly emphasized in social
multiculturalism, the principle of equality between groups and within groups can be framed as
equality that substantiates freedom of all. Two dimensions of equality that substantiates freedom
of all are capability equality and least-gap equality.
A reconfigured basic income guarantee (RBIG) is a concrete form of equality within
groups. An RBIG is a basic income guarantee (BIG) supplemented by public education, public
healthcare, and linguistic diversity. An RBIG promotes both capability equality and least-gap
equality: it provides a differentiated social income to individuals and, at the same time, lessens
the economic gap between the rich and the poor. The differentiated social income and the least
economic gap ensure promotion and development of individual differences. An RBIG also
promotes linguistic diversity enriches group differences. An RBIG, thus, promotes both
individual differences and group differences.
Equality between groups also plays a constitutive role in promoting individual difference
and group difference. It provides legal, economic, and political protection to groups. Such a
protection of groups is conducive to promoting individual differences of group members. While
equality between groups can promote group differences, in some cases, it conflicts with equality
within groups. Put differently, a minority group may work toward its external self-determination
although it cannot provide equality within groups. In that case, a self-government seeking group
should provide at least the minimum of RBIG to its members, in order to prevent an internal
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minority problem. In the case of independent, poor countries, the global community is
responsible for providing at least the minimum of RBIG to people in the poor countries. In this
way, social multiculturalism, through equality within groups and equality between groups,
promotes individual difference and group difference and accordingly can address oppression and
domination of concrete others.
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Conclusion

Human history continues to include the vulnerable―the poor, the ill, and those
discriminated against, as well as many others who are oppressed, overlooked or forgotten. The
burden of poverty, illness, or discrimination corrodes individual dignity. Though we are
witnessing rapid progress in technology, healthcare, and food production, countless numbers of
people are excluded from the benefits of this human progress. The vulnerable are exposed to
oppression as they experience a lack of basic goods necessary for their capability development,
and to domination as their difference is ignored, neglected, or negated. I have made a brash
attempt to address oppression and domination of the vulnerable peoples by proposing social
multiculturalism as the rights of concrete others. Through social multiculturalism that promotes
both individual difference and group difference of all, I contend that the vulnerable will be able
to address their oppression and domination. Let me summarize how the rights of concrete others
can address oppression and domination of the vulnerable.
In the first chapter, I dealt with the concept of concrete others and an ethics of concrete
others. The Levinasian concept of the other is without doubt a Copernican revolution in framing
the vulnerable: a vulnerable person as the other is Divine other. Whereas the other has been
understood as one who is viewed through the eyes of a subject, Levinas proposes the other as one
who is beyond categorization/valuation by a subject. Put differently, a human being as the other
has a transcendental dimension that cannot be overridden by a subject. Nonetheless, the concept
of the other neglects the immanent dimension of human beings, i.e., their concrete differences. In
reality, those who are vulnerable are experiencing oppression and domination because of their
concrete differences. The concept of the other opens ways of denying the immanent dimension
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of human beings (by rejecting incarnational understanding of human beings), disregarding
concrete differences, and imposing a negative connotation on concrete differences. Because of
the limitation of the concept of the other, I propose the concept of concrete others, which
emphasizes the immanent dimension, the concrete differences, as well as positive engagement of
the vulnerable in immanent dimension of their lives.
Based on the concept of concrete others, I propose an ethics of concrete others as
adequate for addressing oppression and domination of the vulnerable. Several varieties of ethics
have attempted to protect and promote concrete differences of human beings: an ethics of
multitude, an ethics of différance, and an ethics of difference and equality. An ethics of multitude
tries to protect concrete difference by providing equality. Yet, in the final analysis it proves to be
detrimental to protecting concrete difference as its promotion of equality conflicts with
protecting concrete difference. An ethics of différance attempts to protect difference by
respecting concrete difference. However, its exclusive emphasis on concrete difference makes it
impossible to distinguish difference of the colonized from difference of colonizers. An ethics of
equality and difference endeavors to promote both equality and difference rather than promoting
one at the expense of the other. While an ethics of equality and difference designates boundaries
within which both difference and equality can be promoted, it does not clarify the relationship
between equality and difference. I propose an ethics of concrete others, which adopts equality
that is necessary for protecting and substantially promoting difference.
Chapter 2 addressed difference that needs to be substantially promoted by equality. I
delved into two dimensions of difference: group difference and individual difference. Both
differences constitute individual identity. Although a person‘s group difference is distinguishable
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from individual difference, the two are in a constitutive relationship in which they shape each
other. These two differences need to be protected through an ethics of concrete others.
Between the two differences, I focused on group difference, because culture and language
play an indispensable role in shaping individual identity and individual difference. Group
difference provides diverse options for promoting individual difference, while individual
difference is irreducible to group difference. Every individual has group identities as she belongs
to her surrounding society, such as her family, community, and culture. These group identities
are crucial in shaping individual identities. Considering the importance of group identity of every
individual, the rights of concrete others endorses multiculturalism, which recognizes, encourages,
and promotes group identities. Different ways of promoting multiculturalism in the human rights
tradition include: multiculturalism through individual rights, group rights, and liberal
multiculturalism. Both individual rights and group rights have attempted to promote
multiculturalism, but both traditions have failed to protect either individual difference or group
difference. Individual rights focuses exclusively on individual difference and accordingly regards
group difference as a secondary or redundant identity of an individual. Conversely, group rights
prioritizes group difference and consequently neglects individual difference. The two human
rights approaches neglect the constitutive relationship between group identity and individual
identity of an individual. Unlike the first two approaches, liberal multiculturalism acknowledges
the constitutive relationship between the two identities of an individual and accordingly attempts
to promote both differences.
In promoting both individual difference and group difference, liberal multiculturalism
adopts two principles: equality between groups and freedom within groups. By adopting equality
between groups, liberal multiculturalism provides resources to substantially promote group
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differences. For instance, indigenous people can have targeted minority rights; national
minorities can claim generic minority rights; immigrants can request resources for promoting
cultural and linguistic diversity. On the other hand, by promoting freedom within groups, liberal
multiculturalism tries to address the internal minority problem. The internal minority problem
means that respecting group difference causes negligence of individual freedom of group
members. By restricting illiberal practices of minority groups, the principle of freedom within
groups prevents individual difference from being infringed by group differences. Though liberal
multiculturalism tries to protect individual difference, it fails to do so because it endeavors to
promote freedom within groups without recourse to equality that substantiates freedom of all. It
reveals liberal multiculturalism‘s inconsistency. Liberal multiculturalism adopts equality
between groups in order to substantially promote group difference. Nonetheless, in promoting
individual difference, liberal multiculturalism guarantees only freedom within groups rather than
equality within groups. While attempting to restrict illiberal practices of minority groups,
freedom within groups can partially promote individual differences. However, freedom within
groups cannot substantially promote individual difference of members, by neglecting equality
within groups. As a result, individual members, who are unable to promote their freedom, are
prone to be swayed by elites of the groups. In addition, liberal multiculturalism allows states to
postpone providing their minority groups with targeted minority rights, while liberal
multiculturalism is intolerant of illiberal practices of minority groups. Liberal multiculturalism,
thus, reveals its priority of freedom over equality and its limitation in promoting both group
difference and individual difference. Though it prioritizes freedom, liberal multiculturalism fails
to promote individual difference and group difference.
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Chapter 3 investigated why liberalism in general and liberal multiculturalism in particular
prioritize freedom but are unable to substantiate freedom of all. If liberalism prioritizes
individual freedom, every individual should have equality that substantiates her freedom. I
proposed capability equality and least-gap equality as the equality that substantiates individual
freedom of all. Nonetheless, liberal theories negate equality even when freedom is jeopardized.
Isaiah Berlin contends that equality is unrelated to negative freedom. I argued that equality,
specifically, capability equality, is essential for negative freedom. Robert Nozick asserts that
equality is detrimental to freedom. Based on his entitlement theory, Nozick equates freedom with
property rights. However, I have shown that Nozick‘s view of freedom is untenable since his
entitlement theory does not treat every individual as an end and his original acquisition theory is
unjustifiable. While emphasizing treating every individual as an end, Nozick‘s view of freedom
treats the propertyless as mere means. In order to treat every individual as an end, the
propertyless should have at least capability equality.
Unlike Berlin and Nozick, John Rawls accepts the view that freedom is closely related to
equality. Moreover, Rawls contends that primary goods are necessary for individuals to achieve
their ends. Considering that opportunity, income, and wealth are primary goods, Rawls shows
that economic equality is essential for freedom. However, Rawls‘ difference principle allows an
economic gap between the better-off and the worse-off to exist. Since a huge economic gap
between the better-off and the worse-off makes primary goods less available to the worse-off, the
huge inequality can cause a serious problem to the worse-off in achieving their freedom. Thus,
least-gap equality is necessary for the worse-off to achieve their freedom. Nonetheless, Rawls
neither designates limits of the economic gap nor advocates least-gap equality. Ronald Dworkin
prioritizes equality over freedom. His view of equality, as equality of resources, justifies
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ambition-sensitive and endowment-insensitive distribution. His equality of resources can
promote individual freedom of those who have fewer endowments. However, because he allows
private property to be accumulated by individual choice, Dworkin ends up allowing huge
inequality to develop between the rich and the poor. While Rawls and Dworkin accept the
importance of equality in promoting individual freedom, their theories end in negating freedom
of the propertyless. Liberal theories, thus, reveal a priority of private property over individual
freedom.
I contend that liberalism‘s priority of private property over individual freedom is due to a
liberal view of human beings, i.e., liberal individualism. Liberal individualism renders human
beings as self-interested asocial beings. Individuals are asocial beings in that they are separable
from their fellows, their community, and their society, which have no intrinsic meaning to
individuals. In addition, individuals are possessive beings who own their body, life, and labor
power. Though liberal individualism asserts that every individual is equal, it deemphasizes the
constitutive role of the social in shaping individual identity and individual property. When liberal
individuals constitute a commonwealth, the main aim of the commonwealth is to protect
individual freedom and property. However, the commonwealth is prone to prioritize private
property over individual freedom, since the propertied become rulers of the commonwealth
while the propertyless remain just members. Because the commonwealth is governed by the
propertied for the purpose of protecting their property, individual freedom of all is overridden by
private property rights. As long as private property is prior to individual freedom, propertyless
individuals are unable to achieve their freedom that needs to be substantiated by equality. Thus,
liberalism in general and liberal multiculturalism in particular cannot promote individual

235

freedom of all. In order to achieve individual freedom of all, individual freedom needs to be
given a higher priority than private property.
Chapter 4 proposes a view of human beings that offers an alternative to liberal
individualism. I propose social individuality, a view of human beings as social beings based on
Karel Kosik‘s concept of concrete totality. According Kosik, human beings are a concrete
totality. Human beings are not asocial beings; they are thoroughly social beings. Human beings
are both individual beings and social beings in a dialectical way. In other words, while
individuals are irreducible to society and society is not reduced to its individual members, they
constitute each other. According to Anselm Min, a human being is a moment of cosmic totality,
socio-historical totality, and personal totality. A human being is in a state of endless formation
affected by society as well as nature and her self. I have shown how concretely social human
beings are. They are social―biologically, existentially, in their identity formation, and in
production.
Social individuality justifies restrictions on private property. In a society, an individual
produces, owns, and disposes property through interaction with other human beings as well as
material resources. Factors that produce property include capital, labor, and means of production,
to name a few. These property producing elements are socially developed, accumulated,
transmitted, and utilized. Capital is the objectification, alienation, accumulation of human labor.
Human labor is shaped through an institutionalized system of education based on generational
accumulation of human knowledge and techniques. Means of production is the result of
collaboration among scientists, technicians, and workers, whose talents and capacities are
developed by an institutionalized system of education. The social is thus crucial in producing
property. Accordingly, property is social production that does not guarantee individual property
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rights. Rather, property as social production limits the extent of individual property rights. The
common good is the principle that limits the extent of property rights. Put differently, human
beings who are thoroughly interdependent owe to one another a society which provides basic
human needs for all and the basic conditions of social life such as education, medical care, law
enforcement, and the like.
Chapter 5 proposes social multiculturalism as the rights of concrete others. Compared to
liberal multiculturalism, which adopts equality between groups and freedom within groups,
social multiculturalism espouses equality between groups and equality within groups. Through
equality within groups, social multiculturalism attempts to substantially promote freedom within
groups. There are two dimensions of equality within groups. One is equality that is necessary for
developing individual capabilities. The other is equality that guarantees the least gap between the
poor and the rich. Capability equality is prior to least-gap equality. By the priority of capability
equality I mean that equality is mainly for developing individual capabilities and least-gap
equality is meaningless as long as it is detrimental to individual capability development.
Nonetheless, provision of least-gap equality is essential in completing capability equality. While
without capability equality least-gap equality is pointless, capability equality, coupled with leastgap equality, can substantiate freedom of all.
I propose a reconfigured basic income guarantee (RBIG) as a concrete form of both
capability equality and least-gap equality. An RBIG is a reconfigured form of basic income
guarantee (BIG) supplemented by public education, public healthcare, and linguistic diversity
coupled with cultural diversity. A BIG provides basic income that meets basic needs of all
individuals such as food, clothing, shelter, and a sustenance level of education and healthcare.
Nonetheless, BIG is indifferent to public education, public healthcare, and linguistic diversity.
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Public education is necessary for equipping every individual with adequate knowledge to live
with dignity. Public healthcare ensures every individual is free from the vicious cycle of illness
and poverty. Linguistic diversity coupled with cultural diversity promotes group differences of
individuals. The basic income scheme supplemented by public education, public healthcare, and
linguistic diversity provides capability equality. In addition, it ensures least-gap equality to
concrete others, which prevents political manipulation and monopolization of primary goods by
the well-off, yet provides more quantities of freedom.
In terms of equality between groups, equality means substantial support of internal selfdetermination (or sometimes external self-determination) of minority groups. There may be cases
in which equality between groups is in conflict with equality within groups. If a minority group
is unable to provide RBIG to its members, the group is ineligible to request external selfdetermination in principle. Nonetheless, if an absolute majority of the group aspires to external
self-determination, the group can request its external self-determination with the proviso that it
can provide the minimum of capability equality to its members. Another instance of external
self-determination that is incompatible with equality within groups occurs when an independent
poor country is unable to provide RBIG to its people. In this case, the global community in
general and affluent countries in particular has responsibility for providing the minimum of
RBIG to the people of the poor country. In this way, concrete others in the world can have at
least the minimum of RBIG.
Social multiculturalism attempts to address oppression and domination of concrete others.
Through social multiculturalism I have endeavored to overcome two dichotomies that have
aggravated oppression and domination of concrete others. One is a dichotomy between
difference and equality and the other is a dichotomy between individual difference and group
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difference. In terms of the dichotomy between difference and equality, social multiculturalism
regards equality as a crucial foundation of promoting difference. With regard to the dichotomy
between individual difference and group difference, social multiculturalism emphasizes
inseparable relationship between the two. Social multiculturalism thus adopts equality that
substantially promotes both differences of individuals, i.e., equality between groups and equality
within groups. Through equality between groups and equality between groups, the promotion of
both differences is an effective way of mitigating their oppression and domination of concrete
others. Specifically, when a political community can meet the Marxian criterion, concrete others
will best approximate equality that substantiates freedom of all.
Although social multiculturalism proposes the Marxian criterion as the best
approximation of equality that substantiates freedom of all, it is difficult to fully achieve the
Marxian criterion in the current neoliberal economic system. While the Marxian criterion is not
achievable at once, by emphasizing human socialness and individual dignity, social
multiculturalism is a helpful guide for working toward the Marxian criterion, through growing
awareness of individual dignity and a constitutive role of the social in production and identityformation that justifies capability equality and least-gap equality. With the framework of social
multiculturalism, a political community starts with a minimum RBIG, increases the amount of
RBIG, and in due course can promote both individual difference and group difference based on
the sufficient provision of RBIG to the extent of satisfying the Marxian criterion.
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